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Chapter 1
Introduction: criminological 
study on the social organisation 
of business cartels
1. Introduction
In October 2014, the International Council on Clean Transportation published a study 
revealing large discrepancies between official certification standards and real-world exhaust 
emissions from modern diesel cars (Franco, Posada Sanchez, German & Mock 2014). On 
average, Nitrogen oxides (NOx) emissions were seven times higher than the limit. Tests were 
conducted using three cars, two of which were Volkswagen cars. The American Environmental 
Protection Agency and California Air Resources Board posed questions to Volkswagen (VW) 
in the US, after which VW eventually admitted having used false software to rig the testing 
procedures for new cars (Reuters 2015). This case is also known as the Emission scandal or 
Diesel gate. However, on the back of Diesel gate was the discovery of an even bigger and 
underlying scheme between five car manufacturers: VW, Audi, Porsche, BMW and Daimler. 
Since the 1990’s, between these five manufacturers two hundred employees in over sixty 
working groups made agreements on car technologies, costs, suppliers, and market allocation 
(Dohmen & Hawranek 2017). Journalists Dohmen and Hawranek -Der Spiegel- state it is 
one of the biggest cartels in the history of Germany. Besides financial damages to costumers, 
a lack to innovate and improve technologies for cleaner emissions and agreements to delay 
introduction of these technologies affected public health. Poor air quality causes thousands of 
premature deaths through NOx-gasses (Dohmen & Hawranek 2017).
Cooperative behaviour is often associated with beneficial outcomes and positive externalities. 
For example, cooperation in light of achieving global climate goals, improving sustainability 
of products, or exchanging knowledge on health and safety practices. These are considered 
positive aims achievable through cooperation between organisations. However, some forms of 
cooperation and collaboration have detrimental consequences, as the example demonstrates. 
In other words, cooperation can be for good or for bad. This study deals with the shadow side 
of cooperation. This study deals with a type of cooperation that is forbidden by law because 
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of its negative effects, namely business cartels. Business cartels entail cooperation between 
firms in the same or similar area of economic activity trying to avoid competition between 
them by controlling the market through e.g. fixing prices, dividing customers or rigging tender 
procedures. By effect, cartels drive up prices, decrease costumer choice, limit opportunities 
for new businesses to enter the market, hinder innovation and negatively affect the quality of 
products. In addition, cartels are often associated with draining public funding, for example 
in case of cartels in construction industry, pharmaceutical and other healthcare industries. 
Therefore, cartels can also negatively impact public health. Insight into the nature and structure 
of cartels is necessary for prevention and disruption of cartels in order to minimise their 
negative impacts in society.
Cartel agreements need an organising structure, a system of communication and a way to 
prevent or resolve conflicts, just like other forms of organised cooperation. At the same time, 
participants to a cartel seek to avoid detection of their illegal agreements. Those two elements 
are central to this thesis and are illustrated by this example of a seminal European case: the 
European Vitamin cartels.
In 2001, the European Commission fined eight companies a total of €855,22 million for 
multiple secret price-fixing and market-sharing cartels in vitamin products. In the words 
of the then European Commissioner for Competition Mario Monti: “the most damaging 
series of cartels the commission has ever investigated” (EC 2001, Press release IP/01/1625). 
The cartels were characterised by both a highly formal nature as well as elaborate efforts 
to ensure secrecy. Regular meetings conducted on three corporate levels demonstrated the 
structured nature of the cartel. Top executives met once a year in “summit” conferences, 
staged in luxurious hotels and resorts to set the cartel’s “budget”. The managers, one level 
below the executives, followed up the conferences with “Shareholder Meetings” to set and 
monitor quotas and settle on mutual compensations. Lastly, regional managers met quarterly 
to talk prices and volumes and communicate back to the global sales managers (Connor, 
2001). Secrecy was organised by instructing participants to destroy the minutes of their 
meetings. Some meetings were held in Basel (Switzerland) because participants thought 
European jurisdiction did not apply there. When the industry was under investigation, cartel 
participants used burner phones and switched cars in an attempt to avoid detection from 
regulators.
Conflicts between cartelists, cartelists cheating on agreements or cartelists denouncing the 
cartel to the authorities all form internal threats to the stability of business cartels. Such 
internal threats are all the more pressing today, now that cartel agreements are subject to 
administrative, private or criminal legal sanctions globally. Therefore, cartelists need to prevent 
or resolve internal conflicts and ward-off threats to the stability of the agreements without the 
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use of legal means, such as formal arbitration or enforceable contracts, available to legitimate 
collaborations. This is why cartelists are known to establish several clandestine coordination and 
communication techniques. Sometimes these techniques result in a highly formalised structure, 
as the example of the Vitamin cartels demonstrates. In other cases, cartel agreements revolve 
around more informal ‘understandings’ between competitors. Ironically, when the cartel is 
exposed or detected, the result of internal communication is often a paper trail that will serve 
as evidence for the conduct and involvement of individual participants.
Paoli (2002) describes how criminals operating in illegal markets face the need to operate 
both without and against the state (i.e. law). First, because goods and services provided by 
illegal market suppliers are prohibited, they cannot resort to state institutions to enforce 
contracts. Because of the lack of institutional trust, interpersonal trust becomes essential 
in illegal networks. Second, illegal market suppliers have to operate under threat of arrest 
and confiscation of their assets by law enforcement (Fijnaut & Paoli 2006). In analogy to 
Paoli’s description of organised criminals, cartelists also have to operate without and against 
the law. Constraints revolve around the interaction between cartelists (without the law) and 
between cartelists and regulators (against the law/state). First, cartelists have to manage their 
illegal agreements and solve potential conflicts without legally enforceable contracts. Without 
institutional trust in the form of agreements backed by legal provisions, interpersonal trust will 
prove essential for cartelists. Second, cartelists have to operate under the threat of detection 
and punishment of their agreements or defection because regulators reward confessions 
with sanction immunity (leniency). These constraints have increased in recent decades due 
to a change in cartel enforcement in Europe and globally. Regulation and enforcement of 
cartels have moved from a position of relative tolerance (outside the US) towards increased 
criminalisation. A growing number of countries across the globe introduced rules prohibiting 
cartels and strict criminal or administrative punishments, ranging from high monetary fines to 
prison sentences. Especially cartel enforcement by the European Commission and in European 
Union member states, this process accelerated over the past three decades, and brought cartel 
regulation and enforcement in the EU closer to the longstanding and stricter criminal law cartel 
enforcement tradition in the US.
Despite the increased regulation and enforcement of cartel conduct however, recently detected 
cases in Europe demonstrate how cartels last for years or even decades before they are uncovered. 
These detected cases show how cartel conduct can be systemic to an entire industry sector. This 
prompts the question central to this research, which is how cartel agreements manage to 
endure despite increased efforts to discourage and punish them. In this thesis, the approach 
to the research question focuses on the social organisation of cartels and the interaction 
between cartels and enforcement. The social dynamics within and relational and structural 
networks around cartels are examined to determine how businesses succeed to cooperate 
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without and against the law. Paragraph 1 is an introduction to this study. In paragraph 2, 
existing criminological studies on business cartels are discussed. Paragraph 3 introduces the 
theoretical perspective of this study that is complementary to the existing literature. Paragraph 
4 deals with the legal and regulatory context of this study: the global criminalisation of business 
cartels and the specific European setting of cartel regulation and enforcement in comparison 
to the US. Paragraph 5 outlines the structure of the thesis, the research question, sub questions 
and the research methods.
1.1 Defining cartels
Harding and Joshua (2010) developed a general and broad definition of cartels as: “An 
organization of independent enterprises from the same or similar area of economic activity, 
formed for the purpose of promoting common economic interests by controlling competition 
between themselves” (p. 12). This definition defines cartels as a form of organisation, conducted 
by firms in the same market, trying to control competition. The Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) defines cartels as: “an anticompetitive agreement, 
anticompetitive concerted practice, or anticompetitive arrangement by competitors to fix 
prices, make rigged bids (collusive tenders), establish output restrictions or quotas, or share or 
divide markets by allocating customers, suppliers, territories or lines of commerce.” The OECD 
definition is more specific, in that it points to the different types of cartel agreements and is 
more closely related to legal definitions.
There are four types of cartel conduct: price-fixing, bid rigging, market allocation and 
information exchange. First, in price fixing cartels, businesses make explicit agreements on the 
price of goods and services. Price-fixers will often arrange regular meetings to discuss the market 
and collectively determine prices and strategies to control the market through controlling 
prices. A well-known example of a price-fixing cartel is the American investigation into the 
international ADM lysine cartel (see Box 1.1) that ultimately led to investigations into the 
European Vitamin cartels. Second, in bid rigging cartels, companies agree who gets a project in 
a tendering procedure. They submit bids pretending they are competitive but raise prices 
artificially, determining the winner beforehand. Bid riggers take turns in winning and often 
even out disparities through compensations at the end of the year. Bid rigging often occurs in 
the construction industry and in public procurement. Well-known cases of bid rigging include 
the New York construction industry (Jacobs, Friel & Raddick 1999), the Dutch construction 
fraud (Hertogh 2010; Van de Bunt 2010; Van den Heuvel 2005) and the construction cartels 
in Quebec, Canada (Reeves-Latour & Morselli 2017). Third, market allocation can take two 
forms: dividing costumers or dividing markets geographically into regions and agreeing not to 
compete outside of one’s own territory. Costumer division agreements operate through 
costumer lists and either a rule about not targeting other cartelists’ ‘A-relations’, or flexible rules 
including financial compensation in case costumers assigned to other cartelists are acquired 
17
1
despite efforts of allocating them. Fourth, the EU recently included ‘information exchange’ in 
the legal concept of cartels in the European guidelines on horizontal agreements. This means 
non-explicit and/or one-sided information exchanges concerning information contributing to 
market transparency and predictability can constitute a cartel and be punished likewise. 
Conceptually, this introduces a new category of cartels, but in legal practice information 
exchange so far has only been used in connection to one of the other types of conduct and as 
supporting evidence to reconstruct a continuous cartel infringement. Lastly, although these 
types of conduct can theoretically be separated, in practice cartels are often a combination of 
different strategies and methods used to execute agreements aimed at controlling the market.
Corporate and white-collar criminology define cartels as a classic form of white-collar crime. 
Conceptual debates aside, white-collar crime is generally defined as: “illegal or unethical acts 
that violate fiduciary responsibility of public trust committed by an individual or organization, 
usually during the course of legitimate occupational activity, by persons of high or respectable 
social status for personal or organizational gain” (Helmkamp, Ball & Townsend 1996: 351). 
According to Friedrichs (2010) white-collar crime is characterised by the following criteria: “it 
(1) occurs in a legitimate occupational context; (2) is motivated by the objective of economic 
gain or occupational success; and (3) is not characterized by direct, intentional violence” (p. 5). 
Likewise, cartel conduct takes place within the conventional nature of doing business, namely 
the process of increasing predictability and decreasing risks. In principle, cartelists act in the 
interest of increasing stability and profitability of their companies, however using illegitimate 
or criminal means to that end and potentially damaging the public or consumers. Also, business 
BOX 1.1
ADM Lysine Cartel: the FBI Informant
One of the world’s most well-known price-fixing cases is the international Lysine cartel. This 
was a global cartel between Archer Daniels Midland (ADM), a US based food processing 
company, and its Japanese and Korean competitors. Lysine is a widely used animal food 
additive, an essential amino acid that speeds up the formation of lean meat on farm animals. 
During the mid 1990s, the companies involved in the cartel conspired to fix prices and 
managed to raise prices for lysine up to 70%. The Vice-President of ADM, Marc Whitacre, 
eventually became an FBI informant and revealed the cartel through secret tapings of the 
meetings. Marc Whitacre’s story is remarkable in several ways and resulted in both a book 
‘The Informant’ by writer Kurt Eichenwald and a movie with the same title, starring Matt 
Damon. Conley & O’Barr (1997) describe the ADM story as the result of a classic autocratic 
top-down corporate culture, in their article ‘Crime and Customs in Corporate Society:  
A Cultural Perspective on Corporate Misconduct’.
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cartels are not usually associated with the use of violence, although there are exceptions (see 
chapter 4). In addition, cartels can be defined more narrowly as corporate crime. Braithwaite 
(1984) defines corporate crime as: “conduct of a corporation, or of employees acting on behalf 
of a corporation, which is proscribed and punishable by law” (p. 6). Comparable to Sutherland 
(1949), this definition avoids legalistic discussions about whether conduct that is not punishable 
by criminal law falls within the definition. Likewise, this study applies this broad definition, 
because criminal, administrative and private legal sanctions shift throughout time and vary 
between jurisdictions for the same conduct. However, these regional differences and the moral 
ambiguity that it expresses are relevant and will be addressed throughout this study.
2. Criminological studies on business cartels
To understand how the nature and structure of cartels enables them to endure, we first need to 
understand what causes the existence of cartels in the first place. This research therefore builds 
on existing social-legal and criminological studies that focus on the motives and opportunities 
for individuals and organisations to get involved in cartel agreements. These studies result 
in two main conclusions. First, increasing predictability of business and reducing risks and 
uncertainties of a competitive market are important drivers for cartelists to get involved in 
cartel agreements; and illegal conduct is effectively neutralised and rationalised by cartelists. 
Second, motives and rationalisations for cartel conduct are socially embedded in collectivistic 
business cultures that cultivate cooperation, collaboration and anti-competition sentiments at 
odds with (changing) cartel legislation and regulation. These are two main points of departure 
in the analysis of social organisation of cartels in this study.
2.1 Motives for involvement in cartel agreements
Many empirical studies explain cartel conduct using some version of a cost benefit analysis, 
rooted in rational choice theory, e.g. strain (cf. Paternoster & Simpson 1996). Jamieson (1994) 
looks at all antitrust violations (242) in the US among Fortune 500 firms between 1981 and 
1985. She reviews causes on both the level of the firm as well as the level of the industry and 
market. Jamieson describes cartels as “an initial aversive response to the turbulent field” (p. 
96) and notes how “rational corporate structures require organizational members to translate 
environmental uncertainty into something predictable” (p. 25). In other words, cartels are a 
means to an end for corporations attempting to manage the uncertain environment in which 
they operate: a competitive and ever-changing market. Cartels are a response at the corporate 
and individual level as a result of interacting with uncertainty on a macro level. Likewise, Geis 
(1967) in his seminal case study on the heavy electric antitrust cartels in the US, points to “the 
avoidance of uncertainty, the formalization and predictability of outcome, the minimization 
of risk” (p. 130) as drivers for cartel conduct. Sonnenfeld & Lawrence (1978) studied the 
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folding carton industry in the US, using qualitative interviews with executives of four of the ten 
largest producers in the industry. The study of Sonnenfeld and Lawrence found that price fixing 
constituted an attempt to translate uncertainty, and corporate and executive ‘vulnerability’ 
into ‘a form of rationality that the internal corporate structure could manage’ (cf. Jamieson, 
1994, p. 18). Agnew, Piquero and Cullen (2009) affirm how economic strain is a substantiated 
theoretical explanation for white-collar crime, and also note how this economic strain works 
reversely through the ‘fear of falling’. This fear of falling is best described as an anticipated 
strain, especially applicable to white-collar workers, regarding losing the success and status 
people have achieved throughout their career. This strain can induce crime in an attempt 
to avoid anticipated losses. Again, this explanation rests on a rational choice perspective. In 
this rational choice perspective offenders are viewed as rational, profit-seeking entrepreneurs, 
involved in activities that are driven by the same laws of supply and demand as legal activities 
(Kleemans 2013) (cf. Becker 1968).
The studies discussed so far are all cross-sectional in design and generally depart from detected 
cases, either using large quantitative databases from enforcement agencies or conducting 
interviews and case study analyses. Studies that adopt a longitudinal approach explain cartel 
conduct by looking at the individual life-course of offenders (Wheeler, Weisburd, Waring and 
Bode 1988; Weisburd, Wheeler, Waring & Bode 1991; Weisburd & Waring 2001; Piquero 
& Weisburd 2009). These studies connect characteristics of the offender (age, race, sex etc.), 
with characteristics of the offense. This results in categories of offenders, including high rate 
persistent group of offenders labelled ‘stereotypical criminals’, an intermittent group pattern of 
offending called ‘opportunity seekers’, and a low-rate group of offenders named ‘opportunity 
takers’ and ‘crises responders’ (Weisburd & Waring 2001). Studies concerning the life-course 
of white-collar criminals demonstrate that cartelists: 1) are repeat offenders; 2) begin their 
criminal ‘careers’ at a later age compared to other types of offenders; and 3) have a lower 
frequency of offending compared to other types of offenders (cf. Weisburd, Chayet & Waring 
2016). This affirms claims by Sutherland (1949) and Connor (2010) that cartel conduct is 
reoccurring, and cartelists are often recidivists (repeat offenders).
2.2 Opportunities for involvement in cartel agreements
Besides push factors that motivate firms to engage in cartel conduct, there are pull factors 
that create opportunities for cartel agreements. Criminal opportunities for cartel agreements 
include: high barriers for market entry, a low number of players in the market (high market 
concentration) and homogeneity of products (Benson & Simpson 2009; Jamieson 1994; Punch 
1996; Sonnenfeld & Lawrence 1978). Barriers for market entry may concern high research and 
development costs, high costs of transportation or patents, licences and permits (e.g. related 
to environmental sustainability or safety). These barriers make a market more closed to new 
entrants and by effect more predictable for the existing players in it. Firms in markets with high 
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entry barriers will also have a higher chance of being well acquainted with their competitors. 
For the number of firms in a market a similar argument can be made; less players results in 
more opportunity for being well acquainted with your competitors. However, when it comes to 
the number of players in a market, Jamieson (1994) questions: “does the greater concentration/
higher profitability configuration relieve organizations from financial pressures to violate the 
law? Or, does greater concentration facilitate collusion that, in turn, accounts for the greater 
profits of these corporations” (p. 25). In other words, a low number of participants in a market 
might facilitate cartels but make the need for collusion less pressing. The same goes for high 
barriers of entry; they might facilitate (existing) cartels, but decrease the need for a cartel, 
because if the potential of new entries is low, the market is already predictable so there is no 
need for cartel agreements. Lastly, higher product homogeneity makes it easier for competitors 
to fix cartel agreements. Products like cement, flour, oil etc. have a clear volume and day price. 
This makes the market more transparent and predictable, which also facilitates agreements 
between competitors and enforcing those agreements effectively (Benson & Simpson 2009).
2.3 Neutralisations and rationalisations for involvement in cartel agreements
Neutralisations are a type of cognitive dissonance connected to crime and invoked in the 
human brain to decrease effective self-control previous to engaging in a criminal or deviant act 
(neutralisation) or after a criminal or deviant act (rationalisation). Neutralisation techniques are 
originally described in a study on youth crime by Sykes and Matza (1957) and were later applied 
to corporate crime (Box 1983; Piquero, Tibbetts & Blankenship 2005; Agnew et al. 2009). These 
neutralisation techniques include denying responsibility; denying victims and damage; claiming 
regulation inhibits growth and prosperity; or appealing to higher loyalties like continuity of the 
firm and providing employment for personnel. An example of denying victims and damage is the 
much-referenced quote by a Westinghouse executive (in answering questions from the prosecutor) 
in the study by Gilbert Geis (1967) on the heavy electrical equipment cartels: “Illegal? Yes, but 
not criminal. (…) I assumed that criminal action meant damaging someone, and we did not do 
that” (p. 67). Besides techniques of neutralisation, Benson’s (1985) study on antitrust violations 
demonstrates how cartelists rationalise their conduct by explaining it with existing traditions in 
the market. Certain forms of cooperation or market sharing are part of standing practices and 
customs in the industry. Offenders claim that standing practices and agreements (while laws and 
regulations changed) forced them into breaking the law. One or more of three factors generally 
affect the above-described explanations: 1) personal values and norms 2) corporate culture, and 
3) industry culture. Cartel conduct is rooted in principles, norms, motives and opportunities and 
can, over time, become ingrained in traditions and customs within a corporation, a profession or 
an industry as a whole (cf. Conley and O’Barr 1997). Neutralisation techniques are part of this 
process. For example, Sutherland (1949) notes how trade associations not only provide a formal 
organisation that can be used for coordination purposes, but also as “an agency for developing 
consensus regarding competition” (p. 70). Sutherland describes the sentiment against competition 
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that is cultivated within the context of trade associations: “participants in these associations hear 
frequently of ‘ruinous price wars’, ‘cut-throat competition’, ‘stabilizing the industry’ and ‘live and 
let live’. They have developed contempt for ‘price cutters’ and ‘price chisellers’ (...). Price cutting is 
one of the heinous sins of businessmen in this anomalous period in which businessmen talk of the 
virtues of free competition and free enterprise. Price cutters such as Ford, Firestone, and Macy’s 
have been very unpopular among their business associates” (p. 70-71).
Although many criminological studies on cartel conduct do acknowledge the essential role 
social interactions and networks play in cartel conduct, they do not make it the focal point of 
their study and hereby neglect to actually analyse the nature and structure of cartel networks 
systematically. Baker and Faulkner (1993) point out: “Shapiro’s (1980) conclusion about 
criminology still applies to the study of price-fixing conspiracies: “The study of crime and 
deviant behaviour has been negligent, particularly in recent years, in its lack of attention to 
the form and social organization of criminal activity. We know a great deal about criminals ... 
but very little about the activity itself ” (p. 29; also see Wheeler 1976)” (p. 842). For cartels, 
this gap is still insufficiently filled in the literature. To the contrary, criminological studies on 
organised crime have focused on the form and organisation of criminal activities over the past 
decades (cf. Morselli 2009; Kleemans & Van de Bunt 1999; 2003) and have incorporated 
insights from social network analysis. This has resulted in important findings, such as how 
organised criminal groups are often not hierarchically structured but operate through diverse 
social networks that are embedded in existing relations and institutions (Kleemans & De Poot 
2008). Another insight from criminological studies on organised crime is the demand for 
communication structures and the development of alternative means and strategies to build 
trust between cooperating criminals. The insights from criminological studies on organised 
crime have had major societal impact in the past 40 years. Research findings have changed and 
shaped criminal policy and enforcement strategies of organised crime around the world. This 
demonstrates the potential of an approach focused on the organisation of criminal conduct.
Within the criminological study on corporate and white-collar crime, a lack of attention 
towards the form and organisation of corporate crime in the past has inspired several white 
collar and corporate crime scholars to adopt a similar approach for the study of corporate and 
white-collar crimes. In the literature on corporate crime, an increasing number of studies now 
examine the organisation of corporate crime and its embeddedness in existing social structures 
(cf. Edwards & Levi 2008; Levi 2008a; Levi 2008b; Lord & Levi 2017; Van Erp 2018). These 
scholars also incorporate insights from social network analysis. So far, scholarship has barely 
dealt with the topic of cartel conduct using this approach, with the exception of some studies 
in the field of social network analysis (cf. Baker & Faulkner 2009). These studies demonstrate 
how the significance of trust and communication influences the structure of covert networks 
like cartel agreements (see Chapter 3).
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Two observations after this overview of criminological studies on cartels: the existing literature 
focuses on motives, rationalisations and opportunities for initial involvement in cartel conduct, 
and predominantly so for a non-European context (mainly US based).
First, most of the criminological studies on cartels focus on individual or organisational 
motives, rationalisations and opportunities that explain why people get involved in cartel 
conduct. Focussing on factors that explain why people get involved in cartels, these studies 
deal less with the collective aspects associated with cooperating in illegality and the question 
how offenders deal with the constraints of coordinating and concealing their conspiracy. In 
other words, existing studies deal with how cartels arise or originate, but insufficiently explain 
how cartelists continue or sustain their illegal agreements. The scholarly contribution of an 
approach that does focus on the organisational and collective aspects of crime are demonstrated 
by criminological studies on organised crime. Criminological studies on organised crime have 
incorporated insights from social network analysis and focus on the social embeddedness of 
crime in professional networks and institutions. Although the criminological discourse on 
corporate and white-collar crime is focussing more attention towards organisational aspects of 
crimes such as fraud, embezzlement and corruption, studies have not applied this approach to 
business cartels.
Second, existing criminological studies on business cartels are mostly US-based as a result of a 
longer tradition of criminalisation and criminal law enforcement in the US, as opposed to the 
European Union. Because of this, the existing body of research insufficiently takes into account 
specific European legal and cultural contexts. Regulation and enforcement of cartels in Europe 
has traditionally been a matter of administrative rather than criminal sanctions. In Europe, 
cartel conduct is associated with much more ambiguity and regional differences towards the 
wrongfulness and type of punishment than in the US.
Hence, a gap in current research lies in studying how social network dynamics between 
cartelists and between the cartel and the regulator contribute to the continuation or endurance 
of existing cartel agreements within a European context. This study addresses that gap by using 
a perspective that incorporates social dynamics of cartels in a European context. The following 
section describes this embedded perspective.
3. Towards an embedded perspective on the organisation of 
cartel conduct
Cartel conduct is embedded economic action. Cartel agreements are economically motivated, as 
discussed previously, but they take place in a social and cultural context that influences the nature 
and structure of these agreements. The term embeddedness was introduced by Karl Polanyi (1944) 
and refers to the degree non-economic institutions constrain economic activities. DiMaggio & 
Zukin (1990): “We use “embeddedness” broadly to refer to the contingent nature of economic 
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action with respect to cognition, culture, social structure and political institutions” (p.15). 
DiMaggio & Zukin (1990) distinguish four types of embeddedness: cognitive, cultural, social 
and political embeddedness. First, cognitive embeddedness refers to mental processes that limit 
the exercise of economic reasoning, for example bounded rationality (Simon 1987). Second, 
cultural embeddedness refers to shared or collective understandings that shape economic 
strategies and goals. For example, limits to trading between ritually classified groups or cultural 
norms of integrity causing people not to cheat even if they could get away with it. Third, social 
embeddedness refers to the networks of social interaction in which economic action takes place. 
For example, dealing with the significance of trust and reciprocity in business transactions and 
relations. Fourth, political embeddedness refers to the sources and means of economic action 
that reflect inequalities of power (Dimaggio & Zukin 1990). These power imbalances can 
derive from legal systems, for example in case of property rights the owner is the power-holder, 
for they control the relevant criteria in certain economic activities.
This study seeks to explain the longevity of cartel agreements by studying social and cultural 
explanations for the social organisation of business cartels. In analogy to Paoli’s (2002) 
description of criminal networks, cartels face the need to operate both without and against the 
state. And as mentioned before, this increases the significance of trust and communication 
between cartelists. The nature and structure of those social interactions can prove to be an 
important explanation for the longevity of cartels. Therefore, cultural and social embeddedness 
of cartel agreements are relevant to this study. Although cultural embeddedness and social 
embeddedness can theoretically be distinguished, they are closely interconnected. Social 
embeddedness is both the outcome and the input of cultural embeddedness and vice versa. 
3.1 Cultural embeddedness of business cartels
A classic study in the field of white-collar criminology provides a perspective on cultural 
embeddedness of cartel conduct. Sutherland (1949) describes the ideology in which price fixing 
is embedded as private collectivism and explains it as follows:
“During the last century this economic system has changed. The restrictions on free competition 
has been substituted a system of private collectivism. To a great extent prices, profits the 
flow of capital, and other economic phenomena are determined by formal and informal 
organizations of businessmen. In this private collectivism the public is not represented, and 
the interests of the public receive consideration primarily in the advertisements issued by 
the corporations. This private collectivism is very similar to socialism in its departure from 
free enterprise and free competition, but differs from socialism in that it does not include 
representation and consideration of the public” (p. 84).
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Sutherland explains price fixing conduct through the cultural process of socialisation. He 
demonstrates how attitudes towards crime and neutralisation techniques are learned through 
a social learning process of associating with relevant others. Sutherland developed this 
idea into the theory of differential association (Sutherland, Cressey and Luckenbill 1995). 
Regarding price fixing, he points to a cultural explanation including a fundamentally different 
ideology among businessmen that departs from the ideals behind formal legislation. Whereas 
Sutherland refers to the American context, Stephan (2010) discusses how also in Europe social 
norms favourable to collusion and collectivistic business cultures can undermine cartel laws. 
Regulation and enforcement of cartels are locally implemented and confronted with differences 
in local social norms and business cultures in European national member states. Using several 
examples, Stephan illustrates how social norms favourable to collusion make it less likely 
costumers will report cartel conduct to the authorities. Stephan describes how cooperative 
behaviour and group membership are important in being successful in business. Cartels are not 
universally perceived as morally wrong or harmful, like e.g. theft (Whelan 2013). Throughout 
history, governments and legislators outside of the US have treated cartels as furthering public 
interest and have been tolerant towards competition restricting conduct of private firms. These 
norms can be persistent and can remain supported or adhered to in certain social groups, like 
an industry or market, even if regulations shift on a national level.
The lack of public support for legal rules can have far reaching consequences. Regarding 
this issue, Christine Parker (2006) introduces the term ‘compliance trap’. She demonstrates 
how simple deterrence often fails to produce compliance commitment because it does not 
incorporate business sentiments on the morality of the regulated conduct (‘deterrence trap’). 
By the use of responsive regulation, regulators seek to build moral commitment to compliance 
with the law. Regulators can overcome the deterrence trap by using moral judgment in their 
enforcement strategies. However, this can lead to the ‘compliance trap’. With the compliance 
trap Parker refers to the lack of popular and political support regarding the moral seriousness 
of cartel laws. In this case, cartelists interpret the moral message as stigmatising and unfair 
and this will likely have a negative effect on their long-term compliance with the law, as was 
the case is Australian cartel enforcement. In later studies, amongst Australian cartelists, Parker 
(2012; 2013) demonstrates how business people’s knowledge about the law is less important 
than their relationship or distance from the law. Parker’s interviews with 25 convicted 
cartelists provide insight into the legal consciousness of business people regarding changing 
cartel regulations. The results demonstrate the moral ambivalence towards cartel conduct and 
the ambiguity around what it means to act economically. Parker shows how the rhetoric of 
cartel criminalisation focuses to simplistically on calculated self-interest as the motivation 
for compliance, ignoring the normative and social contexts in which cartel behaviour occurs. 
Parker underlines the importance of collective beliefs and social control within certain markets 
and industries generating and cultivating existing cartel conduct.
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Socio-legal research generally shows discrepancies between the convictions and attitudes of 
e.g. business professionals on the one hand and legislators or lawyers on the other. These 
discrepancies are connected to what Falk Moore (1973) defines as semi-autonomous social 
fields. These semi-autonomous social fields are not completely isolated or fully autonomous but 
do have the capacity of generating rules and conformity to those rules (cf. Meerts 2018; Falk 
Moore 1973). Ewick and Silbey (1998) developed a theory of ‘legal consciousness’ in which 
they identified three types of legal consciousness: ‘before the law’, ‘with the law’, or ‘against the 
law’. Legal consciousness refers to the legal ‘temperature’ in a semi-autonomous social field. 
This legal temperature relates to people’s attitudes about the law within certain sub-cultures 
or organisational fields, like a business culture in a line of industry, a profession or a corporate 
culture. This is well illustrated by a study of the Dutch construction cartels, in which Hertogh 
(2010) applies legal consciousness to describe the differences between attitudes towards ‘fair 
competition’ in the Dutch construction industry and the formal legal rules and regulations 
on competition. Van de Bunt (2010) demonstrates how a powerful informal social norm of 
‘fair sharing’ within the Dutch construction industry explains the continuation of bid rigging 
conduct. Despite the fact this conduct was at odds with the changing legalisation in Dutch 
competition law, which prohibit cartels. These studies demonstrate how cultural context proves 
crucial in explaining cartel conduct in a changing legal and regulatory landscape.
With regard to semi-autonomous social fields, another example of cultural embeddedness of 
economic action that relates to cartels is the concept of a ‘moral economy’ (Thompson, 1971; 
Scott 1976). Thompson (1971) describes how poor peasants - during the English food riots of 
the late 18th century - established their own peaceful political culture with their own informal 
norms. They set the price for products amongst themselves and lived by the principle that a fair 
price was more important to the community than a free market price, punishing large farmers 
who sold their surpluses for a different price. Scott (1976) continued to work on the concept 
of a moral economy in the context of peasant communities and formulated the principles 
participants lived by, namely being ‘risk-averse’ (reluctant towards introducing new techniques 
and innovation) and providing ‘subsistence insurance’ for all participants of the community. 
Scholars use the concept of moral economy to refer to the interplay between customs or norms 
on the one hand and economic action on the other, and to explain why economic actors will 
sometimes conform to social pressure or traditions at the expense of chances to increase profits.
3.2 Social embeddedness of business cartels
Mark Granovetter (1985) developed the concept of social embeddedness of economic action 
that is extensively used in economic sociology. In his seminal article Social Structure and 
Economic Action Granovetter (1985) demonstrates how the structure of relations between actors 
is essential in explaining economic outcomes. This insight has been central in social network 
analysis since (Baker & Faulkner 2009). Social embeddedness is widely used in studies on 
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organised crime (cf. Gambetta 2009; Kleemans & Van de Bunt 1999; Wang 2017). Studies 
on organised crime describe how and explain why criminal activities are structurally and 
relationally embedded. This embeddedness concerns institutional aspects, such as the role of 
licit organisations, services, and communication platforms, and the function of social relations 
of criminal network participants with people outside or inside the periphery of the criminal 
network. Particularly the role of facilitators is discussed in studies on organised crime (cf. 
Morselli & Giguère 2006; Kleemans & Van de Bunt 2003; Van Koppen, De Poot, Kleemans 
& Nieuwbeerta 2009). Facilitators can range from bystanders to actively involved actors that 
contribute to the execution of the activities by the criminal network.
As mentioned, in the literature on corporate crime an increasing number of studies examine the 
organisation of corporate crime and its embeddedness in social structures (cf. Edwards & Levi 
2008; Levi 2008a; Levi 2008b; Lord & Levi 2017). Corporate crime differs from organised 
crime in that, by definition, it deals with serious crime in otherwise formal networks, although 
this is possible but not necessarily the case for organised crime (cf. Fear 2006; Lord, Van 
Wingerde & Campbell 2018). Cartels can be understood similarly, to consist of illegal activities 
that take place within the normal course of doing business: namely, within licit organisations 
(cf. Braithwaite 1989; Clinard & Yeager 1980; Jamieson 1994). Such an approach offers insight 
into how participants within cartels work together to overcome the constraints of working 
without and against the law (and state) in order to explain the longevity of cartels.
John Braithwaite’s (1984) work on corporate crime in the pharmaceutical industry is another 
seminal criminological study that provides insight into a perspective on the social embeddedness 
of cartel conduct. Braithwaite (1984) studies antitrust violations, amongst other crimes, in the 
pharmaceutical industry and comments on the risks and challenges of price fixing agreements 
for its participants. He notes how participants need to monitor the actions of others in the 
cartel to make sure everyone complies with the social norm:
“In a price-fixing agreement, the most crucial requirement is to be able to detect cheating. 
Even an inadvertent undercutting of competitors on a bid can lead to a general round of 
price-cutting; or one company which is (wrongly) suspected of cheating to grasp a bigger 
market share can cause others to retaliate. The historical instability of cartels is a result of the 
fact that they are rife with temptations and inducements to cheat. Hence the importance of 
communication between companies of detailed information on pricing behaviour” (p. 193).
This still applies to the contemporary organisation of cartel conduct. Internal risks for cartel 
participants include conflicts between cartelists, cartelists cheating on agreements or cartelists 
denouncing the cartel to the authorities. A few studies since have examined cartels as illegal 
social networks (Faulkner et al. 2003; Baker & Faulkner 1993; Reeves-Latour & Morselli 2017; 
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Morselli & Ouellet 2018). These studies deal with the function of effective communication 
and coordination techniques for cartel participants in order to keep a sufficient information 
position on the behaviour of others in the cartel. Besides communication, the need for secrecy 
or discretion regarding the illegal nature of business cartels is discussed. In Chapter 2 and 
Chapter 3 of this thesis, more is discussed on the role of clandestine communication structures 
and covertness in cartel networks.
3.3 Cartels and the role of trust 
In answering the question how cartels are able to endure, two types of trust are important; 
trust between cartelists (see Chapter 2, 3 and 4) and trust between cartelist and regulator (see 
Chapter 5). First, the trust or lack thereof between participants of cartel agreements enables or 
disables them to overcome the risks of internal conflicts, cheating and defection. Second, the 
trust or lack thereof between cartelist and regulator (i.e. competition authority or authorities), 
such as confidence in fair procedure and due process influences the likelihood that cartelists will 
denounce the cartel or further inhibits them from doing so.
First, trust between cartelists is important to overcome internal threats to the stability of the 
cartel. Because of the risk of cheating and the impossibility for cartelists to resort to legally 
binding contracts or arbitration in light of conflict, trust plays an essential role in illegal 
networks like cartels. In other words, because institutions do not govern your interactions, as 
is the case in illegal networks like cartels, interpersonal trust becomes even more essential in 
making and enforcing agreements. Trust involves expectations of people about the behaviour 
of others in their group or social network. Gambetta (1988) states:
“When we say we trust someone or that someone is trustworthy, we implicitly mean that the 
probability that he will perform an action that is beneficial or at least not detrimental to us 
is high enough for us to consider engaging in some form of cooperation” (p. 217).
Furthermore, Gambetta points out trust is about the expectation or cost-benefit analyses that 
cooperation with someone else will lead to a beneficial outcome. However, to trust is also to 
rely on something. For instance, to rely on the information of others that cooperation with 
a particular person will be beneficial. Participants need to rely on this kind of information, 
because it is impossible in day-to-day interactions to know everything about the trustworthiness 
of others. In that sense, we need trust in interpersonal relationships in order for us to engage in 
day-to-day forms of cooperation and interaction. This means trust is more than merely rational 
choice; a calculated decision on the likeliness of the other person’s willingness to cooperate or 
defect: it involves risk-taking, including an uncertain outcome. Gambetta continues: “for trust 
to be relevant, there must be the possibility of exit, betrayal, defection” (1988). It can be noted 
that for people to take the risk of defection or betrayal by others, they must expect others to 
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follow up on their commitments. Positive expectations towards the behaviour of others and 
exposure to the risk of betrayal, are both central to the concept of trust.
Cartelists will have to establish trust between participants in the cartel in order to be successful. 
This trust will be more likely to prove sustainable if it does not rely solely on rational cost-
benefit analysis, but also on shared values and norms that support cooperation in favour of 
the social network or community. Sutherland touches upon this shared sentiment between 
businesses, which he labels private collectivism. Summing up, trust: 1) consists of the positive 
expectation of the behaviour of others and the intention to accept vulnerability; 2) can relate 
both to the perceived trustworthiness and to the perceived capacities of the other; 3) can be seen 
as the result of social interaction, e.g. through social control mechanisms (the same accounts for 
distrust); 4) trust and distrust are different outcomes of the same social interactions which both 
require information about the conduct of others.
Second, trust between cartelist and regulator influences the likelihood of cartels being 
denounced to the authorities by cartelists. Competition authorities in most jurisdictions 
introduced leniency policies. Leniency policy offers cartelists the possibility to come forward 
with evidence regarding their involvement in cartel conduct in exchange for immunity or 
reduction of financial penalties. Leniency is a potentially attractive alternative to firms that 
want out of cartel agreements with their competitors. Especially in jurisdictions that introduce 
cartel enforcement or increase enforcement efforts and penalties, leniency has proven to be a 
fruitful policy in uncovering cartel conduct. In Europe, nearly 60% of detected cartel cases 
are discovered through leniency applications, making it the most important detection tool 
for competition authorities in uncovering cartel infringements (Carmeliet 2012). However, 
researchers have suggested several issues with leniency policies. First, based on a case-study 
analysis of 40 international cartels Stephan and Nikpay (2015) concluded that 53% of cartels 
ended before parties applied for leniency and only 6% ended after they applied. These results 
challenge the assumption that leniency ends existing cartel agreements by undermining internal 
trust between cartelists. Second, both US-based findings (Sokol 2012) and international 
findings (Harding, Beaton-Wells & Edwards 2015) suggest cartelists use leniency strategically 
to damage others in the market. Third, in Europe a decrease in the number of leniency 
applicants triggered a debate around factors that decrease the likelihood cartelists coming 
forward with their confession. Both procedural aspects of leniency applications and the rise of 
private enforcement through follow-on civil damage cases are suggested to negatively influence 
leniency applications in Europe (Swaak & Wesseling 2015). Chapter 5 (Leniency in exchange for 
cartel confessions) deals with the question what the considerations are in applying for leniency or 
refraining from doing so and how those considerations relate to private enforcement of business 
cartels in the Netherlands. 
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4. Cartel criminalisation
This study deals with the social organisation of business cartels. Cartel conduct today is 
contextualised by the contemporary social and legal conceptualisation of what a cartel is. These 
conceptualisations have changed over time. In this paragraph, further consideration is given to 
the social and legal conceptualisation of cartels and their development through time and space.
4.1 The European cartel parallax
In their book ‘Regulating Cartels in Europe’, Harding and Joshua (2003) describe the process 
of legal change towards cartels in Europe as follows: “European law -both in the sense of EC law 
and law at the national level- has moved from an earlier stance of tolerance coupled with some 
ambivalence to a position of strong condemnation” (p. 270). In fact, globally there has been a 
movement towards criminalisation of cartel conduct in the past two decades (Beaton-Wells & 
Ezrachi 2011; Harding 2006). Three things define this process: geographical dispersion, stricter 
enforcement and legal inflation of the cartel concept. Since the late 1990s, both in Europe and 
around the world, most countries increasingly introduced administrative penalties and some 
countries criminal penalties for serious cartel conduct (Beaton-Wells, 2008; Ottow, 2012). Legal 
scholars speak of a global trend of cartel criminalisation, because countries in every region of the 
world are increasingly prosecuting cartels (Shaffer & Nesbitt, 2011). Besides exporting the legal 
cartel concept, enforcement of cartels is introduced in certain jurisdictions and increased and 
toughened in others; increasing maximum fines, introducing criminal sanctions and devoting 
more resources to competition authorities charged with enforcing cartels. Besides geographical 
dispersion of the legal concept and stricter enforcement, a process of criminalisation is often 
accompanied by inflation of legal concepts; increasingly more conduct falling into a legal 
definition over time. Likewise, scholars have noted how the definition of cartels is ballooning 
(Wesseling 2013). An example of this, as mentioned earlier, is information exchange: one-
sided, non-explicit exchanges of information between competitors can also qualify as a cartel 
since 2011. In addition, legal scholars have criticised how thresholds for evidence to proof 
a continuous infringement have been lowered, using the argument that cartels are hard to 
detect because they are illegal and therefore secretive (OECD 2006). Through the process of 
criminalisation, cartels have gained an element of delinquency, also referred to as ‘delinquency 
inflation’ (Harding & Joshua, 2003; Wesseling, 2011). However, in Europe, unlike the US, 
this criminalisation process is not a bottom-up reaction to the increasing public outrage 
towards cartel agreements (cf. Stephan 2011), but mainly a product of top-down legislative and 
enforcement activity (cf. Harding 2010).
A way of understanding the dilemma of and interaction between crime and social reaction 
is the concept of a legal parallax. The parallax effect refers to the apparent movement of an 
object when viewed from different positions. You experience the parallax effect when driving 
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a car on the highway, with some objects closer and some further away, both of them moving 
at a different speed, in your perception. The effect is commonly used in computer games and 
web design. A legal parallax refers to the changing social reaction expressed in legal attitudes 
towards a certain type of conduct. Legal parallax in cartels is well explained by Harding and 
Joshua (2003):
“In seeking to understand and account for this transformation it may be important to ask 
whether this reflects a change in the subject matter itself or in the perspective on the subject. 
May it be said that the behaviour of cartels and the impact of the behaviour is different in any 
significant ways as between the earlier and later twentieth century? Or have European views 
altered, coming, for whatever reasons, into line with the American outlook on the subject 
which gave rise to the Sherman Act a century earlier? In short, it may be asked whether this 
is a phenomenon of legal parallax: to what extent the subject may have remained constant, 
but the position of those observing that subject has altered” (p. 272).
An example illustrating the legal parallax in relation to cartels is the social reaction towards the 
actions of the Dutch company Philips. During the first half of the 20th century, Philips was 
involved in the first international cartel in history, called the ‘Phoebus’ cartel. The Phoebus 
cartel divided the global market for incandescent light bulbs. Almost a hundred years later, LG 
Philips was yet again involved in price fixing, in a cartel relating to LCD screens detected by 
the European Commission (COMP/39.309 LCD 2010). However, the social reaction to similar 
behaviour was very different this time around. Unlike in the early 1900s, social reaction to 
the cartel conduct now included high public fines and strong condemnation by the European 
commissioner (see Box 1.2). This example illustrates how although the subject matter remained 
roughly constant throughout the years, the social reaction towards the conduct dramatically 
changed position.
Although tolerant European views towards cartel conduct have undeniably changed in the 
past three decades to become more in line with the American norm towards cartels generally, 
there is no major convergence between the enforcement methods used. Both procedural and 
substantively there are differences between the American and the European ‘fight against cartels’ 
that will also be addressed in paragraph 4.4. But one important difference that will be mentioned 
here is the adversarial legalism underpinning American regulatory enforcement (Kagan 2006). 
Kagan explains how American enforcement is both more legalistic and adversarial compared to 
European legal systems where more horizontal forms of enforcement are applied.
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4.2 Moral entrepreneurs and the criminality of cartel conduct
The political and legislative shift from tolerance towards stronger (moral) condemnation 
of cartels raises critical voices. Several authors reflect on the challenges around identifying 
the moral wrongfulness of cartels (Braithwaite 1984; Whelan 2013; Harding 2010; Beaton-
BOX 1.2
Philips and the cartel parallax
In December 1924, Anton Philips teamed up his company Philips with General Electric, 
Osram and France’s Compagnie des Lampes in the Phoebus Cartel. For years, the Phoebus 
cartel divided the global market for light bulbs and introduced production quotas. Phoebus 
is considered the first cartel with a truly global reach. However, the cartel did more than just 
fix prices and divide markets. Once manufacturers realised the quality and life span of light 
bulbs was improving, they identified a threat to their revenue model, based on the quantity 
of light bulbs sold. In response, they collectively hacked improvement and innovation in the 
light bulb’s lifespan.
By installing the so-called ‘1,000 hours working group’, all manufacturers in the cartel were 
obliged to bring back the lifespan of incandescent lamps to a 1,000 hours. The participants 
of the cartel closely monitored this process and all firms were required to send their light 
bulbs to a central testing lab in  Switzerland. A system with fines was in place to ensure 
everyone in the cartel complied with the agreement, to increase the costs of breaching the 
agreement and prevent opportunism by participants. The industry standard of 2,500 hours 
in 1924 eventually dropped to 1,000 hours by 1940. Historically significant, the Phoebus 
cartel is considered to have given birth to what is called ‘planned obsolescence’ of industrial 
products. The changing international affairs and mutual relations due to the Second World 
War disrupted the cartel’s operations and it started falling apart in the early 1940s. 
Almost a hundred years after Anton Philips initiated the Phoebus cartel, LG Philips 
was involved in price-fixing yet again. The case was detected and fined by the European 
Commission and concerned fixing prices on LCD screens between LG Philips and its 
global competitors. These producers received a fine of 215 million Euros. Commission Vice 
President in charge of competition policy, Joaquín Almunia, said: “Foreign companies, like 
European ones, need to understand that if they want to do business in Europe they must play fair. 
The companies concerned knew they were breaking competition rules and took steps to conceal 
their illegal behaviour. The only understanding we will show is for those that come forward to 
denounce a cartel and help prove its existence”. The question rises: have times really changed, 
or is it mainly the social reaction to this conduct that has altered its stance?
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Wells 2007). Braithwaite, in his US based study on the pharmaceutical industry, argued that 
if competition regulation were merely a matter of reducing economic damage by e.g. price 
fixing, criminal law would not be an effective means of legal control (cf. Harding 2006, p. 200; 
Braithwaite 1984, p. 193). This question includes the assumption that competition regulations 
are induced for ‘economic reasons’. Harding (2006) points out how this might certainly be the 
case for legal systems outside the US, but less so for the Sherman Act. This demonstrates the 
differences between countries in cultural embeddedness of cartel conduct.
Reversely, Whelan (2013) argues that moral wrongfulness is a central issue in the cartel 
criminalisation debate, both informed by deterrence theory or retribution theory. Whelan 
discusses whether cartel activity in the UK and the EU can qualify as a violation of more 
fundamental norms against stealing, deception or cheating. Whelan describes how all these 
norms could be connected to the cartel offence, but also how all of them have clear limitations 
at the same time. For stealing, a fundamental right of ownership should exist; do victims have 
a right to the cartel overcharge? Deception requires customers to actually assume cartelists 
compete with their competitors. Also, the cartel agreement must have been effectuated; a product 
should have been offered at the cartelised price. Lastly, cheating requires determining the exact 
unfair advantage for the cartelist. Likewise, in the events leading up to cartel criminalisation 
in Australia, Beaton-Wells (2007) has pointed to the legal challenges for the cartel offence to 
qualify as criminal in terms of sufficient levels of culpability, harmfulness and wrongfulness. 
Harding (2010) questions whether cartel violations qualify as an ‘original sin or rather as a child 
of regulation’. He states: “It would appear therefore that the significant movement towards 
criminalisation of cartel activity across a number of jurisdictions is a ‘top-down’ rather than 
‘bottom-up’ process, in the sense that it has been led by transnational enforcement interests 
rather than a more wide-spread popular belief in a level of delinquency justifying the moral 
opprobrium of the criminal law” (Harding 2006, p. 200). This potential gap between law and 
society was made abundantly clear in practice during the Australian regulatory conversion 
into cartel criminalisation, starting in the summer of 2009 (cf. Parker 2013). The Australian 
example illustrated how top-down introduction of cartel criminalisation, without the 
appropriate amount of appreciation for social, normative and economic ambiguities regarding 
cartel conduct in society, can undermine legitimacy and credibility of cartel regulation and 
enforcement (Beaton-Wells & Haines 2009; 2010).
In his book Outsiders Studies in the Sociology of Deviance sociologist Howard S. Becker speaks 
of moral entrepreneurs (1963). As Becker (1963) puts it: “rules are the products of someone’s 
initiative and we can think of the people that exhibit such enterprise as moral entrepreneurs” (p. 
147). In this enterprise Becker distinguishes rule creators and rule enforcers. Rule creators are 
the one’s leading the ‘moral crusade’, as Becker puts it. These rule creators can also be defined 
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as reformers. Reformers will often be politicians or lobbyists, for example. Becker states that 
moral crusaders are successful in their mission when they have created a new rule or set of 
rules. With the creation of a new set of rules comes the creation of new enforcement agencies: 
rule-enforcers. What began as a drive to convince the world of the necessity of moral reform 
becomes an organisation devoted to enforcement of the rule(s), such as a competition authority. 
In the tradition of symbolic interactionism, Becker describes how this process creates outsiders 
in society. In this case, outsiders are cartelists practising their traditional market agreements 
now prohibited by newly enforced regulations that were previously tolerated by enforcement 
or permitted by law.
Becker’s definition of moral entrepreneurs also applies to the debate around criminalisation 
of cartel conduct. Across the globe, politicians have been pushing the agenda for cartel 
criminalisation and increasing anti-cartel enforcement efforts in several jurisdictions. Harding 
(2010) questions if organisational enforcement interests of competition authorities may drive a 
top-down process of cartel criminalisation, instead of solving an existing problem bottom-up. 
In that sense regulatory authorities are not neutral or objective actors in the process. Regulatory 
bodies institutionalise the moral crusade and by effect legitimise the fight against cartel conduct 
and cartelists. In Cartel criminality: the mythology and pathology of business collusion Harding & 
Edwards (2016) describe how both rule makers and rule enforcers use narratives and images of 
cartels in their efforts to push the agenda for cartel criminalisation. This opposition between 
bottom-up and top-down forces demonstrates how moral ambiguity around cartel conduct 
can occur. In some markets and come national cultures there might be less support for cartel 
regulations than in others.
4.3 Conceptualisations of ‘the cartel’
Attitudes and conceptualisations regarding cartels are bound to time and place. The corpora 
in the Roman era (e.g. corpus navicolariorum; long distance shippers) and the medieval guilds 
(e.g. the Dutch drapers guild) were both organised groups of merchants controlling quality, 
prices and participation in their market, similar to contemporary cartels (cf. Ottervanger 
2010). Legal definitions concerning this conduct have shifted throughout history, but also 
differ between geographical locations. In order to understand the nature and history of the 
European commitment to regulating cartel conduct, we have to briefly go in to some of the 
history of cartel regulation. 
Antitrust law in the US and competition law in the EU are both based on regulating market 
power of corporations. However, the course of history largely explains the regional differences 
in cartel regulation. For the purpose of this research, we start the history of contemporary 
regulation of cartel conduct with the introduction of the Sherman Antitrust act in 1890 in the 
US. The reason for introducing new rules and regulation regarding competition in the US was 
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the growing influence of large economic trusts in industries like railways, oil and sugar, during 
that time. Vast changes in the American corporate landscape around the turn of the century 
involved major scale-up and centralisation in management of firms. These developments led to 
domination by a few large companies in many American industries. The introduction of the 
Sherman Act was a direct response to the concentration of market power in the US and the 
public outrage it caused (Aalders 2010). Therefore, criminalisation of cartels in the US was 
mainly a bottom-up legal political process; legislation was triggered in reaction to a changing 
society, public protest and social movement. Looking at the definition of US antitrust law we 
can identify the underlying principles rooted in this history:
Sherman Antitrust act 1890 (Sections 1 of the  Sherman  Antitrust  Act.  1): “Every 
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of 
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be 
illegal.”
Section 1 of the Sherman  Act  characterizes business practices qualified as restraint of trade 
as per se violations. A per se violation requires no further inquiry into the actual effect on the 
market. This American legal definition is conduct oriented, conceptualises cartel agreements 
as a conspiracy against the public and criminalised the conduct from the outset (Harding & 
Joshua 2003). Cartel conduct in the US should be observed in relation to the foundations of 
American society; including the principle of free markets and competition as instruments for 
progress and prosperity. Historian Aalders (2010) states: «The differences between cartels in 
America and Europe could not have been greater. Where Europeans embraced cartels as an 
instrument for economic governance, the Americans fought cartels since the late nineteenth 
century convinced of their economic as well as political harms (...) As a land of immigrants, 
feelings of individualism and personal freedom played a much bigger role than in Europe, 
Japan or elsewhere in the world» (p. 287). Contemporary European law is increasingly moving 
towards the American stance on cartels in recent decades. However, in the legal definition we 
can still identify differences in the underlying principles between cartel legislation in the US 
and the EU, rooted in this history of origin.
The European process of cartel legislation, regulation and enforcement was induced by 
international political and economic developments, especially due to the political influence of 
the US in Europe after the Second World War. Therefore, it is more top-down, contrary to the 
bottom-up social movement towards cartel condemnation in the US. This made the European 
commitment towards anti-cartel regulation historically more ambiguous, more instrumental 
and less associated with moral condemnation against cartel conduct. Today’s European legal 
definition is still more outcome orientated, defining cartels as ‘an instrument of damage’ 
(Joshua & Harding 2003, p. 59). The definition fits well with the European efforts to build 
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and strengthen the internal European market. The supranational European definition of cartels 
serves as a template for national members states and reads:
BOX 1.3
Social harms of cartels: the Fentanyl case
Jonhson&Johnson (J&J) initially developed Fentanyl and commercialised it in different 
formats since the 1960s. In 2005, J&J’s protection on the fentanyl depot patch had 
expired in the Netherlands and Novartis’ Dutch subsidiary, Sandoz, was on the verge of 
launching its generic fentanyl depot patch. It had already produced the necessary packaging 
material. However, in July 2005, instead of actually starting to sell the generic version, 
Sandoz concluded a so-called “co-promotion agreement” with Janssen-Cilag, J&J’s Dutch 
subsidiary. The agreement provided strong incentives for Sandoz not to enter the market. 
Indeed, the agreed monthly payments exceeded the profits that Sandoz expected to obtain 
from selling its generic product, for as long as there was no generic entry. Consequently, 
Sandoz did not offer its product on the market. The agreement was stopped in December 
2006 when a third party was about to launch a generic fentanyl patch. The agreement 
therefore delayed the entry of a cheaper generic medicine for seventeen months and kept 
prices for fentanyl in the Netherlands artificially high - to the detriment of patients and 
taxpayers who finance the Dutch health system.
Why did J&J and Novartis enter into that agreement? According to internal documents 
Sandoz would abstain from entering the Dutch market in exchange for “a part of [the] 
cake”. Instead of competing, Janssen-Cilag and Sandoz agreed on cooperation so as “not to 
have a depot generic on the market and in that way to keep the high current price”. Janssen-
Cilag did not consider any other existing potential partners for the so-called “co-promotion 
agreement” but just focused on its close competitor Sandoz. Sandoz engaged in very limited 
or no actual co-promotion activities.
The European Commission fined Johnson & Johnson and Novartis € 16 million for delaying 
market entry of generic pain-killer fentanyl and the Commission Vice-President Joaquín 
Almunia, in charge of competition policy, stated: “J&J paid Novartis to delay the entry of a 
generic pain killer. The two companies shockingly deprived patients in the Netherlands, including 
people suffering from cancer, from access to a cheaper version of this medicine. Today’s decision 
should make pharmaceutical companies think twice before engaging into such anticompetitive 
practices, which harm both patients and taxpayers.”
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Article 101 TFEU: “The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the internal 
market: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings 
and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have 
as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within 
the internal market”
This definition communicates the more consequentialist approach European institutions, such 
as the European Commission have taken in regulating cartels. In Europe, labelling behaviour as 
a cartel is outcome oriented, looking to the effect of, rather than the actual conduct of restrictive 
market practices. However, different regulatory regimes reflect a diversity of approaches 
towards cartel offences between member states in the European Union: from administrative 
penalties to the use of criminal law, sometimes resulting in different approaches within national 
member states for different types of cartel offences (e.g. Germany: administrative law for 
price-fixing, criminal law for bid rigging, cf. Wagner-von Papp 2011). This demonstrates the 
regulatory complexity in Europe as opposed to the US. Throughout Europe, there has been 
moral ambiguity around cartels up until recent history. For example, in the Netherlands there 
was practically no enforcement until the late 1990s. Indeed, there was a Cartel Register where 
firms could register their legal cartel agreements with the ministry of Economic Affairs (cf. Petit 
2017). It was not until 1998 that any noteworthy regulatory action was taken towards cartel 
agreements in the Netherlands.
4.4 Cartels and social harm
Harmful effects that are associated with cartel agreements relate to financial damage: product 
quality, a lack of innovation and draining of public funds. For example, Dutch economist 
Schinkel (2006; 2007) made calculated estimates of financial damages caused by the Dutch 
construction cartels and the European beer cartel. A total amount of between 1.5 and 2.5 
billion euros a year in illegal profits and damages for the period 1992-2001 was caused by the 
construction cartels (Schinkel 2006) and 424 million euros a year for the period between 1996-
1999 by the beer cartel (Schinkel 2007). Additionally, cartels are indirectly associated with 
harms to public health, i.e. in the pharmaceutical industry (see Box 1.3). Recent investigations 
into the German car industry and the EC Truck cartel (Case AT.39824) both demonstrate 
how cartel agreements can include manipulating or slowing down the introduction of cleaner 
engines. In its turn, this has detrimental effects to air quality, with thousands of premature 
deaths as a result of air pollution by the emission of NOx-gasses, in the case of diesel (Dohmen 
& Hawranek 2017). More generally, cartels can also be considered ‘undemocratic’. Meaning, 
they contribute to inequality in the distribution of resources. In contemporary society, market 
mechanisms increasingly influence domains of our social life (cf. Michael Sandel 2013). Hereby, 
health care and education are increasingly considered commodities. Those commodities are 
distributed via the logic of market competition. As a result, distortion of fair competition 
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through cartel agreements or a failure to regulate the market properly means an increase of 
inequality in the distribution of resources at the expense of the patient, the student or the 
citizen and to the advantage of a small group owning the means of production.
4.5 Cartels and economic effects
Besides moral and social condemnation, negative consequences in terms of economic effects 
and market efficiency have influenced the regulation of cartels. Cartels are believed to 
disrupt three economic efficiencies: 1) allocative efficiencies (higher prices, lower output), 2) 
productive inefficiency, and 3) innovation (Petit 2017). Adam Smith (1776) already identified 
the threat of business collusion when he famously wrote: “People of the same trade seldom meet 
together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against 
the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices” (p. 152). Unlike lawyers and legal scholars, 
economists use economic assumptions and describe cartels in a non-normative tradition. In 
their definition, economists do not focus on intentions, but look at outcome. This means a 
cartel can only be a cartel if there is an economic effect in the market, in terms of disrupting 
allocative or productive efficiency, or innovation. In that sense, on the one hand economists 
take a broader approach to what a cartel is than legal scholars, hence they can also include legal 
cartels permitted by law (cf. Petit 2017), for example the global oil cartel OPEC. On the other 
hand, economists take a narrower approach than legal scholars, for they exclude cartels without 
actual effect in the market, despite intentions and conduct.
This study accepts the broad definition of what a cartel is formulated by Joshua and Harding 
(2010): “An organization of independent enterprises from the same or similar area of economic 
activity, formed for the purpose of promoting common economic interests by controlling competition 
between themselves”. Strictly speaking, this definition includes both legal and illegal cartels, and 
cartels with and without actual economic effects. However, for the selection of detected cases in 
this research there has been a focus on detected cartels considered by the competition authority 
as illegal. Justification for this selection within the broader definition is that these cases will 
most likely demonstrate the constraints of coordination and secrecy for cartelists trying to 
cooperate without and against the law.
5. Research outline
5.1 Research question
Despite the process of cartel criminalisation in recent decades, cartels that demonstrably lasted 
for years, sometimes decades are still detected today (Connor 2010; Connor & Helmers 2007; 
Leslie 2008; Levenstein & Suslow 2006; 2011). This raises several empirical questions. On the 
one hand, corporations enter cartels in order to control uncertainties in markets; collective 
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business interests between firms operating in the same market seem to perpetuate cartel 
agreements. On the other hand, incidents of conflicts, cheating, and denouncing the cartel 
to the authorities pose threats to the stability of cartel agreements. Within cartels there is no 
option for legally binding contracts or professional arbitration in case of internal conflicts. 
Therefore, a key characteristic of operating in illegal networks is to establish trust between 
participants. In addition, the need to maximize concealment as well as coordination is essential 
(Baker & Faulkner, 1993; Faulkner Cheney, Fisher & Baker 2003).
This research will focus on the question how cartelists control their cartel, and how enforcement 
strategies by cartel authorities influence those interactions. The question is: how do cartels 
manage to endure in illegality? To study and operationalise the research question, this study is 
divided into four sub-questions. These sub-questions are based around challenges that cartelists 
need to overcome in order to manage their agreements: stabilising, concealing, enforcing, and 
confessing. This study aims to explore both the internal organisation of cartels, dealing with 
coordination, concealment and enforcement, and the interaction of cartelists with regulatory 
and enforcement authorities, particularly in relation to the leniency policy.
5.1.1 Stabilising the market: the cooperation paradox
Economic assumptions presuppose cartels to be inherently unstable and short-lived. Indeed, 
in a perfect market, cartels would be self-destructive: there can be profits in undercutting the 
cartel price and hereby enlarging one’s market share, effectively ending the cartel (Harrington 
2006; Stigler 1968). However, it can be rational to cooperate rather than compete, especially 
in the long term. Leslie (2004) points out that the best solution for long-term livelihood is to 
settle trust between direct competitors. A notorious quote of a member of the ADM lysine 
cartel, speaking to his competitor is: “you are not my enemy, our customers are the enemy” 
and “I want to be closer to you than I am to any of my customers” (Connor, 2001). Sutherland 
(1949) noted on the trust dilemma: “Even though business men have developed an increased 
consensus in opposition to the competitive principle, they search for loopholes in the statutes, 
and attempt to secure an advantage over other establishments in the industry. This leads to an 
expansion of the details covered by the agreements” (p. 73-74). Because of the incentive to 
cheat, the cartel agreements will become increasingly more detailed. The question is: do more 
detailed agreements contribute to building trust between cartelists, or are they a symptom of 
a lack of trust or even distrust between cartelists? Furthermore, cartel conduct is not always 
motivated by pure short-term greed but by the desire to avoid losses, which can fluctuate given 
the economic climate, possibly destabilising cartels under positive market conditions. Also, 
people can be pressured and coerced into cartel agreements (Parker 2011, p. 252). But while 
there can be motives to cooperate there are also incentives to cheat, such as the possibility to 
increase one’s market share and sanction immunity with the authorities through the leniency 
system (Levenstein & Suslow, 2006; Carmeliet, 2012). Both jeopardize the stability of cartels. 
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Moreover, the stability of cartels may depend on the internal power balance and the voluntary 
or (informally) coerced nature of member’s participation. Chapter 2 of this study deals with the 
first sub-question: How do informal coordinating mechanisms enable cartel stability outside 
the scope of formal legal control and what role does trust play? 
5.1.2 Concealing: the secrecy-coordination paradox
Criminal acts committed through collaboration between criminal partners require not only 
concealment but also communication. Communication is essential in organising crime: 
namely, making arrangements regarding the required resources, contacts and transport; settling 
disputes; and dividing criminal profits (Gambetta 2009). The balance between operational 
efficiency through communication and secrecy through concealment is a widely known trade-
off for participants of any covert network. The paradox of concealment and communication 
is a focal point in the study of illegal and criminal networks (Morselli 2009; Kenney 2009; 
Krebs 2002). As with many criminal networks, business cartels need to coordinate collective 
actions efficiently by communicating while facing the risk of exposure. Firms have to exchange 
information on prices, customers, tendering procedures and so on; internal issues and disputes 
must be resolved; and acceptable agreements on compensations must be reached between 
participants (Faulkner et al. 2003). And in the light of increasing enforcement efforts and 
the criminalisation of business cartels (Harding, Beaton-Wells & Edwards 2015; Shaffer and 
Nesbitt 2011; Whelan 2014), perpetrators of cartel conduct must also conceal their activities 
from customers, non-participants, and internal and external watchdogs. Chapter 3 of this study 
deals with the second sub question: How are cartels able to remain hidden from outsiders for 
long periods of time? 
5.1.3 Enforcing agreement: cartels and the involvement of organised crime
Some business cartels involve organised crime. In these cases, organised crime groups solve 
the potential issue of internal instability in cartels by using their violent reputation (Varese 
2014). In this category of cases, organised crime groups and networks supposedly act as ‘cartel 
enforcers’, both by controlling compliance of firms to the existing agreements in the cartel and 
by preventing outsiders of the cartel from entering the market. Involvement of criminals with 
a violent reputation can solve issues regarding internal instability of the cartel (Gambetta & 
Reuter 1995). These organised criminals receive commission or ‘pizzo’ from the derived profits 
of cartels (Varese 2014, p. 345). The literature on organised crime extensively discusses examples 
of the involvement of organised crime groups in economic crime, like business cartels (Varese 
2014; Stephan 2010; Chu 2002; Gambetta & Reuter 1995; Reuter 1983). These examples are 
generally labelled as infiltration of organised crime in legitimate business sectors. However, not 
all cartels involve organised crime groups. What determines these differences? Chapter 4 of this 
study deals with the question: why do business cartels sometimes do and sometimes do not 
involve organised crime groups?
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5.1.4 Breaking down secrecy: cartel confessions in exchange for leniency
Cartel confessions are the most important source for competition authorities in uncovering 
cartel conduct violations (Carmeliet 2012). Especially during the nineties and first decade 
of this century, leniency has enabled detection and punishment for competition and anti-
trust enforcement agencies in a substantial amount of cartel cases. However, in recent years 
a decline in the number of leniency applications was noted and discussed by competition 
authorities worldwide (ICN 2014). It is still unclear what precisely causes this decline. Leniency 
arrangements are based on the assumption that cartelists are rational actors with accurate and 
predictable information about both the expected benefits of the cartel, as well as the likelihood 
of detection and the size and likelihood of punishment (Stephan & Nikpay 2015). In 
combination with deterrent penalties and a credible threat of detection, leniency is presumed 
to instil distrust between cartelists and trigger a race to the competition authorities (Stucke 
2015). In light of the decreasing frequency of the use of leniency in recent years, experts express 
concerns regarding the dependency of competition authorities on this detection tool (Guttuso 
2015; ICN 2014). Recent discussion centres on the functioning of leniency arrangements in 
practice. Chapter 5 discusses the question: What are considerations for cartelists in applying for 
leniency or refraining from doing so?
5.2 Methodology
In order to answer the research question, this study uses three methods of analysis: literature 
review, case-file analysis and semi-structured interviews. Methodological approaches conducted 
in previous cartel studies (cf. Parker 2011, p. 248) include: 1) quantitative studies using 
enforcement data (Golub, Detre and Connor 2005; Simpson 1986; 1987; Simpson & Koper 
1992; Jamieson 1994); 2) case study qualitative interviews (Sonnenfeld & Lawrence 1978; 
Sonnenfeld 1981; Parker, Ainsworth and Stepanenko 2004; Parker 2006; 2012); 3) case study 
public records detected cases (Stephan 2009; Berzins and Sofo 2009; Connor 2010; Stephan 
2005; Simpson & Piquero 2001; Conley & O’Barr 1997; Geis 1967); 4) quasi-experimental 
surveys of individuals posing hypothetical vignettes and asking about behaviour (Simpson 1998; 
2002; Piquero, Exum & Simpson 2005; Smith, Simpson and Huang 2007). The lessons learned 
from these approaches is that because of the secretive nature of cartels and the restrictions to 
access to enforcement data due to confidentiality, a combination of these methods is the most 
fruitful approach. For two reasons a selection of qualitative research methods is used to answer 
the central research question in this study. First, the research questions in this study consist 
of ‘how’ and ‘what’ questions. These questions revolve around understanding the nature and 
structure of cartels and the relational and structural networks they are embedded in. Answering 
these questions will enable us to better understand what makes cartel agreements last. For 
that reason, a relatively modest selection of cartel cases (n=14) is sampled for this study to be 
analysed in depth in order to answer these questions. Second, large quantitative databases on 
illegal cartel cases in the Netherlands are unavailable due to confidentiality and reluctance of the 
41
1
Dutch Authority for Consumers and Markets to share this information for research purposes. 
The available data sources that remain are the case studies and interviews with competition 
authority officials, lawyers, legal counsel and cartelists. In addition, these sources are also more 
suited to answer the underlying research questions of this study. Therefore, these sources are 
best analysed through a qualitative methodology and analysis.
5.2.1 Research methods and data sources
This study employs several qualitative research methods and uses a combination of qualitative 
sources. The results in this study are based on literature review, case-file analysis of official 
documentation and semi-structured interviews. The literature review contains both theoretical 
and empirical studies on cartels from different disciplines including criminology, sociology, 
socio-legal studies, and competition law and economics. The case-file analysis conducted for 
this study is based on secondary sources that can be divided in three categories: 1) private 
enforcement reports and records of detected Dutch cartel cases, 2) public parliamentary 
investigation reports and records into construction industry in the Netherlands and Quebec, 
Canada, and 3) public enforcement reports published by the European Commission on 
detected European cartels. The European cartel cases are used to illustrate and contextualise the 
main findings of the research, resulting from the former two categories and other sources; the 
literature review and interviews. The interviews conducted for this study are primary sources and 
can be characterised as semi-structured interviews. These interviews were held amongst three 
categories of respondents in the Netherlands: 1) competition authority officials/investigators 
(in 2012), 2) specialised competition lawyers (between 2015-2017), and 3) cartelists (between 
2015-2017). 
The methodology sections in the main chapters of this study deal with the specific methodology 
and data sources used per sub-question. Table 1 provides an overview of methodologies used 
per chapter in this study. 
Table 1 Methodology used per chapter
Literature review Case-file analysis Interviews
Chapter 2
Chapter 3
Chapter 4
Chapter 5
To create an overview of all the methodology used in this study a more detailed overview is also 
presented below. Note that there is overlap with the methodology sections in the respective chapters. 
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5.2.2 Methods used in chapter 2 and 3: case-file analysis of private enforcement reports of 
detected Dutch cartel cases and interviews with Dutch competition authority investigators
Chapter 2 (on the cooperation paradox) and chapter 3 (on the coordination-secrecy paradox) 
both examine cartel stability based on a qualitative case file analysis of 14 Dutch cases and 
complimented with semi-structured interviews with Dutch competition officials. In these 14 
cases, the Dutch Competition Authority imposed an administrative fine between October 2007 
and January 2012.1 The cases were selected because reports that led to a fine contain substantial 
proof, including documentation on coordination and communication within cartels. This 
documentation allowed for a systematic and in-depth study of the structure and nature of cartels. 
The fourteen cases were examined using document analysis and semi-structured interviews with 
case managers from the Authority for Consumers and Markets. The documentation consisted of 
official reports by the authority,2 summarising the files and containing a selection of evidence used 
in administrative proceedings towards administrative fines imposed upon corporations. These 
files contain descriptions of the modus operandi of cartels, and include correspondence between 
their members, transcriptions of verbal interrogations with corporate officials by the competition 
authority, and sources of cartel administration. These statements are supported by additional 
written administration. For chapter 2, the material was systematically studied using a checklist 
focusing on the type of network; the nature of mutual relations; mechanisms for mutual control; 
mechanisms for mutual trust; and instances of cheating and conflicts. For chapter 3, the material 
was studied systematically using a checklist focusing on the modus operandi for concealment; 
the type of network; the nature of mutual relations; the role of the social environment (e.g. 
industry associations, customers); and mechanisms for mutual trust. For every case (in both 
chapters 2 and 3), the document analysis was complemented with a semi-structured interview 
with the project manager of the authority that handled the investigation. In these interviews, 
the following topics were discussed (chapter 2): the nature of the cartel; mechanisms for mutual 
control and trust; and instances of cheating; mutual conflicts, (chapter 3): the nature of the 
cartel; the type of network and communication; mechanisms for mutual control and trust; and 
the role of third parties. The interviews with investigators served to provide a better overview of 
the files in the records of the case and an opportunity to ask additional questions that could not 
be answered in full through only studying the written reports.
1 Commissioning administrative fines is one of the possible sanctions authorised by Dutch competition law (according 
to Art. 56 lid 1 sub a Mw). Since October 2007, Dutch competition law allows the investigation of private property 
and the possibility of fining natural persons (Kamerstukken I 2006/07, 30 071, A). October 2007 is the starting point 
of the analysis for the sake of comparability of the material. January 2012 is indicated as end date because cases usually 
take several years from the initial investigation until the official sanction; all cases completed by January 2012 have been 
included.
2 These files are a result of investigations based on the legal power invested in the Dutch competition authority to 
interrogate corporate officials and demand corporate intelligence (Art. 5:16 Awb), to investigate company and private 
property and administration (Art. 5:15, art. 54, 55 Mw), and to use leniency requests and other relevant informants and 
public information.
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1The use of secondary sources has several limitations. Because of detection and enforcement 
biases, the cases do not necessarily provide a representative image of all cartel conduct in 
the Netherlands. Some cartels have greater chances of being detected, and cases that involve 
substantial proof will have a greater chance of ultimately resulting in an administrative fine. The 
statements of corporate officials referred to in this study, originate from secondary sources and 
therefore might express firms’ perspectives, but were expressed in the course of an administrative 
procedure. Note that one of the formal legal requirements of finding a person or corporation 
guilty of an infringement is that the effects of the infringement must be ‘noticeable’; have a 
significant effect on the market. This might lead some of the corporate officials to deny the ‘real’ 
effect of any agreements made, as a legal defence strategy, or to under-report their conduct in 
general. Table 2 presents descriptive information on the selected cases, including the cartel’s 
duration,3 number of firms, and nature of the conduct.4 The relatively high number of firms in 
these cases can be biased because of three main reasons. Firstly, cartels with an active industry 
association have a greater chance of detection. Secondly, cartels with a more limited number of 
firms may conspire more effectively, with little chance of detection. Thirdly, an effective cartel 
may have a self-amplifying effect; the collusion can offer more firms an opportunity to survive.
The Dutch cases in this study have an average duration of about five years, which is comparable 
to the typical duration of cartels globally (Levenstein and Suslow 2006; 2011). This duration 
shows that firms manage to stabilise their cartel for several years, which indicates a form of 
stability and effective coordination. Besides duration, most of the cases involve a large number 
of participating firms. For instance, 15 firms were involved in cases 7 and 9. It indicates the 
need for systems of communication and monitoring in coordinating collective action in cartels. 
The duration also suggests effective communication.
Table 2 states the nature of the conduct. Three main categories are distinguished: bid-rigging, 
price-fixing, and market division or allocation. Based on legal definitions, these serve as a 
descriptive label, indicating the main category of the infringement, though these categories 
are not mutually exclusive per se. Bid-rigging involves firms in a tendering procedure, 
communicating before the bidding takes place. They divide the work and rotate bids, thereby 
rigging the procedure. Also known as collusive tendering, it generally involves raising price 
offers to the buyer. In price-fixing cartels, firms make explicit agreements on the price or 
3 To determine the duration of these cartels, the period of the continuous infringement stated in the report is used. This 
also means that the period before the introduction of the Dutch cartel prohibition (January 1998) is not incorporated in 
determining the duration. This suggests an underestimation of the actual duration of the cartel. This effect is enhanced 
by the internal selection bias of the competition authority concerning the minimum standards regarding evidence.
4 In light of confidentiality, the industry in which the cartels took place cannot be indicated per case in table 2. The cases 
took place in the following industries; construction (6); heavy industry (3); general services industry (2); forestry (1); 
waste disposal (1); and financial services (1).
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surcharge of a particular product or service. Firms will use, for instance, minimum pricelists. 
The other cases are market division or allocation. In these cartels, firms agree to fix market 
shares or divide markets into geographical regions.
Table 2 Descriptive information on selected cartel cases
Case # Duration in years Number of firms Nature of the conduct Collective market share
Case 1 6 9 Market division 70%
Case 2 8 9 Price-fixing 85-90%
Case 3 6 8 Bid-rigging 60-80%
Case 4 6 5 Market division 60-80%
Case 5 6 5 Bid-rigging -
Case 6 1 9 Bid-rigging -
Case 7 7 15 Market division 90%
Case 8 1 2 Bid-rigging -
Case 9 6 15 Market division 87.3%
Case 10 1.5 4 Price-fixing 58%
Case 11 2 3 Bid-rigging 85-95%
Case 12 9 14 Bid-rigging -
Case 13 3.5 10 Market allocation -
Case 14 11 4 Market allocation 35-50%
5.2.3 Method used in chapter 4; case-file analysis of public records parliamentary 
investigations into bid rigging in the construction industry in the Netherlands and Canada
For the purpose of this chapter, the publicly available records of the investigations from La 
Commission sur l’octroi et la gestion des contrats publics dans l’industrie de la construction 
(CEIC 2015) and Parlementaire Enquetecommissie Bouwnijverheid (PEB 2002) served as 
data for a comparative analysis. These publicly available reports contained: transcripts from 
witness testimonies, police evidence including wiretaps and video surveillance, demographic 
information, economic and market studies. A document analyses was performed on these 
sources based on a topic list including the following topics: general case information, type of 
actors, structure of the industry, market indicators and the modus operandi of the cartels. In 
addition, information on regulatory regimes and regulatory changes during the active years of 
the cartels was gathered and analysed.
5.2.4 Method used in chapter 5; semi-structured interviews with specialised competition 
lawyers, in-house legal counsel and cartelists
For the purpose of this chapter a qualitative study among corporate and legal professionals in 
the Netherlands was conducted. As mentioned, most socio-legal studies on leniency in cartel 
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cases are based on single case studies or systematic case-file analyses. Unfortunately, leniency 
case-file reports – including transcripts of cartel confessions, internal communication and 
documentation of leniency applicants – are classified. Despite several requests to access these 
files for the purpose of scientific study, the Dutch national competition authority denied access 
to these files. Due to both the limited availability of official documents as empirical material 
and the nature of the research question – which is directed at qualitative understanding of the 
interaction between leniency arrangements and cartelists –motivations and perceptions in this 
study are studied through interviews.
A total of 34 semi-structured interviews were carried out with competition lawyers (17), in-
house legal counsel (6) and cartelists (11). The competition lawyer and in-house legal counsel 
all had extensive experience in consultation and defence in (alleged) cartel infringement 
cases. In addition, most of them (14) had experience with preparing and submitting leniency 
applications for clients. Because cartel cases tend to be both a specialist topic and are often 
considered high-profile cases with high financial and reputational stakes, a combination of a 
level of seniority and expertise amongst respondents was important. Therefore, all respondents 
were selected on the basis of their professional experience and expertise. Respondents held 
relevant professional experience of minimum 8 years, up to 41 years and were all experts in 
the fields of competition law. The competition lawyer respondents all worked in one of the 
following occupations: partner, lawyer-partner, senior counsel or off-counsel. The in-house legal 
counsel respondents also had a relevant professional experience of a minimum of 8 years, up to 
18 years. In addition, interviews were held with cartelists (11); chief executives and directors 
with experience in the process of considering leniency related to (potential) cartel conduct 
violations in their company. Their working experience in an executive or director role varied 
between 5-26 years. All the corporate professional respondents had a one-time only experience 
with cartel infringements and or leniency. Only two of them had a background in law, the 
others in business studies or economics. Half the cases ultimately led to an administrative 
fine from the competition authority. Also, respondents’ firms only pursued leniency in about 
one-third of these cases. This was important in answering the question why some cartelists also 
refrain from asking for leniency.
In order to gain access to the field and establish contacts with respondents to conduct 
interviews, the Dutch national association for competition lawyers was contacted. The board 
of the association forwarded a request in their newsletter, explaining the research and call for 
respondents. Several respondents contacted the researcher after the call in the newsletter, others 
were contacted after online searches for contact information, and others were approached 
through the so-called snowballing method; every respondent was asked to recommend 
additional contacts which were contacted. Clients (in-house legal counsel, chief executives and 
directors) were also contacted through this method of snowballing. The interviews took place at 
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the offices of the respondents. Mostly, these interviews were held in the conference room, rarely 
in personal offices or coffee corners. Interviews typically lasted for around 50 minutes, with 
outliers of 45 and 150 minutes. The interviews were audio recorded and transcribed afterwards. 
During the interviews, the following topics were discussed: issues relating to the distribution 
of responsibility (e.g. the role of legal professionals) and the decision-making process within 
companies relating to cartel infringements and leniency; incentives and disincentives to 
apply for leniency; and the role and influence of follow-on civil procedures (damage claims, 
compensations) and the influence of professional litigation funders.
The use of this approach has several limitations. About 30-40% of approached potential 
respondents declined from being interviewed for this study. This mainly concerned those who 
were contacted after the online search (‘cold calls’). All non-response was followed up by a 
question for the reason(s) of non-response. Where indicated, reasons for non-response amongst 
lawyers were mainly a lack of time, interest or sufficient expertise in their own opinion. Reasons 
for non-response amongst in-house legal counsel, executives and directors, mainly concerned 
issues regarding confidentiality. In-house legal counsel often sign internal contracts with their 
company, or between company and regulator in case of settlements. Either way, this bounds 
them from speaking or commenting on the case. In addition, the negative image of big business 
(especially multinational corporations) as non-compliant was noted several times as a reason 
not to cooperate in this study. Regarding cartelists: the fact that mostly multi-national firms 
declined from participating in the study might indicate a slightly overrepresentation of more 
local and smaller businesses. On the other hand, the majority of interviews with lawyers 
were lawyers of large international and trans-national firms dealing with major multinational 
corporations as clients, so their experience is represented in the data from that end.
Semi-structured interviews have limitations. Firstly, it is not possible to generalise results to a 
greater population. Therefore, the results in this study are not representative for all cartel cases 
or every leniency application in the Netherlands. The purpose of this study is to understand 
the nature of the interactions regarding leniency. Research findings regarding the interaction 
between regulation and businesses can have a wider relevance e.g. in other domains of law. It 
tells us something about the nature of interactions between different types of professionals 
when it comes to the decision-making process around compliance issues within companies. 
Secondly, social desirability of respondents is an issue in interviews. Naturally, lawyers are 
advocates to their clients’ best interest and therefore, to a certain extent, also to their conduct. 
To correct for anticipated social desirability, the interviewer used extensive research through 
case studies on recent national cartel cases. In addition, during the interview the researcher 
consequently insisted respondents to go into specific examples from their own professional 
experience to avoid generalizations in their answers. Moreover, in the process of doing so, this 
provided an opportunity for the interviewer to go into detail.
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5.2.5 Informed consent and data management
Confidentiality was guaranteed for all methods used in this study. No information is presented 
in this thesis or other publications based on this research that may lead to the identity of 
respondents, specific organisations, or specific cases. With the exception of public information, 
such as public sanction decisions or news articles used in this study. For the purpose of the 
semi-structured interviews in this study, data was collected only with informed consent of 
respondents (see Appendix II and III). In case of the interviews with competition lawyers 
and cartelists, respondents were asked to agree with an audio-recording of the conversation 
beforehand. Regarding data-management and data protection, respondents were explained the 
following: 1) these recordings will serve the purpose of transcribing the interview afterwards; 
2) when the transcription is completed these audio-recordings are deleted; 3) the transcriptions 
are anonymised, this anonymisation means transcripts will not contain any retraceable personal 
information regarding the respondent, their client, organisation or market; 4) this means 
respondents might recognize themselves in statements they have made in future publications 
of this study. However, third parties will not be able to identify them from this information. In 
other words, their anonymity is not infringed. Before the start of the interview, the researcher 
identified himself, his role and affiliation and the source of funding for this study. Respondents 
were also informed on the publication plan for the study. This research is funded by the 
Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO) through a Research Talent Grant.5 
5  https://www.nwo.nl/actueel/nieuws/2014/magw/gehonoreerde-voorstellen-magw-onderzoekstalent.html
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Chapter 2
Managing cartels: how cartelists 
create stability in the absence of 
law*
Abstract:
Firms enter cartels (e.g. price-fixing; bid-rigging) in order to control market uncertainties and 
gain collusive profits, but face challenges in controlling the cartel itself. A challenge for business 
cartels is how to organise collective illegal activities without the use of formal control, such 
as binding legal contracts or arbitration. While one might expect that a lack of formal legal 
control leads to mutual conflicts and opportunistic behaviour resulting in short-lived cartels, 
firms often manage to continue their illegal conduct for years. This raises questions as to how 
firms organise their cartels in the absence of legal means. Chapter 2 addresses how informal 
coordinating mechanisms enable cartel stability outside the scope of formal legal control. Based 
on an in-depth study of 14 Dutch cartels, this chapter shows the importance of informal social 
mechanisms to coordinate, monitor, enforce, and compensate for the longevity of business 
cartels. Furthermore, the results emphasise that in order to explain cartel stability, social 
mechanisms that induce trust need to be considered.
*  This chapter has been published as: Jaspers, J.D. (2017). Managing Cartels: how Cartel Participants Create Stability in 
the Absence of law. European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, 23 (3), 319-335.
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1. Introduction
Business cartels are an example of corporate and economic crime that entail collusion between 
competitors to fix prices, divide markets, or rig tendering procedures (Friedrichs 2010; Stewart 
2007; Geis 1987). Cartels initially enable firms6 to minimalise uncertainties and the risks of a 
competitive market. However, once in a cartel, firms face various external and internal threats to 
the cartel itself. Internal threats involve cheating, not complying with the cartel, and defection, 
insiders denouncing the cartel using leniency.7 Cartelists need to deal with these threats in 
an informal setting. In other words, cartels require collective action, but participants have to 
operate subversively, against the background of increasing criminalisation8 of this conduct in 
recent years. Cartelists are therefore unable to formulate binding contracts or resort to legal 
conflict resolution in the event of broken agreements.
Business cartels are, in that sense, comparable to organized crime. From organized crime 
literature, we know that non-violent forms of dispute settlement are common and often prove 
to be a less costly business tool than violence, in illegal contexts (Paoli 2003; Zaitch 2002). 
Violent retaliation can attract unwanted attention from authorities and harm ‘business’ relations 
and reputations of reliability in illegal markets (Zaitch 2005). Studies on drug markets show 
that non-violent retaliation in the form of negotiation, avoidance and toleration reduces the 
costs of conflict and is widespread (Jacques & Wright 2008; 2011). In analogy to the study of 
organized crime, the aim of this chapter is to investigate how legitimate firms manage their illegal 
agreements with others and how they deal with the risks of cheating, free riding and defection.
The question how firms manage to stabilise cartels has received limited attention in criminological 
literature. There are some criminological white-collar crime studies on cartel conduct, like 
the seminal study of Geis (1987) on price-fixing in the heavy electrical equipment industry. 
These studies explain cartel conduct by a need to manage and avoid uncertainties, make results 
more predictable and minimise risks (Agnew, Piquero, and Cullen 2009; Paternoster and 
Simpson 1996; Jamieson 1994; Geis 1987; Sonnenfeld and Lawrence 1978). However, these 
studies do not adopt a longitudinal perspective to cartels. To the extent that studies do adopt a 
longitudinal approach to white-collar crime, they focus on the individual life course, instead of 
on co-offending (Piquero and Weisburd 2009; Weisburd and Waring 2001).
6 Admittedly, there are issues of agency within firms that influence the outcome of corporate conduct. However, I will not 
deal with that issue here and will consider firms simply as economic entities.
7 Leniency is a whistleblowing instrument through which firms can come forward to competition authorities with 
substantial evidence regarding the cartel in return for sanction immunity or waivers of prosecution.
8 Since the late 1990s, most countries introduced administrative penalties, and some countries have imposed criminal 
sanctions for cartel conduct (Beaton-Wells 2008; Ottow 2012). Today, scholars speak of a global trend of cartel 
criminalisation, with more than 30 countries worldwide using criminal law to sanction cartels and most other countries, 
the European Union and its member states in particular, having increased the level of fines significantly over the last two 
decades (Harding, Beaton-Wells, and Edwards 2015; Shaffer and Nesbitt 2011).
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In economic literature, numerous studies do focus on how firms manage to stabilize cartels 
(Harrington 2006; Hinloopen 2006; Ashenfelter and Graddy 2005; Spagnolo 2000; Spar 
1994; Stigler 1968). Economists mostly perceive cartels as ‘inherently unstable’, focusing on the 
incentives to cheat and means of retaliation in order to prevent cheating. The image of cartels 
as ‘inherently unstable’ is influential and underpins competition law and policy. Accordingly, 
the legal debate focuses on raising regulatory pressure in order to destabilise existing cartel 
agreements. This inherent instability is not in line with the empirical evidence of the duration 
of cartels. Cartels manage to exist for years − even decades (Levenstein and Suslow 2006; Leslie 
2008; Connor 2010; Connor and Helmers 2007) − and they often comprise a relatively large 
number of participating firms (Connor 2010). The criminalisation project therefore seems ill 
informed by a proper understanding of the operation of business cartels (Beaton-Wells and 
Haines 2010; Harding 2006; Harding and Joshua, 2003: 284).
This chapter contributes to a more complete understanding of the operation of cartel stability, 
by addressing the question how cartels operate in secrecy, confronted with coordination 
problems and instability and how they deal with mutual disagreements in the absence of legal 
means. To review the scholarship on cartel stability, it is helpful to distinguish two directions 
of thought. The first and most dominant approach is an economic one that focuses on a lack 
of trust between cartelists and on their individual incentives to cheat. The second approach is a 
social one that focuses on the impact of social mechanisms that enable trust between cartelists. 
As regards cartel stability, these contrasting approaches result in two explanatory models that 
generate different expectations as to how members stabilise their cartels in the absence of legal 
means.
In an empirical manner, this chapter investigates different responses of cartelists to assess the 
validity of existing theoretical explanations concerning cartel stability. Therefore, the question 
is posed: How do informal coordinating mechanisms enable cartel stability outside the scope 
of formal legal control and what role does trust play? Based on 14 case studies of Dutch cartels, 
this chapter explores how cartels manage to survive for years despite the threat of cheating 
and detection; how do firms organise cartels; and how do they prevent and overcome internal 
conflicts? Section 2 of this chapter discusses previous studies and theory concerning cartel 
stability. Section 3 introduces data and the methods used for this study. Section 4 addresses the 
internal mechanisms of coordination, monitoring, compensation, and enforcement in light of 
the research question. Section 5 deals with the conclusions, limitations, and possibilities for 
further research.
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2. To cheat or not to cheat: theoretical perspectives on cartel 
stability
2.1 The economic perspective: stability through retaliation
Economic literature on cartels uses a model that departs from the idea of a lack of trust between 
member firms. In this model, firms are bound to cheat on the mutual agreement because of 
incentives to do so. Economic studies perceive cartels in terms of a game-theoretical problem: 
it starts from the idea that cartel participants are motivated instrumentally, and the perceived 
costs and benefits are part of a rational assessment. With this comes a focus on incentives 
for players in the cartel to cheat, such as overselling or underpricing (Stigler 1968). Firms 
will do so in order to maximise individual profits further or to expand market shares beyond 
the cartel’s collective agreement. This leads to the perceived ‘inherent instability’ of cartels 
(Rapoport 1965). This model is vividly illustrated by one of the directors of ADM in the lysine 
cartel9: ‘Everybody’s going to want to cheat anyway. Knowing them, we will want to cheat’ 
(Leslie 2004: 561; Eichenwald 2001: 220). 
In this perspective, cartel stability depends on the perceived losses and profits that result from 
cheating in relation to the likelihood of possible punishment from other cartel members. 
Therefore, cartelists can only establish stability by means of a system that increases − by way 
of internal punishment − the costs of cheating (Spagnolo 2000; Spar 1994). Cartels need to 
monitor their agreement to detect cheating and punish firms that practise it (Levenstein and 
Suslow 2006; Connor 2001; Ayres 1987). Thus, in order for a cartel to survive, this model 
assumes credible punishment should be in place to penalise members that cheat, thereby 
enforcing the cartel agreement (Ayres 1987; Green and Porter 1984; Stigler 1968). Forms 
of credible punishments described are price slicing and the threat of price wars (Harrington 
2006; Grossman 1996). For instance, when firms observe cheating by other firms, they lower 
their cartel prices temporarily in order to punish possible cheaters and to stabilise the cartel 
(Ashenfelter and Graddy 2005). 
In short, an economic approach seeks explanations for cartel stability in effective internal 
detection and punishment. This introduces the expectation that the cases will demonstrate 
sophisticated systems of coordination, monitoring, and enforcement. Retaliation in the form 
of price slicing and price wars will serve to increase the costs of cheating, thus ultimately 
stabilising cartels.
9 The international lysine cartel entailed a price-fixing conspiracy between the American food processing company Archer 
Daniel Midland and its main Korean and Japanese competitors around the animal feed additive lysine. Cartelists 
allegedly managed to raise global prices of lysine by 70% for several years during the mid-1990s.
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Recent empirical studies find two important issues regarding cartel stability that challenge the 
assumptions in the economic model. Firstly, cartels invest more in means to prevent cheating 
than to resort to ex post punishments,10 which are costly (Harrington 2006; Levenstein and 
Suslow 2006). Secondly, a retaliatory response to cheating increases the likelihood of a cartel’s 
natural demise (Levenstein and Suslow 2011). Where strong systems of monitoring and 
enforcement are considered to account for cartel stability in the economic model, empirical 
results suggest otherwise. The deviating effects of internal punishments leave room for 
alternative explanations for the longevity of cartels.
2.2 The social perspective: stability through mutual trust
Empirical cartel studies that use a social approach criticise economic assumptions on behaviour 
as being too simplistic (Parker 2012). Results from the Melbourne cartel project11 show the 
discrepancies between economic assumptions in competition policies and the social reality of 
business conduct (Parker 2012; Haines and Beaton-Wells 2012). A social approach examines 
the relation between actors rather than focusing on the individual agent. It considers the actions 
of individuals to be strongly socially embedded. A social approach considers cartels in the 
context of mutual trust, focusing on the incentives of firms to act cooperatively in the informal 
setting of cartels. Trust may provide an important element in explaining how firms manage to 
operate their cartels for long periods (Stephan 2010; Leslie 2004), and better account for some 
of the recent empirical findings on cartel stability.
Empirical studies using a social approach to cartel stability are scarce, but we can find similar 
explanations for cooperative behaviour in studies on legal business conduct in informal settings; 
this is referred to as ‘the shadow of the law’. It shows that business relations are socially embedded 
and able to generate social norms that make legal sanctions unnecessary and superfluous 
(Ellickson 1991; Granovetter 1985; Black 1983; 1984; MaCaulay 1963; 2013).12 Scholars in 
economic sociology have stressed the argument and the paradox of the social embeddedness 
10 In this regard, I point out the importance of compensation systems, such as side payments and buy-backs. These are 
financial compensations or compensations in kind, and serve to even out disparities regarding, for instance, agreed-upon 
volumes at the end of the year. I classify them here as a means of coordination in order to regulate the execution of the 
agreement and to prevent miscommunications or conflicts. This has to be distinguished from punishment by retaliation 
as a response to conflicts.
11 This research project was conducted at the Melbourne Law School by researchers Caron Beaton-Wells, Fiona Haines, 
Christine Parker, David Round, and Janette Nankivell. The project studied the process of cartel criminalisation and 
the perceptions of the general public and business professionals with regard to cartel conduct. Researchers used a 
multidisciplinary approach, including legal and social research methods. For more information, see http://www.law.
unimelb.edu.au/cartel.
12 The ability of people to work together for common purposes in groups and organisations has also been defined as social 
capital by a group of influential scholars within the field of sociology (Coleman 1988; Fukuyama 1995; Putnam 1995). 
Fukuyama (1997: 378-9) says: ‘Social capital can be defined simply as the existence of a certain set of informal values or 
norms shared among members of a group that permit cooperation among them (…) the norms (…) include virtues like 
truth-telling, the meeting of obligations, and reciprocity’. Putnam (2000; 19) also stresses the importance of norms of 
reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from social networks.
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of economic action, claiming that the more an informal economy approaches the model of a 
‘true market’, the more it depends on social ties. Social embeddedness is considered especially 
visible in a context where mutual trust is the only resource against malfeasance (Portes 2010; 
Granovetter 1993). Therefore, in the absence of enforceable legal protection, personal relations 
between cartelists are expected to form an important factor for the internal stability of cartels. 
Stephan (2010: 361) states: ‘The notion that one should befriend individuals in business and 
bring them into one’s home can be an explicit social mechanism for ensuring that an agreement 
is honoured in the absence of strong legal protection’. Personal relations and interpersonal trust 
can account for cartel stability, and three main conditions for interpersonal trust can be identified: 
communication, reciprocity, and reputation. 
Communication: Common protocols and frequent communication can play a significant role 
in the process of building trust. People who communicate frequently are more likely to perceive 
mutual trust (Leslie 2004: 538). Face-to-face meetings and coordination will facilitate the 
perception of trustworthiness, thus promoting cooperative behaviour. Just as in the economic 
approach, systems of coordination and monitoring are expected here. The social approach 
perceives these systems as a symptom of the incentives to cooperate and as a means to build trust, 
thus making punishments irrelevant. Moreover, simply allowing discussions and participating 
in negotiations increases cooperative behaviour within cartels, creating more internal support 
and legitimacy for the agreement and its conditions (Leslie 2004: 544). Therefore, instead of 
retaliation, negotiation and mediation are expected in response to mutual disagreements.
Reciprocity: In the operation of cartels, firms will build upon mutual rights and obligations 
because of the coordination of agreements and the compensation in light of them (Van de 
Bunt 2010; Hertogh 2005). This enables norms of generalised reciprocity to develop within 
the cartel. Being in debt to others and having others indebted to you affects one’s actions. It is 
expected that this creates mutual dependencies between firms, which in turn promotes peaceful 
arbitration and discourages cheating, thus ultimately stabilising the cartel.
Reputation: A reputation for being trustworthy is crucial in business relations (Van Erp 2008). 
One’s promise of trustworthiness must be credible, as trust is a function of expectations (Leslie 
2004: 540). Having a shared past serves as input for this reputation, and having a shared 
future creates a need for it, again giving firms an interest in handling their relations in a 
harmonious manner. The desire for a positive reputation encourages parties to avoid mutual 
conflict or retaliation (Posner 2009). Retaliation, such as price wars, can be an expensive piece 
of ‘equipment’ in business relations. Firms thrive on being perceived by others as being a 
trustworthy, cooperative, and reasonable partner. 
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Table 1 Two ideal typical explanatory models of cartel stability
MODEL Economic approach Social approach
UNDERLYING 
BEHAVIOURAL 
ASSUMPTIONS
Instrumentally oriented economic 
action:
-Instrumentally motivated actors
-Mutual lack of trust central
-Focuses on the incentives to cheat:
--maximise profits
--expand markets
Socially oriented economic action:
-Normatively motivated actors 
-Mutual trust central
-Focuses on the incentives to cooperate:
--value introjection
ORGANISATION OF 
CARTELS
As a result of lack of trust and 
incentives to cheat:
- Systems of coordination and 
monitoring
As a result of social ties, means to build 
trust, and the incentives to cooperate:
- Systems of coordination and 
monitoring
EXPECTED RESPONSE 
TO CHEATING
Punishment/retaliation Mediation/negotiation
EXPECTED OUTCOME Forced compliance of cheating firm 
to original agreement, or exclusion 
of cheater
Adjusted agreement and/or 
compensation scheme and continuation 
of the cartel
Table 1 depicts the two explanatory models of cartel stability. Both approaches expect similar 
organisation within cartels: namely, systems of coordination and monitoring. However, 
they foresee different responses in light of internal cheating: the economic approach expects 
retaliation and the social approach anticipates negotiation. The models contain ideal types, 
the cases that are studied and discussed are viewed in regard to these models to assess which 
elements they contain in practice.
3. Methods and data sources
This chapter examines cartel stability based on a qualitative case file analysis of 14 Dutch 
cases. In these cases, the Dutch Competition Authority imposed an administrative fine between 
October 2007 and January 2012.13 These cases were selected because reports that led to a 
fine contain substantial proof, including documentation on coordination and communication 
within cartels. This documentation allowed for a systematic and in-depth study of the structure 
and nature of cartels. The fourteen cases were examined using document analysis and semi-
structured interviews with case managers from the Authority for Consumers and Markets. The 
13 Commissioning administrative fines is one of the possible sanctions authorised by Dutch competition law (according to 
Art. 56 lid 1 sub a Mw). Since October 2007, Dutch competition law allows the investigation of private property and the 
possibility of fining natural persons (Kamerstukken I 2006/07, 30 071, A). October 2007 is the starting point of the analysis 
for the sake of comparability of the material. January 2012 is indicated as end date because cases usually take several years 
from the initial investigation until the official sanction; all cases completed by January 2012 have been included.
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sources are official reports by the authority,14 summarising the files and containing a selection 
of evidence used in administrative proceedings towards administrative fines imposed upon 
corporations. These files contain descriptions of the modus operandi of cartels and include 
correspondence between their members; transcriptions of verbal interrogations with corporate 
officials by the competition authority; and sources of cartel administration. These statements 
are supported by additional written administration. The material was systematically studied 
using a checklist, focusing on the type of network; the nature of mutual relations; mechanisms 
for mutual control; mechanisms for mutual trust; and instances of cheating and conflicts. For 
every case, the document analysis was complemented with a semi-structured interview with 
the project manager of the authority that handled the investigation. In these interviews, the 
following topics were discussed: the nature of the cartel; mechanisms for mutual control and 
trust; and instances of cheating and mutual conflicts. These interviews served to provide a 
better overview of the files and an opportunity to ask additional questions that could not be 
answered in full through studying the written reports.
Table 2 Descriptive information on selected cartel cases
Case # Duration in years Number of firms Nature of the conduct Collective market share
Case 1 6 9 Market division 70%
Case 2 8 9 Price-fixing 85-90%
Case 3 6 8 Bid-rigging 60-80%
Case 4 6 5 Market division 60-80%
Case 5 6 5 Bid-rigging -
Case 6 1 9 Bid-rigging -
Case 7 7 15 Market division 90%
Case 8 1 2 Bid-rigging -
Case 9 6 15 Market division 87.3%
Case 10 1.5 4 Price-fixing 58%
Case 11 2 3 Bid-rigging 85-95%
Case 12 9 14 Bid-rigging -
Case 13 3.5 10 Market allocation -
Case 14 11 4 Market allocation 35-50%
The use of secondary sources leads to several limitations of this study. Because of detection 
and enforcement biases, the cases do not necessarily provide a representative image of all cartel 
conduct in the Netherlands. Some cartels have greater chances of being detected, and cases that 
14 These files are a result of investigations based on the legal power invested in the Dutch competition authority to 
interrogate corporate officials and demand corporate intelligence (Art. 5:16 Awb), to investigate company and private 
property and administration (Art. 5:15, art. 54, 55 Mw), and to use leniency requests and other relevant informants and 
public information.
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involve substantial proof will have a greater chance of ultimately resulting in an administrative 
fine. The statements of corporate officials referred to in this chapter, originate from secondary 
sources and therefore might express firms’ perspectives, but were originally made in the course 
of an administrative procedure. Note that one of the formal legal requirements of finding a 
person or corporation guilty of an infringement is that the effects of the infringement must 
be ‘noticeable’; have a significant effect on the market. This might lead some of the corporate 
officials to deny the ‘real’ effect of any agreements made, as a legal defence strategy, or to under-
report their conduct in general. Table 2 presents descriptive information on the selected cases, 
including the cartel’s duration,15 number of firms, and nature of the conduc.16 The relatively 
high number of firms in these cases can be biased because of three main issues. Firstly, cartels 
with an active industry association have a greater chance of detection. Secondly, cartels with a 
more limited number of firms may conspire more effectively, with little chance of detection. 
Thirdly, an effective cartel may have a self-amplifying effect; the collusion can offer more firms 
an opportunity to survive.
The Dutch cases in this study have an average duration of about five years, which is comparable 
to the typical duration of cartels (Levenstein and Suslow 2006; 2011). This duration shows 
that firms manage to stabilise their cartel for several years, which indicates a form of stability 
and effective coordination. Besides duration, most of the cases involve a large number of 
participating firms. For instance, 15 firms were involved in cases 7 and 9. It indicates the need 
for systems of communication and monitoring in coordinating collective action in cartels. 
Table 2 also states the nature of the conduct. Three main categories are distinguished: bid-
rigging, price-fixing, and market division or allocation. Based on legal definitions, these serve 
as a descriptive label, indicating the main category of the infringement, though these categories 
are not mutually exclusive per se. Bid-rigging involves firms in a tendering procedure, 
communicating before the bidding takes place. They divide the work and rotate bids, thereby 
rigging the procedure. Also known as collusive tendering, it generally involves raising price 
offers to the buyer. In price-fixing cartels, firms make explicit agreements on the price or 
surcharge of a particular product or service. Firms will use, for instance, minimum pricelists. 
The other cases are market division or allocation. In these cartels, firms agree to fix market 
shares or divide markets into geographical regions.
15 To determine the duration of these cartels, the period of the continuous infringement stated in the report is used. This 
also means that the period before the introduction of the Dutch cartel prohibition (January 1998) is not incorporated in 
determining the duration. This suggests an underestimation of the actual duration of the cartel. This effect is enhanced 
by the internal selection bias of the competition authority concerning the minimum standards regarding evidence.
16 In light of confidentiality, the industry in which the cartels took place cannot be indicated per case in table 2. The cases 
took place in the following industries; construction (6); heavy industry (3); general services industry (2); forestry (1); 
waste disposal (1); and financial services (1).
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4. Managing cartels in the absence of formal legal control
To analyse which elements of the two approaches occur in the cases, they are discussed in light 
of the explanatory model provided in Section 2: respectively, the organisation of cartels, the 
responses to cheating and conflicts, and the outcome of these responses. 
4.1 The organisation of cartels: systems of coordination, compensation and 
monitoring
Cartel stability is enabled by systems of coordination, compensation, and monitoring in all 
cases, as expected from both the economic and the social approach. Bid-rigging cartels use 
cover pricing and phases-of-the-moon systems. Firms inform each other on new incoming 
requests from potential and existing clients, while others respond when they receive the same 
request. Agreements are made on a specific project, and firms divide the work, communicating 
their prices and offers prior to submitting them in a tender procedure. They typically agree on 
who will obtain the tender, and the rest will submit a higher price. The firms themselves often 
document divided projects and clients. Based on this overview, they make use of compensations 
to even out disparities. To do this, firms can use false invoices, by which goods and services 
are billed that did not actually take place. In some cases, discounts for mutual deliveries are 
used to compensate. In addition, some bid-rigging cartels use a phases-of-the-moon system 
to decide whose turn it is to acquire the next project or client. It is a form of bid rotation by 
taking turns. Less communication is needed this way, leading to less potential written evidence 
of communication. Here is an example of how such a system can operate:
“We kept an overview in Excel. It was quite simple. Name of the tender, names of the 
suppliers [cartelists], their prices, and the name of who got the tender. Those firms involved 
in the specific tender kept score, they noted the price on which the tender was assigned. An 
example: if there were three suppliers, one would have received work for €70,000, the other 
for €80,000 and the third for €30,000; then the next project would be for the one with 
€30,000. The lowest in the list came first.” (5)
There are also instances of cover pricing; purposely submitting a higher price than other firms. 
This is also referred to as ‘borrowing prices’ or courtesy bidding, which is used to stay in the 
loop and remain visible to potential clients, while lacking the capacity to actually execute the 
work. Cover pricing is a form of bid-rigging that takes place more decentralised and ad hoc.
Price-fixing cartels usually organise a number of meetings to set minimum prices or increase 
prices regarding a certain product or service. Minimum pricelists and standard client letters 
are used. In one example, producers meet twice a year to discuss and fix prices. As well as the 
means to increase prices, cartel members also discuss the timing of announcing the surcharge.
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Other cases include market division cartels, dividing market shares and geographical allocation. 
These cartels use client lists, turnover lists, market-sharing lists, and geographical distributions. 
Dividing clients, often referred to by firms as ‘respecting clients’, is most common among the 
selected cases. One of the cartelists explains the use of client lists as follows:
“Goal of the list is to respect each others’ A-relation customers. This means that if I received 
an order from someone else’s A-relation client, I at least had to apply the price lists. And we 
did. The other one would then have the possibility to underprice that offer to manipulate the 
order in their direction”. (1)
Cartels show a learning ability when it comes to effective coordination. In the next example, 
firms develop and professionalise their coordination system through trial and error. Initially 
they have a simple system: firms report orders of a certain size at a central contact point, discuss 
who is to be given the order, and divide the work accordingly. However, as in most of the cases, 
firms need some form of compensation to even out disparities that would build up over time 
and were not in line with the mutual agreement. To compensate for this, firms would prefer 
orders, but sometimes also needed to apply financial transactions. However, this led to practical 
issues resulting in a flexible compensation rule, noted in the minutes of one of their meetings. 
This example illustrates how cartelists manage to negotiate a solution as well as how firms 
choose the desire for stability over financial gain:
“Because no member of the cartel could ever deliver exactly in accordance with the pre-
established market shares, and it is considered undesirable for members to transfer money to 
one another as if they were bankers, an agreement is established including that compensation 
is not needed for over- or under-exceeding 5% of the market share”. (4)
Other cases also illustrate this point. In case 14, firms divided national regions, and every 
cartelist was committed to refer potential clients to the firm that was active in that area. However, 
firms did not always succeed in referring clients. If clients went against being referred, the firm 
that originally received the order accepted the offer, hereby violating the original allocation 
agreement. For this situation, the cartel introduced a rule: if a client from another region was 
contracted, the firm owed 2% of that contract to the cartelist who ‘owned’ that region. Cases 4 
and 14 are good illustrations of the coordination process in most cases, for two reasons. Firstly, 
it shows how parties can prevent resentment or conflicts by compensating according to what 
is perceived as ‘just’. Secondly, it demonstrates how cartelists evaluate and negotiate in order 
to establish internal rules and agreements. Both examples of the informal rules that emerge 
from collective bargaining in the absence of formal legal means. Cartel rules can clearly be a 
result of social norms in a sector, as in the example of ‘respecting clients’. Furthermore, the 
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coordination process highlights the significance of communication and reciprocity. It illustrates 
how informal social can function as a far more powerful system to govern business conduct 
then formal legal rules (cf. Macaulay 1963). This also facilitates cartel stability and makes 
internal punishment or retaliation less likely or irrelevant.
However, cartelists do monitor their agreements, which indicates some scepticism of firms with 
respect to the level of trust. We can distinguish different functions of these informal control 
mechanisms: firms collect information on the actions of other participants in the cartel; assess 
whether it is in line with the agreement; and decide what type of response should be applied 
to the cheating party. Cartels use two main mechanisms to monitor the agreement: meetings 
for reporting sales figures and so on, and independent administrators. In most cases, cartelists 
use some form of reporting figures, such as turnover, market shares, and prices. A managing 
director explains which issues are dealt with in these meetings:
“This was an evaluation meeting in which the outcome of dealer negotiations was addressed. 
Amongst other things, the following questions were dealt with: Did everyone manage to 
retain their clients? Did clients leave? Was an increase in prices established?” (2)
Firms mention the social control function of cartel meetings. In the next example, one of 
the participants explains how meetings − in theory − would be superfluous. His statement, 
however, indicates the scepticism that most cartelists hold towards others’ complying with the 
agreements:
“The role of pricelists is that they contain the price upon which others should overcharge in 
formulating their offer. Actually, the meetings would not have been necessary if every member 
had just abided by the pricelists, because that was defining.” (4)
Some cartels also use independent – third-party – administrators, sometimes referred to as 
a cartel ‘secretary’. They are often retired executives, familiar with the market. They arrange 
practical matters, look after administration, and lead discussions or negotiations. One of 
these ‘secretaries’ explained that he organised the meetings, made reservations for venues, paid 
expenses in advance, took minutes of the meetings, and kept score of the general turnover 
numbers. Being an independent ‘fixer’, a secretary often functions not only as an administrator 
but also as an informal auditor. He monitors the cartel and fulfils a role in preventing possible 
disagreements or in mediating in the case of conflicts.
Firms are capable of coordinating and compensating in good standing and through collective 
bargaining within cartels. However, signs of informal control indicate a certain lack of trust. 
Notable from these examples is that, because of their need to operate underground, cartelists 
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have to rely heavily on informal means of coordination as expected from the paradox of social 
embeddedness (Portes 2010). At the same time, however, cartelists tend to formalise their 
interactions heavily by clandestine bookkeeping, minutes of meetings, and rules on mutual 
compensation. It remains unclear whether this is a function of trust or a lack of it.
 
4.2 Responses: cheating, discussion, and conflict
With internal monitoring also comes information on the behaviour of other cartelists. This 
information sometimes reveals cheating by one or more cartel members. When parties do not 
communicate regularly, suspicions of cheating arise, resulting in mutual disagreements and 
irritation. One of the firms openly raised questions on the level of internal compliance in 
the cartel in the following example, documented in internal correspondence between cartel 
members:
“Member [name club], [C] is right – we report everything that has to be reported, but we 
also observe from the order of the numbers [phases-of-the-moon system] that there seem to 
be only two companies that still report. The rest of them do nothing or keep quiet. Especially 
now, when times are tough, it is useful and necessary that we keep in touch (…). That’s what 
we agreed upon. Or is [serial number of environmental certification these companies require 
to do business in this market] the end-all of the [name club]? This can’t be true. Show some 
personality and guts – this attitude leads to nothing, to nothing at all.” (3)
Third-party fixers also notice internal struggles that occur in the context of collective meetings. 
The ‘secretary’ in the following example explains how he had a mitigating role in a dispute that 
derived from episodes of mutual cheating: 
“I would tell them to stop arguing. (…) I believe that firms deviated a lot from the established 
pricelists. Everyone did. One would be left with the impression “they exchange everything, we 
all go home, and everyone does something else instead.” (4) 
In addition to third-party fixers, other cartel participants can fulfil a conciliatory role in the 
event of internal disagreements. A managing director explains:
“Arguments could escalate quickly because somebody had taken someone else’s A-relation 
customer, for instance. If others saw this happening, they would adopt the role of mediator 
between parties in the meeting.” (1)
The next example also shows how firms can overcome conflicts bilaterally through 
communicating and showing a willingness to settle. This is a segment of a wiretapped 
conversation between cartelists as part of a police file, also used in the administrative procedure 
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by the Dutch competition authority. It reflects a conversation held after an episode of cheating 
on the agreement by one of the parties:
“[A:] Guys, if this is the way we are going to do business, every man for himself, you know 
what’s going to happen, right? The price will only go down and, well, quite frankly, I can of 
course go way down. I don’t want to do this, but you just wait and see [B:]. You know, let us 
be wise. We should just return to the way we did business before, in everybody’s best interest. 
We should take for granted that mistakes will be made, but we should set aside our feelings 
and trust each other’s word.” (12) 
These cases show how cheating is noticed by others in the cartel and can lead to disagreements. 
However, cheating can also occur without being detected. In the following example, one of the 
cartelists explains how they would manipulate the information presented to others: 
“It was a statement of the auditor that indicated how many square metres [name company] 
had supplied in the previous year. We would manipulate this statement and present it in 
the meeting. We blurred out the [type of product] that wasn’t relevant to the cartel. We 
would leave the total amount but replace the attachments with the amounts we had reported 
earlier.” (1).
These four cases demonstrate that despite sophisticated coordination systems, cheating occurs 
and can result in conflict. Although negotiations and mediating ‘fixers’ can help to overcome 
most conflicts, thus stabilising the cartel, in some cases this does not suffice. The following 
example, also from case 1, shows how multiple attempts to overcome a lack of trust can 
ultimately fail. One of the managing directors provides a brief history of the cartel’s internal 
struggles:
“In the autumn of 2002, the tension between [V] and [B] escalated again. [B] was accused 
in connection with several matters. I had a conversation on this matter with [V]. As a result 
of this conversation, [V] even called a director of [B]. I was upset about this, and then ended 
everything in December. (…) I think [V] eventually apologised in, I think, March 2003. We 
then sat back at the negotiation table. Everything was already falling apart anyway; [B] was 
doing his own thing. There had been a meeting in April 2003, and we concluded: “Guys, we 
have to stop. This is pointless.” The stupid thing was that you were better off if you weren’t 
sitting at the table, because then you wouldn’t have to decrease your volume of production. As 
the biggest party, [V] had the greatest interest in keeping the thing together. You would have 
a really disproportional attendance at the table. We then finally quit.” (1) 
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4.3 Outcome: breaking up is hard
Based on the documents and the interviews with enforcement officials, it is not always possible 
to determine whether cartels in the selected cases actually ceased their activities, and, if so, 
whether this took place before, during, or after the administrative procedures. As previously 
mentioned, however, ‘internal violations’ involving cartel agreements are mostly resolved at 
an early stage, ex ante, by mutual compensations, negotiations, and mediation. In the last 
example, we saw how cheating could eventually lead to the demise of the cartel.
Nevertheless, based on the case material, there is reason to believe that on numerous occasions 
ending the cartel was not an easy decision. It was rarely due to explicit pressure and intimidation, 
and more often because of existing loyalties towards ‘co-competitors’, as illustrated by a quote 
from one of the directors:
“Again, I declare that we decided internally, with the introduction of the new Dutch 
competition law, to cease our activities. We did not succeed. We should have distanced 
ourselves from these activities. I urged this several times and was sometimes pressured by 
other firms to continue with the agreements.” (12)
This example underlines what other scholars have pointed out: taking part in cartels is not a 
voluntary and purely instrumental decision, but is embedded in social reality that includes 
existing loyalties to industry peers in markets and within firms (Parker 2012). Breaking with 
the cartel was often also difficult because of the mutual dependencies that had evolved as 
a result of working closely with others for years. When one relies on informal systems and 
methods for doing business, it is not easy to reject them overnight for the sake of continuation 
of your business. This is illustrated in the following example:
“Recently I have said “no” on five or six occasions; the reason for saying “yes” again to future 
agreements [collusive tendering] was that I would also be included in the market if they 
received an order. If I say “no” too often, I’m sure to be excluded by them in the future. If I say 
“yes”, however, this also creates possibilities for me. It’s give-and-take in this business.” (12)
Reciprocity is a powerful market mechanism. It means that one might become a ‘prisoner’ of 
the system, entangled in mutual rights and obligations that make it harder to say goodbye (Van 
de Bunt 2010; Hertogh 2005) The uncertainty of a competitive market − smaller margins, 
downward price levels, and so on − can also function as a push factor into continuing the cartel. 
This can result in cartelists, that had become competitors, to become cartelists again. This is 
illustrated by the following example:
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“In March 2003 we as a company said “we should stop”. It was illegal then, and it’s illegal 
now. We have to learn to reason from the cost price plus leeway. After the summer of 2003 
(fall) [company B] frontally attacked [company A]. [A] counter-attacked. Prices dropped 
dramatically and [A] yielded in a lot of orders that autumn. Then [B] took the initiative 
again to sit back at the negotiating table and said this was not workable; we are giving away 
everything to the market.” (1)
5. Conclusions
This study highlights how firms in the selected cases manage their cartels in the absence of 
law. The focus of this chapter has been on the internal structure of cartels, with regard to how 
firms are able to stabilise their cartel. The research question was How do informal coordinating 
mechanisms enable cartel stability outside the scope of formal legal control and what role does 
trust play? Two different perspectives were identified in the existing literature: an economic 
approach departing from the assumption of a lack of trust and a need for monitoring and 
retaliation, and a social approach departing from the assumption of mutual trust and the use 
of negotiation and mediation. Elements from both ideal types occurred in the selected cases.
On the one hand, the cases demonstrate the importance of informal social mechanisms for 
the ‘successful’ operation of cartels. Means of coordination and compensation − meetings, 
informal rules, and mutual debts − were established between firms through communication 
and reciprocity. The cases thereby confirmed the paradox of social embeddedness: namely, the 
need to operate secretly forces cartelists to rely heavily on social ties through informal means 
of coordination. Furthermore, mutual rights and obligations make parties interdependent, 
and reciprocity can function as a powerful market mechanism. This stabilises and strengthens 
cartels and makes it hard for firms to end existing agreements.17
On the other hand, third-party auditors and the formalisation of agreements in writing also 
indicate a lack of trust: conflicts occurred in some cases, and parties sometimes responded 
through retaliation. However, retaliation appears more likely to lead to the end of the cartel 
rather than stabilising it. In light of conflicts, the dominant strategy seems to be not to punish 
other cartel members. In contrast, firms are often able to overcome mutual disagreements by 
means of negotiation and compensation. Moreover, most cases do not involve explicit episodes 
of conflict, confirming the preventative effect imposed by the systems of coordination and 
17  In addition to these findings, it is noted that social capital, strong social ties, and trust are often considered desirable 
in light of growth and economic value (cf. De Bliek 2015). However, these mechanisms can also have less desirable 
consequences. The strong ties in a social group such as a business cartel can benefit its members but exclude others from 
access. Moreover, it can limit and restrict the individual freedom of its members (Parker 2012; Portes 2010: 39).
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compensation. This is comparable to findings on drug markets, where retaliation is found to 
be a costly business tool and negotiation and toleration are common (Jacques & Wright 2008; 
2011; Zaitch 2005).
The results emphasise that in order to explain cartel stability we need to consider the social 
embeddedness and the importance of social mechanisms that induce trust. Trust and a lack 
of trust both play a role in how firms manage and shape their cartels. In a theoretical sense, it 
remains a chicken and egg situation, because the formalisation of cartel agreements − clandestine 
bookkeeping, minutes of meetings, and rules on mutual compensations − can express both 
mutual trust or a lack of it. Both elements are clearly hard to disentangle, and such an exercise 
harms the complexity of the social reality of cartels. In this regard, the economic approach 
overlooks the fact that − given the participants’ proper response − conflicts can prove to be 
an opportunity to strengthen the cartel, and they pan out to be a source of stability instead of 
instability. This is also referred to as the ‘cleansing’ function of social conflicts (Coser 1956). In 
these cases, cartels will be more difficult to break up, even when facing the threat of formal legal 
control (enforcement) or changing market conditions (Levenstein and Suslow 2011).
The results illustrate the importance of mutual dependencies between competitors and the use 
of informal social mechanisms to build trust and to stabilise cartels. This enables even relatively 
large groups of firms to cooperate effectively (e.g. case 12, fourteen firms and a duration 
of nine years, case 7, fifteen firms and a duration of seven years). The cases thereby show 
how an economic model provides an incomplete explanation for cartel stability and calls for 
incorporating a different approach to explain how cartel stability operates. Furthermore, this 
calls for incorporating a social perspective in competition law and policy, in which the influence 
of economic assumptions is widespread.
5.1 Limitations
It is difficult to determine the perspective of cartelists when their statements and testimonies 
have to be derived from secondary sources collected in the context of administrative procedures. 
Some issues, therefore − such as the significance of reputation − are less well documented. The 
data also did not always provide a definitive answer to whether the detected cartel had actually 
ended. This is an important question, because there is reason to believe that mutual conflicts 
and detection can also give rise to cartels beginning or starting anew. This could indicate a 
learning ability in prosecuted firms in addition to a ‘stronger-through-conflict’ cooperation 
with other firms in their market. Large-scale cartel recidivism on an international and European 
level also supports this view (Connor and Helmers 2007; Connor 2010). However, the level 
of recidivism is yet to be established with regard to the Dutch situation, and more careful 
consideration of the ‘cleansing function of social conflict’ is needed.
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This chapter has only discussed the internal threat of cheating within cartels. Other threats, like 
defection by insiders (whistle-blowers) or detection by outsiders, have not been addressed here 
but will be in the following chapters of this study. The material on detected cartels does not 
provide this inside information on considerations of firms that blew the whistle on the cartel in 
exchange for immunity or a waiver of prosecution. 
Another issue raised by this study concerns the strain between concealment of conduct and 
coordination, as was pointed out by the formalisation of agreements through minutes of 
meetings, bookkeeping, and so on. Communication and exchanges between firms in a cartel are 
underestimated (Grout and Sonderegger 2005). Communication seems to play a significant role 
in cartel stability, which might suggest that cartelists will engage in overtly collusive practices, 
in contrast to what might be expected from their need to conceal their cartel. This generates 
further questions surrounding cartel stability; for instance, what will prevail − the need to 
coordinate or the need to conceal? For further research on these issues, it is recommended to 
interview insiders such as compliance officers, in-house or external lawyers, or general managers 
of businesses confronted by or involved in cartel infringements (see chapter 5).
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Chapter 3
Strong by concealment? How 
secrecy, trust, and social 
embeddedness facilitate 
corporate crime*
Abstract:
Chapter 3 examines how corporate crime is organised through studying the longevity of 
illegal business cartels. Previous studies demonstrate cartels can remain undetected for years 
or decades. Similar to criminal networks, cartel participants need to communicate in order to 
collaborate effectively but operate covertly at the same time. The case study analysis of fourteen 
Dutch cartel cases in this study demonstrates two main findings. First, cartel participants 
communicate frequently and elaborately, and the need for trust and communication impedes 
concealment. Second, the longevity of cartels cannot be explained by isolation from but 
by embeddedness in their social environment. The context of legitimacy and a facilitating 
environment are significant factors. Criminal collaboration is studied extensively in literature 
on organised crime, however gained little attention in the literature on corporate crime. Hereby, 
this study contributes to an understanding of how corporate criminal conduct is organised, by 
applying relevant theory on criminal networks gleaned from the literature on organised crime.
*  This chapter has been published as: Jaspers, J.D. (2019). Strong by concealment? How secrecy, trust, and social 
embeddedness facilitate corporate crime. Crime, Law and Social Change. doi: 10.1007/s10611-019-09847-4.
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1. Introduction
Criminal acts committed through collaboration between criminal partners require not only 
concealment but also communication. Communication is essential in organising crime: 
namely, making arrangements regarding the required resources, contacts and transport; settling 
disputes; and dividing criminal profits (Gambetta 2009). The balance between operational 
efficiency through communication and secrecy through concealment is a widely known trade-
off for participants of any covert network. The paradox of concealment and communication is 
a focal point in the study of illegal and criminal networks (Morselli 2009; Kenney 2009; Krebs 
2002). In the literature, concealment and communication are often presented as opposites, 
operating as communicating vessels (Baccara & Bar-Isaac 2008; Baker & Faulkner 1993; 
Morselli, Giguere & Petit 2007). 
As with any criminal network, business cartels – e.g. price-fixing, bid-rigging – need to 
coordinate collective actions efficiently by communicating while facing the risk of exposure. 
Firms have to exchange information on prices, customers, tendering procedures and so on; 
internal issues and disputes must be resolved; and acceptable agreements on compensations 
must be reached between participants (Faulkner, Cheney, Fisher & Baker 2003; Jaspers 2016). 
In light of increasing enforcement efforts and the criminalisation of business cartels (Harding, 
Beaton-Wells & Edwards 2015; Shaffer and Nesbitt 2011; Whelan 2014), perpetrators of cartel 
conduct must also conceal their activities from customers, non-participants, and internal and 
external watchdogs.
Despite the risk of detection, many cartels remain active for years, even decades (Connor and 
Helmers 2007; Levenstein and Suslow 2006). For instance, the recent European price-fixing 
truck cartel lasted for 14 consecutive years (IP/16/2582), and is no exception (cf. Connor 
& Helmers 2007). This raises questions as to how business cartels succeed in remaining 
undetected for long periods, considering the increased pressure on revealing cartel conduct and 
their need for communication and coordination. Are there effective social control mechanisms 
within cartels that ensure long-lasting secrecy? Do cartels employ effective modus operandi 
of concealment? Does a silent or even cooperative social environment ensure cartels of their 
longevity? Although these are familiar questions with regard to criminal networks, they have 
received limited attention thus far in the literature on cartels.
Cartels consist of illegal activities in otherwise legal networks (Fear 2006) and the question as to 
how cartels deal with communication and secrecy should be addressed accordingly. Considering 
cartels as communication networks has rarely been done (cf. Faulkner et al. 2003; Baker & 
Faulkner 1993). Recent studies that do adopt an organised crime perspective regarding the 
organisation of serious crimes such as fraud and bribery have demonstrated that this provides 
71
3
a fruitful approach for studying corporate and white-collar crime (Edwards & Levi 2008; Levi 
2008a; Levi 2008b; Lord & Levi 2016). It exposes the nature and structure of these crimes, 
and sheds light on new criminal opportunities and systematic causes for corporate and white-
collar crime. Business cartels can be seen as a form of corporate and thereby organisational 
crime (Braithwaite 1989; Clinard & Yeager 1980; Jamieson 1994) in which legitimate firms, 
business relations, and transactions provide the context for illegitimate conduct (Wheeler & 
Rothman 1982; Punch 1996). Business cartels are inherently incorporated in legal networks and 
legitimate firms (Fear 2006). However, earlier studies demonstrate how covertness and secrecy 
are important dimensions of cartel conduct. Both within and outside companies involved in 
cartel agreements, covertness is an important aspect (cf. the Vitamins cartel, Connor, 2006). 
This exemplifies how much of what happens in firms is shaped by informal and unwritten 
processes (Parker, 2016; Costas & Gray, 2014).
Hence, this chapter applies the criminological notions on the functioning of illegal and 
criminal networks to the nature and structure of business cartels. First, using these insights – 
rather than legal and economic theory – enables a broader understanding with regard to the 
longevity and effective secrecy of cartels. Applying social theory to study corporate crime and in 
particular cartels enables to reach beyond the idea of both the homo economicus (the rational 
actor, cf. Parker 2012) and the homo juridicus (the legal actor that knows and recognises the 
law, cf. Haines & Beaton-Wells 2012) in understanding and explaining cartel conduct. Second, 
the empirical findings of this chapter shed new light on the theoretically assumed tension 
between communication and concealment in illegal networks. By investigating how cartels 
are organised, this chapter applies insights gained from extensive study of covert and criminal 
networks to cartel agreements. Employing that perspective, this study builds upon the work of 
Levi (2008b), Passas (2003) and Ruggiero (1996), where corporate and white-collar crime is 
studied by examining the mobilisation of existing resources and networks.
2. Secrecy and trust in criminal networks
Two lines of thought within the literature on criminal networks are discussed: one that departs 
from the concept of the ‘secret society’ and the trade-off between communication and concealment, 
and one that focuses on the importance of mutual trust and social networks for operating in 
illegality. These insights are subsequently translated into expectations regarding cartels.
2.1 Criminal networks as secret societies
Several sociological studies on covert networks and criminal networks like terrorist groups and 
mafia families depart from a trade-off between communication and concealment (Baccara & 
Bar-Isaac 2008; Baker & Faulkner 1993; Chen 2005; Kenney 2009; Krebs 2002; Morselli 2009, 
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p. 63; Morselli, Giguere & Petit 2007; Zhang & Chin 2002). These studies employ the classical 
concept of the secret society as their conceptual point of departure. Networks that maximise 
for concealment and are strongly isolated from their environment – like Freemasonry or WWII 
resistance groups – are also characterised as secret societies (Simmel 1906; Hazelrigg 1969). 
Georg Simmel introduced the concept of the secret society as follows: […] ‘an interactional 
unit characterized in its totality by the fact that reciprocal relations among its members are 
governed by the protective function of secrecy’ (Hazelrigg 1969; Simmel 1906). Simmel (1906) 
elaborated on two central circumstances in the secret society: namely, members are concerned 
with the protection of ideas, objects, activities, and sentiments to which they attach positive 
value; and members seek protection by controlling the distribution of information about the 
valued elements. According to Simmel’s concept, outside pressure towards certain ideas and 
activities of a group enhances the likelihood of secret societies forming. 
The literature on criminal networks that uses the concept of the secret society describes different 
examples in which criminal networks deal with the expected trade-off between concealment 
and communication. One example is the ‘Cupola’ within the Cosa Nostra. This ‘commission’ 
of highly ranked experienced men within the Cosa Nostra was supposedly responsible for 
internal dispute settlement (Gambetta 2009, p. 61). These men held a key information 
position regarding the illegal activities of the Cosa Nostra ‘family’ but were themselves never 
directly involved in criminal activities. This shielded them from prosecution by the authorities 
and law enforcement. This example suggests a form of centralisation of communication and 
information. A second example of how illegal networks deal with the assumed trade-off between 
communication and concealment are terrorist groups. Terrorist groups are known to operate 
and communicate through a decentralised cell structure. People within a cell know each other, 
but do not possess information concerning how the overarching network outside the cell is 
organised or know the identity of participants of other cells (Krebs 2002; Memon, Larsen, 
Hicks & Harkiolakis 2008).
In theory, prioritising either for concealment or for effective communication leads to a different 
network structure. Prioritising for concealment is expected to lead to a decentralised network, 
while prioritising for effective communication is expected to lead to a centralised network 
(Baker & Faulkner 1993). Networks that are focused on effective communication leave their 
participants more vulnerable to detection and punishment. In contrast, networks that are 
focused on concealment are less successful in generating effective communication, which is 
detrimental to the network’s operational efficiency (Baker & Faulkner 1993; Goffman 1970). 
The aspect for which networks prioritise is expected to depend on the need to act and the 
accompanying need for and frequency of communication (Baccara & Bar-Isaac 2008; Morselli 
et al. 2007; Baker & Faulkner 1993). This means that terrorist groups are more prone to 
prioritise for concealment than for communication, because they require less continuous action 
73
3
and therefore less communication (Morselli et al. 2007). Moreover, covert social networks are 
therefore expected to be project-oriented (Fielding, 2016).
In short, decentralised networks provide better protection against detection of its members, 
while centralised networks provide more effective communication. In light of the literature, it is 
expected that cartels limit their frequency of communication with regard to their need to operate 
covertly. The degree of communication within the network is expected to be minimalised, and 
participants share information only on a need-to-know basis (cf. Zhang & Chin 2002).
2.2 Criminal networks as networks of trust
For decades, the classic concept of secret societies was also the image that existed of organised 
crime. Contemporary literature suggests that communication and concealment go hand-in-
hand. Instead of a paradox, they are both regarded as imperative to the longevity of criminal 
networks (Kleemans & de Poot 2008; Von Lampe & Ole Johansen 2004; Klerks 2001). The 
classic image of criminal networks as being centralised and hierarchical is also outdated by 
criminological research into organised crime and has been adjusted to be an image of the 
flexible criminal ‘entrepreneur’ (Paoli & Vander Beken 2014; Spapens 2010; Zaitch 2002; 
2005). Owing to the need to be flexible and secretive, most criminal networks involved in 
organised crime are unlikely to become large-scale ‘enterprises’ with a clear structure, hierarchy, 
and bureaucracy (Paoli 2002).18 Criminal networks are more likely to function horizontally 
and through means of decentralised communication structures. In these structures trust, again 
plays an important role.
The literature on organised crime demonstrates how mutual trust is of great importance 
to the functioning of criminal networks (Kleemans & de Poot 2008; Von Lampe & Ole 
Johansen 2004; Klerks 2001). Trust is considered to work in two ways − it is important both 
for effective communication and for the successful concealment of illegal activities. Indeed, 
communication is considered a condition for concealment in criminal networks. In this sense, 
trust functions as a linking pin in the operation of criminal networks. In some contemporary 
literature, communication and concealment are therefore not considered a trade-off but two 
equally pivotal imperatives for the functioning of criminal networks. Trust is strongest in pre-
existing social relations: namely, strong ties. Therefore, most participants in illegal networks 
are recruited from existing social networks (Erickson 1981). Strong social ties, like family ties 
(cf. Moors & Spapens 2016), provide trustworthy partners that are discrete towards outsiders 
with regard to the illegal activities. Unlike conclusions in the literature that are based on the 
18 This does not negate the fact that vertically organised hierarchical criminal organisations (e.g. the Cosa Nostra) exist. 
However, they are neither the only form of organised crime nor do they exclusively control the illegal markets. Paoli 
states this in her ‘paradoxes of organized crime’. One of these paradoxes entails that organisations that are effective in 
illegal markets, due to their flexible and horizontal structure, are unfit because of their nature to develop into large-scale 
criminal ‘enterprises’.
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trade-off between communication and concealment, trust can be built through elaborate 
communication (Klerks 2001; Von Lampe & Ole Johansen 2004). However, strong ties do 
also present a possible liability relating to concealment, because potential evidence is scattered 
when information is exchanged elaborately. Ultimately, trust is a function of expectations, and 
has to do with building a reputation of trustworthiness (Baker & Faulkner 1993). A shared 
past provides input for this reputation, and a shared future creates the need for it (Kleemans 
& Van de Bunt 1999).
At the same time, it is important for criminal networks to work not only with trustworthy 
partners but also with capable partners: namely, people who can provide certain skills, contacts, 
and resources that are essential to the illegal conduct (Van de Bunt & Kleemans 2007, p. 51). 
Therefore, criminal networks also tend to use potential partners outside of their existing social 
network. This is referred to as the strength of weak ties (Granovetter 1973; 1981). Because 
participants in criminal networks sometimes need to work with these weak ties, they use what is 
called trust-substitutes − forms of ‘hostage-taking’ to increase cooperation among co-offenders 
(Campana & Varese 2013). When there is a lack of trust in legitimate business relations, parties 
can use certain securities that increase the costs of opportunistic behaviour, such as contracts with 
fines or bounties. Within criminal networks, participants rely on alternative resources. One of 
these resources can be the threat of violence, such as ‘hostage-taking’ (Van de Bunt & Kleemans 
2007, p. 66; Campana & Varese 2013; Gambetta 2009; Zaitch 2005). However, the actual use 
of violence often appears to be a costly strategy insofar as it attracts unwanted attention from 
enforcement authorities, which results in caution in applying it (Zaitch 2005; Jacques & Wright 
2008; 2011). In addition, the use of violence might prevent partners from cheating, but can at 
the same time result in losing other, potential partners (Gambetta 2009, p. 36).
In short, based on the literature it is expected that cartels focus strongly on effective 
communication because of the importance of mutual trust, and not primarily on concealment. 
In addition, cartels are expected to focus on generating mutual trust, and to communicate 
frequently in order to achieve this goal. Firms within cartels are expected to use existing social 
ties (strong ties), and also to seek capable business partners with whom they do not have a 
history of cooperation − and trust (weak ties) − because these ties prove to be essential for 
establishing specific goals. The use of weak ties leads firms within cartels to make use of trust-
substitutes.
2.3 Criminal networks and social embeddedness
The fact that criminal conduct can remain hidden from outsiders might not only be due to the 
operation of the network itself − it may be explained by the relation of the network to its social 
environment. Do isolation and covertness truly protect members of criminal networks against 
detection? Or does it make them more vulnerable to suspicion and detection? An alternative 
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explanation is that neither isolation nor exclusion, but the social embeddedness of crime and 
criminal networks protects its members against detection (Passas 2003; Van de Bunt 2010; Van 
de Bunt, Siegel & Zaitch 2014). Scholars have suggested that most crime is committed within 
an informed and even cooperative social environment (Gibson 2014; Hallsworth & Young 
2008). The embeddedness of illegal activities in legal networks, organisations, and platforms 
provides a silent social environment that operates as a shell surrounding criminal networks.
In other words, to answer the question how cartels succeed in hiding their activities from 
outsiders for long periods of time, the relation of the cartel and its participants with their social 
environment is also important. In the existing literature, the concept of social embeddedness 
is used to describe this process (Granovetter 1973; 1981; Van de Bunt, Siegel & Zaitch 
2014). Social embeddedness entails both structural and relational embeddedness. It concerns 
institutional aspects, such as the role of licit organisations, services, and communication 
platforms, and the function of social relations of criminal network participants with people 
outside or inside the periphery of this network. Regarding the role of facilitators, social 
embeddedness is discussed extensively in the literature on criminal networks (Morselli & 
Giguère 2006; Kleemans & Van de Bunt 2003). Facilitators are considered to be licit actors19 
that intentionally or unintentionally fulfil a role in the illegal activities of the criminal network: 
for instance, the role that solicitors and lawyers play in laundering criminal money (Lankhorst 
& Nelen 2005; Middleton & Levi 2005; Di Nicola & Zoffi 2005), or the role of companies 
and entrepreneurs in the transport sector in the traffic and trade of illegal goods (Van Koppen 
& De Poot 2013; Kleemans & De Poot 2008).
2.4 Business cartels as criminal networks
As previously stated, the expectation is that many of the traits, dilemmas, and processes relevant 
for most illegal and criminal networks contribute to an understanding and an explanation of 
the operation of business cartels. However, cartels do possess certain particularities that must 
be addressed. First, because cartels deal with agreements between business competitors, mutual 
trust and communication are expected to be essential, but are also more problematic for the 
operation of cartels. Self-interest and opportunism can form challenges for competitors to work 
together. This raises the question as to whether cartel participants use trust-substitutes, and, 
if so, in what shape or form do these trust-substitutes occur. Second, cartel conduct entails 
illegal activities that take place within the normal course of doing business: namely, within 
licit organisations (cf. Braithwaite 1989; Clinard & Yeager 1980; Jamieson 1994). Therefore, 
is it easier to shroud cartel conduct in a sphere of legality (cf. Punch 1996; Friedrichs 2010; 
Wheeler & Rothman 1982)?
19 Therefore, although they are not referred to as facilitators for the purpose of this article, illicit actors involved in 
facilitating crime, such as a hitman or a forger of passports, are sometimes also labelled facilitators in the existing 
literature (Ruggiero 1996; Morselli & Giguere 2006).
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By now, one could reflect on the question whether the context of, for example, working out 
misunderstandings within price-fixing cartels could be further away from dealing with conflict 
over missed payments between hardened drug criminals. The Dutch fruit trader Rinus M. 
found out about this difference the hard way. When he became involved in transporting illegal 
drugs and a shipment went missing, he tried to resolve the issue using business mores, but was 
confronted with those of organised crime: namely, intimidation and eventually assassination 
(NRC, 16th September 2016). Although there are obvious differences between business cartels 
and other forms of organised crime, such as the use of violence, it is fruitful to apply insights 
on criminal cooperation, gained in studies on organised criminal networks, to business cartels. 
This can help to explain the nature of cartel networks and their longevity, and to provide input 
with regard to considering enforcement strategies.
In conclusion, a criminal network perspective, including notions of secrecy, trust and social 
embeddedness, provides several reasons as to why criminal conduct remains hidden from the 
public for long periods. Three main expectations are: (1) criminal networks may not be as 
centralised and hierarchically organised as in the classic image of the ‘secret society’; (2) criminal 
networks may not only prioritise for concealment but also for effective communication; (3) 
it is not isolation from their social environment but their embeddedness that provides an 
explanation for the longevity of criminal networks.
3. Methods and data sources
This chapter examines cartel stability based on a qualitative case file analysis of 14 Dutch 
cases. In these cases, the Dutch Competition Authority imposed an administrative fine between 
October 2007 and January 2012.20 These cases were selected because reports that lead to a 
fine contain substantial proof, including documentation on coordination and communication 
within cartels. This documentation allowed for a systematic and in-depth study of the structure 
and nature of cartels. The cases were examined using document analysis and semi-structured 
interviews with case managers from the Authority for Consumers and Markets. The sources are 
20 Commissioning administrative fines is one of the possible sanctions authorised by Dutch competition law (according 
to Art. 56 lid 1 sub a Mw). Since October 2007, Dutch competition law has allowed the investigation of private 
property and the possibility of fining natural persons (Kamerstukken I 2006/07, 30 071, A). October 2007 was the 
starting point of the analysis for the sake of comparability of the material. January 2012 was indicated as end date 
because cases usually take several years from the initial investigation until the official sanction. All cases completed by 
January 2012 have been included.
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official reports by the authority,21 summarising the files and containing a selection of evidence 
used in administrative proceedings towards fines imposed upon corporations. These files 
contain descriptions of the modus operandi of cartels including: correspondence between their 
members, transcriptions of verbal interrogations with corporate officials by the competition 
authority, and sources of cartel administration. These statements are supported by additional 
written administration.
The material was studied systematically, using a checklist focusing on the modus operandi 
for concealment; the type of network; the nature of mutual relations; the role of the social 
environment (e.g. industry associations, customers); and mechanisms for mutual trust. For 
every case, the document analysis was complemented with a semi-structured interview with 
the project manager of the authority that handled the investigation. In these interviews, the 
following topics were discussed: the nature of the cartel; the type of network and communication; 
mechanisms for mutual control and trust; and the role of third parties. These interviews served 
to provide a better overview of the files and an opportunity to ask additional questions that 
could not be answered in full through studying the written reports.
Table 1 Descriptive information on selected cartel cases
Case # Duration in years Number of firms Nature of the conduct Collective market share
Case 1 6 9 Market division 70%
Case 2 8 9 Price-fixing 85-90%
Case 3 6 8 Bid-rigging 60-80%
Case 4 6 5 Market division 60-80%
Case 5 6 5 Bid-rigging -
Case 6 1 9 Bid-rigging -
Case 7 7 15 Market division 90%
Case 8 1 2 Bid-rigging -
Case 9 6 15 Market division 87.3%
Case 10 1.5 4 Price-fixing 58%
Case 11 2 3 Bid-rigging 85-95%
Case 12 9 14 Bid-rigging -
Case 13 3.5 10 Market allocation -
Case 14 11 4 Market allocation 35-50%
21 These files are a result of investigations based on the legal power invested in the Dutch competition authority to 
interrogate corporate officials and to demand corporate intelligence (Art. 5:16 Awb); to investigate company and private 
property and administration (Art. 5:15, art. 54, 55 Mw); and to use leniency requests and other relevant informants and 
public information.
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The use of secondary sources in this study leads to several limitations. Because of detection and 
enforcement biases, the cases not necessarily provide a representative image of all cartel conduct 
in the Netherlands. Some cartels have greater chances of being detected, and cases that involve 
substantial proof have a higher chance of ultimately resulting in an administrative fine. The 
statements of corporate officials referred to in this chapter originate from secondary sources, 
and therefore might express firms’ perspectives, but were originally made in the course of an 
administrative procedure. Note that one of the formal legal requirements of finding a person or 
corporation guilty of an infringement is that the effects of the infringement must be ‘noticeable’ 
and have a significant effect on the market. This might lead some of the corporate officials to 
deny the ‘real’ effect of any agreements made as a legal defence strategy, or to under-report their 
conduct in general.
Table 1 presents descriptive information on the selected cases, including the cartel’s duration,22 
number of firms, and nature of the conduct.23 The relatively high number of firms in these 
cases can be biased due to three main issues. First, cartels with an active industry association 
have a greater chance of detection. Second, cartels with a more limited number of firms may 
conspire more effectively, with little chance of detection. Third, an effective cartel may have a 
self-amplifying effect, as the collusion can offer more firms an opportunity to survive.
The Dutch cases in this study have an average duration of about five years, which is comparable 
to the typical duration of cartels (Levenstein and Suslow 2006). The duration shows that 
firms manage to conceal their cartel for several years, despite the large number of participants. 
This suggests effective communication and raises several questions. What are the methods of 
concealment? How do firms deal in practice with theoretically expected trade-offs between 
communication and concealment? Which network structure does this result in? And what role 
do trust, existing networks, and facilitators play? 
Table 1 also states the nature of the conduct. Three main categories are distinguished: bid-
rigging, price-fixing, and market division or allocation. These categories serve as descriptive 
labels – based on legal definitions – indicating the main category of the infringement, though 
these categories are not mutually exclusive per se. Bid-rigging involves firms in a tendering 
procedure, communicating before the bidding takes place. They divide the work and rotate 
bids, thereby rigging the procedure. Also known as collusive tendering, this generally involves 
22 To determine the duration of these cartels, the period of continuous infringement stated in the report is used. This also 
means that the period before the introduction of the Dutch cartel prohibition (January 1998) is not incorporated in 
determining the duration. This suggests an underestimation of the actual duration of the cartel. This effect is enhanced 
by the internal selection bias of the competition authority concerning the minimum standards regarding evidence.
23 In light of confidentiality, the industry in which the cartels took place cannot be indicated per case in Table 1. The cases 
took place in the following industries; construction (6); heavy industry (3); general services industry (2); forestry (1); 
waste disposal (1); and financial services (1).
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raising price offers to the buyer. In price-fixing cartels, firms make explicit agreements on 
the price or surcharge of a particular product or service. Firms use, for instance, minimum 
pricelists. The other cases involve market division or allocation. In these cartels, firms agree to 
fix market shares or divide markets into geographical regions.
4. Results and discussion
The 14 Dutch cartel cases are discussed in light of the question as to how cartels can 
remain undetected for long periods, and how participants deal with trust, communication, 
and concealment. Derived from the literature on illegal and criminal networks, three main 
theoretical expectations are investigated in relation to cartel conduct and presented accordingly: 
(1) exchange of information in cartels is not as centralised and hierarchically organised as in 
the classic image of the ‘secret society’; (2) trust enables cooperation in cartels, and participants 
build this trust through elaborate communication or by using trust-substitutes; (3) it is not 
the isolation of cartels from their social environment but social embeddedness that provides an 
explanation for their longevity.
4.1 Concealment and communication
In line with what could be expected from earlier studies into business cartels (Baker & Faulkner 
1993; Geis 1987; Punch, 1996, p. 98), the Dutch cases do show methods of concealment, such 
as limiting face-to-face interaction and minimising the channels of communication. Examples 
of this include phased price increases; minimalising the frequency of communication; meetings 
in neutral locations (i.e. not at the offices or on personal premises of the firms or corporate 
officials involved); discrete mutual compensations (e.g. in kind, or discounts to supplies); and 
the use of codes. Some cases involve communication exclusively by phone or in person. Most 
meetings took place in neutral locations, such as conference rooms, restaurants, hotels and so 
on. With regard to the meetings in case 2, the secretary of the cartel stated the following: 
“The meetings were held in alternating locations. This would typically not take place at the 
actual offices of one of the firms”. (2)
In case 8, one of the cartel participants − in a conversation with his cartel partner − even refers 
to the risk of communicating over the phone and stresses the need to meet in person. This 
episode of a recorded telephone conversation is related to bid-rigging, and is directed at trading 
information on who takes part in a particular tendering procedure:
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“A: Would you be able to drop by the office this morning?
B: Yes, let’s see, because tomorrow is the bidding for project of [name of street] right?
A: 4 pm, could you make it?
(…)
B: Yeah, no, it would be better to meet at yours before, because I also have some background 
information. I would prefer discussing it with you in private (…)
A: Because, uhm, yes.. around 2 pm, could you make that, or no?
B: Yeah ok, that could work, I will just stick around here in [name city]”. (8)
The cases show that as well as minimalising written communication, cartel participants also 
try to minimalise communication in general. This is demonstrated by the use of impersonal 
systems of communication, such as a circulation system by ‘taking turns’ in bid-rigging cartels 
(also referred to as ‘phases-of-the-moon system’); pre-determined geographical allocations; lists 
with client distributions; and minimum pricelists. These systems can make abundant personal 
contact and correspondence superfluous and can thereby minimise the risk of detection and 
written evidence at a later stage. However, the paradox here is that building mutual trust, which 
can be done through extensive and frequent personal communication, is hindered by the use of 
these impersonal ‘buffers’ (cf. Goffman 1970, p. 78).
At the same time – antithetic to the previously mentioned studies − the cases show how cartel 
participants tend to document a significant part of their agreements and communication. This 
is demonstrated by elaborate written overviews, individual and collective turnover lists, client 
lists, minutes of plenary sessions etc. (cf. Van de Bunt 2010; Hertogh 2010). This exemplifies 
that minimalising mutual communication and using impersonal systems of communication 
is not sufficient for cartels to operate. In particular, the risk of opportunistic behaviour and 
miscommunication demonstrably leads to frequent communication between cartel participants. 
A strong illustration of this is the following quote from a secretary of one of the cartels in which 
he refers to the functioning of instruments such as price lists and the discrepancy between 
theory and practice:
“The function of a price list is that it indicates the price which others should exceed. Actually, 
the meetings would have been superfluous if everyone in the cartel would stick to the list. 
Because it was fixed […] Word on the street however was that firms would deviate from the 
agreed upon prices frequently.” (4)
In most cases, effective communication is prioritised over concealment. Case 14, which dealt 
with a market allocation, also demonstrates this point. The commercial departments of the 
firms involved in this cartel, which deal with acquiring new customers, had to be brought up 
to speed on the implications of the cartel agreement (which meant only acquiring customers 
81
3
from their own region). To the question of who was aware of the illegal conduct, the project 
leader of ACM answered:
“Executives and commercial managers. At the dawn raids in the offices of the firms, maps 
were seen with a visualisation of the market allocation at the desks of the commercial staff. 
They were at least required to know the implications of the market allocation agreements 
when they were on the phone with potential customers. So actually, everyone that was 
required to be informed, was informed.” (14)
Case 14 clearly illustrates how participants in the cartel exchanged information only on a need-
to-know basis (cf. Zhang & Chin 2002).
Nevertheless, the need for secrecy in relation to effective communication can indeed result in 
practical dilemmas. In the operation of case 3, the trade-off between secrecy and operational 
efficiency is illustrated clearly along with the inherent limitations of maximising covert 
networks for concealment. The participating firms in case 3 used code names to refer to clients 
when using the centralised dedicated phone and fax line to communicate on new offers. They 
employed abbreviations to refer to different municipalities − their clients in this case. In one 
instance of communication, one firm reported an offer of ‘R in NB’ and ‘R in ZH’. As a 
result, this caused some confusion among the other firms, with 12 faxes (of questions/answers) 
exchanged on this issue. There was considerable confusion as to which codes belonged to which 
municipalities, illustrating how the need for concealment interferes directly with the need for 
effective communication. In addition, it shows how the need for effective communication 
prevails over the need for concealment. This can be well understood from a practical viewpoint, 
since the illegal networks’ main goal cannot be achieved without clear communication. In other 
words, if members of illegal networks fail to understand each other, the whole existence of the 
network is pointless. These findings hereby contradict the theoretical assumption that illegal 
networks prioritise for concealment but confirm the expectation that prioritising for effective 
communication can come at the expense of concealment (Baker & Faulkner 1993). The paradox 
here is that the more one strives for concealment (e.g. by using codes or other impersonal 
systems of communication), the more frequently one eventually needs to communicate. Also, 
it concurs well with other studies that show if resources are concentrated amongst a few, the 
network is likely to be concentrated (Fielding, 2016).
4.2 The level of centralisation
The centralised communication system from case 3 is no exception. Noticeably, most of the 
cases show clear forms of centralisation in the communication structures that are employed 
by cartel participants. This shows that cartels do not necessarily prioritise for concealment, 
and that they operate in a highly centralised manner. Illustrative examples include the use 
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of collective summaries and administration of the agreements or third parties that function 
as secretary or chair of the cartel. This is also demonstrated by case 5, in which one of the 
participants discusses the method of communication in the cartel that entails a bid-rigging 
conspiracy:
“Everyone was audited, it was a form of division of projects […] We all did our own 
calculations on the price. No one would accept exceptionally high prices. The coordinator 
and the one whose turn it was to get the project would debate on the conditions in these 
general meetings.” (5)
To achieve the cartel’s objectives, it appears to be important that the participants communicate 
frequently and extensively, meet in person, and document their agreements in writing to 
ensure that participants can take each other at their word. This seems counter-intuitive from 
a perspective of secrecy, regardless of how collective and plenary communication reveals a 
pragmatic strategy of cartels in building mutual trust. This seems to be related to the essential 
role of trust in business cartels, where opportunistic behaviour is a perceived risk with 
regard to participating firms. Conceptually, however, it remains unclear whether elaborate 
communication and administration should be perceived as a function of trust or of distrust 
(cf. Jaspers 2016).
4.3 The role of trust and trust-substitutes
Considering the pivotal role that trust plays in cartels, it is unsurprising and in line with 
the expectations derived from the literature that pre-existing social and professional networks 
play a significant role in the Dutch cartel cases. Existing ties between competitors, through 
different platforms within the sector or because firms did business together in the past, can 
lead to or provide an opportunity for agreements on prices or market division. This confirms 
the theoretical expectation that having a history of working together strengthens a reputation 
for being trustworthy (cf. Erickson 1981). However, not all cases involve pre-existing relations, 
or strong ties, between the cartel participants. As well as trustworthy partners, cartel members 
also need capable partners. As stated earlier, cartels entail agreements between competitors in 
which the chance for opportunistic behaviour is ever present. Nevertheless, participants in 
these cartels find solutions for cooperating with weak ties. 
As expected from the literature on criminal networks, cartels also have forms of guarantees or 
‘insurances’ against opportunistic behaviour, which can be characterised as trust-substitutes 
(cf. Campana & Varese 2013). First, there are systems of clearing scores (cf. Van de Bunt 
2008; Hertogh 2010), in which built-up differences between participants are compensated 
with regard to agreed-upon turnover quota, geographical allocation, or client distributions. 
For this purpose, mutual discounts on supplies, false invoices, or other transactions are used. 
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In addition, in cartels where clients or projects (e.g. bids) are divided or rotated, a common 
future (referred to as shadow of the future, cf. Kleemans & Van de Bunt, 1999) also induces 
mutual trust. A system of reciprocity leads to participants anticipating the work that will 
come their way in the future. Second, case 9 contains several examples of the use of trust-
substitutes. A relatively large number of firms – 15 − were involved in this case. An example 
from case 9 is the collective purchase of a bankrupt factory. A large factory, suited for the 
production of the product involved in the case, came up for sale. The cartel participants were 
afraid that commissioning the factory by a third party would disturb their conspiracy to control 
the national market. A third party then purchased the factory on behalf of the cartel, which 
provided the financial means and instructions for the take-over. The factory was dismantled 
and the equipment and machines from the factory were divided amongst the participants of 
the cartel, but − as was discovered later − were never actually put to use. With a provision in 
the private legal agreement (the purchasing contract), the participants made sure the factory 
could no longer be used for production of the designated product. The financial investment 
functioned as a vouch for the market division agreement. Everyone had now invested financial 
means in a successful execution of the agreement and had something tangible to lose if it failed.
The role of trust and trust-substitutes is in line with what was expected from the literature 
on criminal networks. Note, however, that with cartels − and in contrast to some forms of 
organised crime − trust-substitutes are always − seemingly − legitimate means, such as collective 
loans, mortgages and so on, which create mutual dependencies and increase the collective 
interest in the cartel being successful. This makes it all the more difficult for enforcement 
authorities to detect these legitimate forms of cooperation between firms within the context of 
illegal cartel conduct.
4.4 Social embeddedness of illegal cartel agreements
In almost all cases in this study, industry associations and related formal communication 
platforms play an important role in the cartel. At a minimum, they provide an opportunity 
for firms in a market to get to know each other, but sometimes these platforms play a more 
active role. In case 5, firms used a calculation firm as a platform to rig tendering procedures. 
A calculation firm normally offers consultancy to all companies in the market to measure and 
calculate the surfaces and equipment needed for a particular project. This way, firms in the 
sector can share costs of calculation to decrease the losses on calculating projects that they 
do not get to execute. This is a common and authorised way of doing business. However, 
the owner of the calculation firm took it one step further by actively hosting illegal cartel 
meetings between the competitors and documenting their agreements for them. In case 7, 
the participating firms initially came together to discuss transport safety issues regarding 
their product. However, prices and clients were also discussed here, resulting in an illegal 
client distribution between competitors. In case 14, the firms had a ‘soft-franchise’ system in 
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place. They collectively owned a subsidiary to make legitimate agreements – such as sharing 
research and development costs – but also made illegal agreements − such as market allocation 
agreements dividing costumers. The following quote from case 10 illustrates more clearly how 
industry associations can provide an opportunity for cartel conduct, and can therefore be seen 
as a form of structural embeddedness of cartels:
“The industry association [A] and industry association [B] served as communication 
platforms, in which the members would discuss topics that affected the industry as a whole. 
Topics like pensions, labour conditions and collective employment agreements […] In between 
the lines the point was suggested that: ‘we should do something about it [the prices].” (10)
As regards cartel facilitators, intentional and unintentional facilitators can be distinguished. 
In case 5, for instance, the owner of a calculation firm knowingly and deliberately facilitated 
cartel conduct. The role that different secretaries and chairmen play in several of the cases can 
also be seen as deliberately facilitating cartels (e.g. cases 2 and 4). In other cases, clients invited 
contractors to assess the project on site, which enabled all the requested potential contractors 
to know which other parties would take part in the tendering procedure. This provided them 
with an opportunity to rig the procedure, which can be qualified as unintentional facilitation 
by clients (cases 5 and 7). Clearly, an agreement with a competitor can potentially be made 
quickly, and many legitimate collaborative platforms and formal meetings can provide an 
opportunity for cartel conduct to take place.
4.5 Discussion
In short, three main expectations in this study were: (1) cartels may not be as centralised and 
hierarchically organised as in the classic image of the ‘secret society’; (2) cartels may not only 
prioritise for concealment but also for effective communication; and (3) it is not isolation from 
their social environment but their (natural) embeddedness that provides an explanation for the 
longevity of cartels.
First, to avoid the risk of detection, cartels clearly use techniques aimed at concealing their 
illegal conduct. However, the case study analysis illustrates how cartel participants are focused 
primarily on bringing about well-functioning agreements, and they therefore – in a pragmatic 
manner − communicate frequently and in a centralised manner. Paradoxically, efforts to 
conceal by means of impersonal communication methods, such as phases-of-the-moon systems 
(rotating bids by taking turns) and price lists, can lead to a need for more communication 
and documentation. Cartelists also try to ensure that co-conspirators keep their end of the 
agreement. Opportunism is perceived a large risk by cartel participants and increases the need 
for centralised communication and extensive documentation of agreements. This illustrates 
how the need for mutual trust often prevails over concealment of conduct by minimising 
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the means of communication. However, further study and discussion is needed to determine 
whether the elaborate systems of communication and sometimes administration are to be 
considered instruments for building trust or are in fact indications of the lack of trust.
Second, the use of trust-substitutes and the role of facilitators demonstrate how cartels are 
strongly embedded in their social environment and can emanate from pre-existing professional 
and personal networks. Cartel participants, in contrast to most ‘classic’ types of organised 
criminals, can thereby shroud themselves in a context of legitimate business interactions. The 
perpetrators of cartel conduct can be considered trusted criminals (Friedrichs 2010; Punch 
1996; Wheeler & Rothman 1982). Corporate and white-collar crime perpetrators often rise 
above suspicion and are facilitated by a cooperative and silent social environment. The position 
of these perpetrators and the fact that they act on behalf of the organisation - particularly in 
cartels - hereby creates a smokescreen for enforcement authorities, which complicates their 
detection efforts (Van de Bunt 2010).
Third, this study demonstrates that the longevity of cartel secrecy is explained not so much by 
concealment or internal control within the cartel as it is by the embeddedness of cartels in their 
social environment. This is also illustrated by the use of trust-substitutes (in the form of loans, 
mortgages, etc.). Furthermore, the role that facilitators play in cartels is made evident from 
examples of imprudent clients, actively involved secretaries and chairmen of cartels, or – for 
example − members of collective market associations. The added difficulty in distinguishing the 
intentional and unintentional facilitation of illegal activities is the distance that exists between 
the actions of the facilitator and the illegal conduct of the network. This distance provides 
facilitators with an opportunity to evade moral and legal accountability for their actions (cf. 
Cohen 2001). 
6. Conclusion
The organisation of corporate and white-collar crime was explored in this chapter. This brings 
up a few points for consideration in the field of both organised and corporate and white-collar 
crime. Theoretical implications for the study of corporate crime are that, although one can 
draw a few parallels in the operation of criminal networks in organised crime (e.g. importance 
of trust; the use of trust-substitutes; social embeddedness), an important difference lies in 
the vast opportunities that corporate crime perpetrators have at their disposal to shroud their 
activities in a context of legitimacy and licit corporate conduct. This might also explain why 
most organised forms of corporate crime do not require types of intimidation or violence 
in the event of conflict. As regards corporate criminal conduct, an oblivious or cooperative 
social environment provides practical opportunities for businesses to create and maintain illegal 
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agreements. When it comes to the body of work describing the trade-off between concealment 
and communication, the theoretical implication for the study of organised crime is that illegal 
or criminal networks might not always prioritise for concealment. They can operate through 
elaborate communication and go beyond information exchange on a need-to-know basis, as 
was demonstrated by the cases described in this analysis.
For the purpose of this study, the role of public regulation and enforcement, or lack thereof, as 
part of the social environment of cartels was not included. If we would, one may consider the 
role privatization of regulation and enforcement and cuts of public funding in many regulatory 
fields in explaining how misconduct can remain hidden in general. However, for the specific 
area of public anti-cartel enforcement a global rise in public authorities and resources for those 
authorities has taken place in the past decades (Harding, Beaton-Wells, Edwards 2015; Shaffer 
& Nesbitt 2011; Whelan 2014). In that sense, competition enforcement forms an exception 
to other regulatory fields, especially in the US, that do suffer privatization and cuts in public 
funding. This may be connected to the fact that specifically fair competition enforcement 
endorses and supports the ‘neoliberal’ ideal of open markets and competition. However, 
increased resources do not automatically mean increased detection. Also, national governments 
may increase resources towards enforcement for symbolic reasons that remain separate from 
questions around enforcement effectiveness regarding detection of cartels. 
5.1 Policy implications
It is clear that the longevity cannot be explained solely by studying the means of concealment 
by cartelists alone. Most cases can be indicated as a ‘public secret’: namely, many people − 
within and outside the organisations involved − know or could or should know about the 
activities but are either disinterested or are reluctant to come forward to reveal them or to 
inform enforcement authorities. Governance and regulation of corporate and white-collar 
crime should pay attention to creating possibilities for gathering the information bystanders 
have about illegal conduct. Acknowledging the vast amount of knowledge and complicity 
dispersed in the periphery around illegal networks provides opportunities for detection and 
enforcement.
Because many licit organisations, platforms, and other facilitators provide opportunities for 
cartel conduct to occur, it is also important to acknowledge their legal and moral responsibility 
and accountability with regard to cartels. Some judicial decisions demonstrate how such 
facilitators can be taken into account (Harding 2009). One could argue that governance and 
regulation of corporate and white-collar crime should examine carefully the responsibility and 
liability of facilitators and bystanders – as established in efforts against organised crime through 
criminalising actions of preparation and complicity – (cf. Middleton 2005). 
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This also brings us to lessons learned for operational cartel enforcement. First, cartel participants 
tend to communicate frequently and in a considerably centralised manner. Episodes of 
seemingly legitimate transactions or contracts between competitors can therefore be an 
indication for underlying illegal agreements. In addition, enforcement could pay attention to 
the social embeddedness of cartels through franchise constructions, merger and acquisition 
processes, market associations, buyers and so on. Deliberately or otherwise, these actors are 
potential facilitators. By activating the ‘silent social environment’ to speak up, one can break 
down walls of secrecy and promote disclosure of misconduct (Van de Bunt 2010). The Dutch 
competition authority ACM took certain steps in this area, by launching a public campaign in 
which more information was presented on the nature and effects of business cartels to create 
awareness and to motivate the general public to speak up and provide authorities with extra tips 
and complaints about cartel conduct (Het Financieele Dagblad, 7 June 2016).
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Chapter 4
Business cartels and organised 
crime: exclusive and inclusive 
systems of collusion*
Abstract:
In chapter 4, two case studies of large-scale bid rigging in the construction industry in Canada 
and the Netherlands are analysed to explore why business cartels sometimes do and sometimes 
do not involve organised crime. By combining concepts from both organised crime and 
organisational crime, an integrated understanding of the organisation of serious crimes for 
gain is applied. Across time and space, businesses in the construction industry are known to fix 
prices, use collusive tendering and divide market shares in illegal cartel agreements. In order to 
stabilise cartels, participants need to ward off new competitors and prevent cheating within the 
cartel. The question why we see a system of collusion involving organised crime and violence 
in Canada as opposed to the Netherlands is answered through analysing two comparable cases. 
Two systems of bid rigging emerge under different cultural conditions: inclusive and exclusive 
collusion. The exclusive system makes use of the violent reputation provided by criminal groups 
and distinguishes from the inclusive system that uses sophisticated administration of mutual 
claims in shadow bookkeeping.
*  This chapter has been published as: Jaspers, J.D. (2018). Business cartels and organised crime: exclusive and inclusive 
systems of collusion. Trends in Organized Crime 22, 414-432. doi: 10.1007/s12117-018-9350-y.
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1. Introduction
When firms in the same market control competition between them by fixing prices, sharing 
markets or rigging tendering procedures they engage in a business cartel (Harding & Joshua 
2010). Firms involved in business cartels need to conceal their illegal conduct from customers, 
non-participants and internal and external watchdogs (Baker & Faulkner, 1993). However, 
besides keeping enforcement and other watchdogs in the dark, participants also have to ensure 
that other firms in the cartel comply with the illegal agreements. Cartelists monitor prices, 
customers, and tendering procedures and negotiate compensations to ensure compliance with 
cartel agreements (Faulkner, Cheney, Fisher & Baker 2003). In addition to communication and 
negotiation (Jaspers 2017), some cartels use – the threat of – price wars or exclusion from the 
market to deter or sanction cheaters within the cartel (Ayres 1987; Connor 2001; Levenstein 
& Suslow 2006; Bhaskarabhatla, Chatterjee & Karreman 2016). In other cases, potential 
instability within cartels is prevented using the protection of organised criminal groups and the 
(threat of ) violence (Varese 2014).
In the latter category of cases, organised criminal groups - organisations or networks established 
with the aim of executing criminal activities (Van de Bunt & Huisman 2004) - supposedly 
act as ‘cartel enforcers’. Both by controlling compliance of firms to the existing agreements in 
the cartel and by preventing outsiders of the cartel from entering the market they enforce the 
existing cartel. Involvement of criminals with a violent reputation can solve issues regarding 
internal instability of the cartel (Gambetta & Reuter 1995). Through extortion or persuasion, 
organised criminals offer ‘protection’ services in exchange for commission or ‘pizzo’ from the 
derived profits of cartels (Varese 2014, p. 345). The literature on organised crime extensively 
discusses examples of the involvement of organised criminal groups in economic cartels (Varese 
2014; Stephan 2010; Chu 2002; Gambetta & Reuter 1995; Reuter 1983). The studies that 
specifically deal with cartels generally label these examples of involvement as ‘infiltration’ of 
organised crime in legitimate business sectors. These cases entail involvement of the Cosa Nostra 
in the construction industry in New York (Jacobs, Friel & Radick 1999; Jacobs 1991, p.49) 
and in the food-, clothing- and transportation industry in New York (Mass 1991, p. 37; Reuter 
1987; 1985); involvement of mafia in the fruit- and vegetables wholesale (Gambetta & Reuter 
1995) and in the construction industry in Sicily (Gambetta & Reuter 1995); the flower cartel 
in Sicily (Varese 2011a; 2011b, p. 102; Franchetti 1876); criminal groups in the taxi industry in 
South Africa (Stephan 2010, p. 353); and protection against competition by the Triads in Hong 
Kong (Chu 2002, p. 77-80). However, contemporary literature on organised crime takes a more 
nuanced approach concerning the interactions between ‘licit’ and ‘illicit’ services and ‘formal’ 
and ‘informal’ economies (Passas 2002; Van Duyne 1995; 1996). These studies emphasize the 
overlap and symbiosis between corporate and criminal actors, or ‘upper’ and ‘underworld’ (Van 
de Bunt, Siegel and Zaitch, 2014; Lippens & Ponsaers 2006; Ruggiero 1997).
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In addition, not all business cartel agreements involve organised crime. In the literature on 
corporate and white-collar crime, business cartels have also received ample attention. These 
cases entail, for example, the ADM lysine cartel in the US (Conley & O’Barr 1997); the heavy 
electrical equipment cartel cases in the US (Geis 1987); and price-fixing in the pharmaceutical 
industry (Braithwaite 1984). Geis (1987) already pointed to business cartels as a severe form of 
corporate crime in his seminal study on price-fixing. Additional studies throughout the years 
have underlined how anti-trust and competition violations are both the most persistent and 
most profitable form of corporate crime (Clinard & Yeager 1980; Shapiro 1984; Braithwaite 
1989; Jamieson 1994). White-collar crime studies on business cartels mostly explain cartel 
agreements by the need of corporate actors to minimise risks and manage uncertainties (Agnew, 
Piquero & Cullen 2009; Jamieson 1994; Geis 1987; Parker 2013; Piquero 2012; Sonnenfeld 
& Lawrence 1978). However, these studies do not discuss cartels that involve criminal groups 
and networks. Thus, the literatures on organised and organisational crime offer separate and 
different accounts of a similar phenomenon.
This chapter attempts to take into account insight from both (sub) fields of criminological 
study to explain why business cartel agreements sometimes do and sometimes do not include 
the involvement of organised criminal groups. Van Duyne (2007) already noted the obvious 
interconnections between business cartels and organised crime. For example, business cartels fit 
all the criteria for the UN and EU definitions of organised crime, except for criminal prosecution 
in the Netherlands. Ruggiero (1996) also discusses the analytical similarities between white-
collar crime (Sutherland 1949) and organised crime and suggests a joint analysis based on 
the theory of organisations and the theory of the firm. Moreover, Dorn (2009) suggests that 
organised crime as a concept is becoming redundant in favour of ‘serious crime’ in both policy 
and research. In synthesising the research traditions of organised crime and organisational 
crime, scholars have suggested working towards theorising the organisation of ‘serious crimes’ 
(Edwards & Levi 2008) and ‘serious crimes for gain’ Lord et al. (2017). Moving away from 
conceptual debates on the differences between organised and organisational crime we can focus 
attention towards understanding how networks of perpetrators and facilitators are formed 
around serious crimes for gain; what resources they use, how they operate and how they are 
developed and maintained throughout space and time. Cartels can be considered as such a form 
of serious crime for gain. Cartel crimes can involve non-violent modus operandi; sophisticated 
schemes, market associations, informal meetings, shadow book keepings, as well as violent 
modus operandi; violence and the threat of violence.
This raises questions regarding the nature and causes of the involvement of organised 
criminal groups in business cartels. Why is it that we sometimes do and sometimes do not 
see involvement of organised crime and the use of their violent reputation in business cartels? 
What explains the differences between violent and nonviolent business cartels? To examine 
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these issues, bid rigging in the construction industry is analysed in both the Canadian province 
of Quebec (cf. Reeves-Latour & Morselli 2016; Hudon & Garzón 2016) and the Netherlands 
(cf. Van den Heuvel 2005; Van Duyne 2007; Van de Bunt 2010; Hertogh 2010). In both cases, 
large-scale bid rigging in several markets of the construction industry lasted decades and both 
cases were investigated through extensive parliamentary inquiries. In this chapter, the publicly 
available records of the investigations from La Commission sur l’octroi et la gestion des contrats 
publics dans l’industrie de la construction (CEIC 2015) and Parlementaire Enquetecommissie 
Bouwnijverheid (PEB 2002) will serve as data for a comparative analysis. Using these types 
of secondary sources has proven a useful and successful approach (cf. Clinard & Yeager 1980; 
Della Porta & Vannucci 1999; Van den Heuvel 2005; Van de Bunt 2010; Hudon & Garzón 
2016). The design for making this comparative analysis is based on the Most Similar Systems 
Design, commonly used in comparative politics (cf. Anckar 2008). Many of the characteristics 
of the two case studies, such as organisation and culture of the industry, economic and market 
parameters are similar. However, despite the similarities, one significant difference is that in 
Quebec, violent modus operandi by organised criminal groups were used in some of the cartels. 
In the Netherlands, no such modus operandi was used.
2. Theory: from protection to collaboration 
2.1 Government replacement and protection theory
An influential explanation for the involvement of organised crime in several sectors of the 
economy is the idea of government replacement or protection theory (Anechiarico 1991; Della 
Porta & Vanucci 2012; Hill 2014; Gambetta 1993; Gambetta & Reuter 1995). According 
to this theory, the role of organised criminals would be the result of governments failing to 
provide certain protection to corporations or individuals (Hill 2014; Gambetta 1993). Instead, 
organised criminals provide these services and guarantees. Concerning the involvement 
of organised crime in business cartels, Gambetta and Reuter (1995) explain: “The state is 
unable to or unwilling to meet the demand of entrepreneurs for profit-enhancing and risk-
reducing regulation; the mafia provides the service instead” (p. 132). Della Porta and Vanucci 
(2012) also connect the involvement of organised crime with a lack of effective government 
regulation; organised crime replaces an absent government. Several authors use the perspective 
of government replacement to study different cases of organized crime in several (national) 
contexts and formulated the idea of protection theory (cf. Kleemans 2014; Shortland & Varese 
2014; Paoli 2003). Protection theory searches for analytical links between the absence of state-
involvement and the emergence and behaviour of criminal groups. For instance, explaining 
violence as a means to protect stolen or illegal assets or to ensure criminal agreements in general 
(Campana & Varese 2013).
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Several scholars also criticize protection theory (Paoli 2002; 2003; Kleemans 2014). Although 
Paoli (2002; 2003) recognizes that mafia type organisations can provide protection and 
potentially replace certain political functions, she points out that those groups are not exclusively 
involved in organised criminal activities. Flexible, multifunctional organisations and criminal 
networks – that do not resemble the hierarchical structure of mafia type organisations (2002) 
– perform many activities that qualify as organised crime (e.g. participating in illegal markets). 
While so-called protection to businesses may be a service traditionally provided by hierarchical 
criminal organisations, flexible criminal networks may not be involved in providing such 
services. Therefore, the type of organised crime present in a particular area might influence 
the likelihood of involvement of organised crime in business sectors. Additionally, Kleemans 
(2014) points out how protection theory lacks a good notion of the analogy between organised 
criminal groups and states: “states neither guarantee illegal transactions in illegal markets nor 
illegal operations in legal markets (p. 37)”. In other words, protection theory does not explain 
those activities, which are deliberately not protected by states, because of moral objections or 
its harmful effects. Also, government replacement and protection theory insufficiently explain 
the involvement of organised crime in states that do have strong public protection. The fact 
that organised crime also occurs in countries generally considered as ‘strong states’, empirically 
underlines this argument (Fijnaut 1998; Kleemans & Van de Bunt 1999; Kleemans & Van de 
Bunt 2003). This translates to the topic of cartels, as even in a strong state with a powerful 
economy like the Netherlands businesses have proved to be able to effectively establish and 
maintain business cartels (cf. Van den Heuvel 2005; Van de Bunt 2010; Hertogh 2010).
Three implications from the literature on organised crime relevant to business cartels are: 1) 
protection theory might insufficiently explain certain activities considered as organised crime, 
because involvement of organised crime in business cartels may not be the result of an absent 
government; 2) some types of organised crime are not involved in protection services; 3) and 
the distinction between hierarchical and flexible organised criminal groups might therefore 
have implications for the involvement of organised crime in business cartels.
2.2 White-collar crime as organised crime
Sutherland (1949, p. 228) already noted how white-collar crime relies on the corporate 
form of organisation and should therefore be considered organised crime. Building on 
this, Ruggiero (1996) purposes a joint analysis using organisational theory for the often 
conceptually distinguished phenomena of white-collar and organised crimes. Social networks 
around serious crimes for gain are known to involve interactions between ‘licit’ and ‘illicit’ 
services and ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ economies (Passas 2002; Van de Bunt, Siegel and Zaitch 
2014; Lippens & Ponsaers 2006; Ruggiero 1997; Van Duyne 1995; 1996). Different types of 
relationships between organised crime and legitimate business, or upper- and underworld are 
distinguished (Van Duyne, Von Lampe & Passas 2002). Passas (2002) developed a theoretical 
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framework in which he categorises relationships as antithetical or symbiotic. Firstly, antithetical 
relationships refer to a form of competition between legal and illegal actors, a predatory nature 
of the relationship and unequal power balance between actors. For example, in a parasitical 
relationship criminal groups use business actors to extort illegal profits on a regular basis. In 
this situation, businesses are seen as victims of extortion (cf. Varese, 2014). Secondly, symbiotic 
relationships between legal and illegal actors revolve around supply and demand for network 
and services, mutual benefits and an equal balance of power. For example, in collaboration 
actors work together towards executing the offence and are both willing participants (cf. 
Gambetta, 1993; Gambetta & Reuter, 1995). Besides collaboration, parties can be involved in 
a relationship defined as co-optation; there are still mutual benefits to the collaboration but an 
uneven power balance between them (Passas 2002).
These studies demonstrate how different actors may participate for their own personal 
or organisational goals and motivations, benefiting from specific collaborations. Hence, 
to understand the involvement of organised crime in business cartels, one must appreciate 
the nuanced nature of the motives and interactions of illegal and legal actors. This requires 
considering firms and corporate personnel as more than just willing or vulnerable victims of 
extortion and forced upon influence by organised criminal groups. Because, the risk of a one-
dimensional approach is that you might frame an economic crime problem as an organised 
crime problem or vice versa, by overstating the influence or power of certain actors (Morselli 
et al. 2012). 
3. Methodology: data sources and analysis
For the purpose of this chapter, the publicly available records of the investigations from La 
Commission sur l’octroi et la gestion des contrats publics dans l’industrie de la construction 
(CEIC 2015) and Parlementaire Enquetecommissie Bouwnijverheid (PEB 2002) served as 
data for a comparative analysis. These publicly available reports contained: transcripts from 
witness testimonies, police evidence including wiretaps and video surveillance, demographic 
information, economic and market studies. A document analyses was performed on these 
sources based on a topic list including the following topics: general case information, type of 
actors, structure of the industry, market indicators and the modus operandi of the cartels. In 
addition, information on regulatory regimes and regulatory changes during the active years of 
the cartels was gathered and analysed.
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4. Comparing cases: similar circumstances, different outcomes
4.1 Regulatory changes
4.1.1 Canada
Canada has a long-standing history of criminalising cartel conduct, dating back to 1892, 
when Canada’s competition legislation was incorporated into the criminal code (Boscariol et 
al. 2010). However, antitrust law did come under fire of the provinces in the 1930s. Up to 
the year 1976 there were only criminal provisions against unfair competition in Canada, after 
1976 civil provisions were added to this. In 1986, the current competition act was passed In 
Canada, partly decriminalising competition law. Although cartels remained subject to criminal 
sanctions, new non-criminal provisions were drafted for merger reviews and abuse of dominance. 
In 2010, amendments were made in the Canadian Competition Act. The cartel prohibition 
came into force with the introduction of a per se criminal offence for certain ‘hard-core’ cartel 
behaviour (Boscariol et al. 2010). In terms of regulatory practices, the biggest changes were 
made from 2011 onwards, in the form of an institutional rearrangement of the anticorruption 
environment. Both a new Anti-Corruption Act and Quebec’s Permanent Anti-Corruption Unit 
were instated. The permanent coordination unit incorporates within the same structure, two 
construction regulatory agencies, police squads from municipal and provincial levels, a panel of 
public prospectors, and special teams from Quebec’s Revenue Agency and Quebec’s Ministry 
of Municipal Affairs and Land Occupancy (Reeves-Latour & Morselli 2017). The construction 
industry was pressured heavily by the creation of these new agencies and increased regulatory 
scrutiny (Reeves-Latour & Morselli 2017).
4.1.2 The Netherlands
Organisational structures in the construction industry in the Netherlands were in place 
since the early 1950’s; industry associations and clubs enabled and ensured ‘regulation of 
competition’ in the industry. For example, the roads and construction combination ‘WAC’, 
that was founded in 1953 and the ‘SPO’, an overarching organisation regulating the pricing 
in the whole construction industry, which represented 28 cartels with more than 4000 firms 
involved and was founded in 1963 (Dohmen & Verlaan 2004). Dutch government approved 
these associations. At this point, there was no active enforcement against cartel conduct in the 
Netherlands, just a few officers in the Ministry of Economic Affairs dealt with the most excessive 
market power cases. They were provided with very little resources; hence, their activities were 
limited. In addition, there was no explicit cartel prohibition under Dutch law. There was the 
code on Economic Competition (WEM). However, this merely provided a provision that 
prohibited abuse of a cartel or market dominance, classifying as a criminal offense. In addition, 
there was a legal provision in the Dutch criminal code, but both the provision in the code on 
Economic Competition (WEM) and in the criminal code were hardly used in practice (De Bree 
2006). This meant a tolerant enforcement climate for cartels in the Netherlands, and during 
96
Chapter 4 | Business cartels and organised crime
roughly 40 years, there was no active enforcement of cartels in the Netherlands. Indeed, since 
1962 there was a cartel register at the ministry of Economic affairs. Businesses could get their 
cartel legally registered, to ensure government approved them (cf. Petit, 2017, p. 41-42). The 
rationale behind the register was that it enabled the Ministry to monitor that firms would not 
abuse cartels. However, calculated estimates demonstrated that only about half of active cartels 
were registered during that time (De Jong 1990).
Meantime, the institutions of the European Union aimed to promote one internal European 
market and as a means to that end wanted to decrease national cartels in its member states. 
They applied political pressure and introduced new legislation against unfair competition. In 
the Netherlands, a gradual regulatory shift was also starting to take place regarding legislation 
and enforcement of unfair competition. Finally, the Dutch price regulating association for the 
construction industry ‘SPO’ was prohibited and abolished by a 1992 decision from the European 
Commission (PEB, 2002, p. 87). This meant that many common practices in the construction 
industry, such as the pre-consultation agreements in tendering procedures and collective price-
regulation, were no longer allowed in the sector. In practice however, most negotiations and 
price-regulation practices continued ‘underground’, in secrecy. In 1998, the Dutch government 
eventually introduced new and stricter legislation in which all cartels, in an effort to end the so-
called ‘cartel paradise’, were explicitly forbidden for the first time. This meant that all efforts by 
corporations to hinder fair competition, such as bid rigging, price-fixing and market allocation, 
were explicitly forbidden under administrative law. Note, formally decriminalisation took 
place, bringing anti-cartel legislation from criminal into administrative law. However, from 
that moment onwards corporations and their officials could be punished by far more severe 
financial penalties than ever before. Administrative fines up to 10% of the annual turnover of 
the company or personal fines up to 500,000 Euros were introduced. In 2016, this was increased 
to a maximum of 10% annual turnover of 4 consecutive years, or 900,000 Euros in personal 
fines24. Moreover, the certainty of punishment increased. With the introduction of the cartel 
prohibition in Dutch law a new independent regulator was installed in 1998 by the Ministry of 
Economic affairs, namely the Dutch Competition Authority (now: Netherlands Authority for 
Consumers and Markets). This authority was provided with resources and investigative powers 
and this is seen as the starting point of competition law enforcement in the Netherlands.
4.2 Economic and market conditions
4.2.1 Canada
Since 1996, there was an increase in overall employment in the construction industry in 
Canada of 90%, with 11,000-16,000 jobs annually. The sector of civil engineering and roads 
had two specific periods of growth, namely between 2002 and 2004 and between 2008 and 
24 Stb. 2016, 22.
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2012. Between 1996 and 2012, investments in this industry went up from roughly 4 to 17 
billion CAD. The main client in this market is the government, which awards public contracts 
to construction companies (CEIC, Tome1 p. 76-96). In 2002, the department of Public 
Contracts of Montréal calculated that the costs of public contracts were 30-35% higher than 
Toronto or Quebec City (CEIC, Tome 2 p. 9). In 2014, there were 2683 companies working 
in the civil engineering sector in the province of Quebec, of which 1109 companies in the 
Greater Montréal area. The majority (83%) of construction firms in Quebec employ five or 
fewer employees. However, they account for only 19% of the income, which indicates high 
degree of concentration in the industry (i.e. a few large companies taking up a majority of the 
total market). In fact, 20 companies have a workforce of between 201 and 500 employees, and 
two employ more than 500 employees. In addition, the commission pointed out that the use 
of consortia and joint ventures is very common in the construction industry of Quebec (CEIC, 
Tome 1, p. 90). 
4.2.2 The Netherlands
Between 1998 and 2000, the Dutch construction industry had an economic boost. In 2001, 
446000 people were working in the construction industry, accounting for more than 7% of 
total national Dutch employment. There were 65000 construction companies at that time, of 
which roughly 75% was considered very small with no employees (individual freelancers), 90% 
had less than 10 employees and 10% had 10-100 employees (PEB 2002, p. 56). For the purpose 
of the comparison in this chapter, we will focus on the civil engineering and infrastructure 
sector (e.g. sewing, roads, tunnels etc.). This sector was relatively concentrated compared to 
other sub-sectors in the Netherlands; 21 large firms (with more than 500 employees) held a 
combined total market share of 60%. In 2002, the sector had an annual turnover of 15 billion 
Euros. The main client in this sector is the government, accounting for more than 5 billion 
Euros in 2002 (PEB, p. 56; Van de Bunt, 2008). In addition, it is common for companies to 
work together in the industry using subcontracting, combination works and outsourcing of 
excess work or activities in which they have little experience. Ergo, there is a high degree of 
cooperation between firms in this sector. For example, in the asphalt industry, 8 companies 
together divided 70% of the projects in and around Schiphol (PEB 2003, p. 557; Van de 
Bunt 2008, p. 135). The parliamentary commission pointed out that although the economic 
conditions facilitated large-scale bid rigging to occur, these circumstances can be seen as a 
conditio sine qua non; only in combination with a specific business culture could they evolve 
into large-scale irregularities in the Dutch construction industry. A combination of tradition 
and business culture made construction firms continue to coordinate bidding and regulate 
pricing, after this conduct was explicitly forbidden (PEB, 2002, p. 51).
98
Chapter 4 | Business cartels and organised crime
Table 1 National statistics construction industry Canada and the Netherlands
Canada The Netherlands
Population 35.6 million people 16.8 million people
Employment construction industry 255,600 people in 2014
(6.3% total employment)
446,000 people in 2001
(7% total employment)
Number of companies in construction 350,000 in 2014 
(Quebec: 2683, Montréal: 1109)
65,000 in 2001
Annual turnover 17 billion CAD in 2012
(6 billion public tenders)
15 billion EUR in 2002
(5 billion in public tenders)
Several parallels can be drawn between Canada and the Netherlands, both in terms of the 
structure and nature of the construction industry and in terms of the legislative and political 
context. However, a notable difference is the level of concentration and number of construction 
firms in the local market. High concentration in the Quebec market (i.e. small number of 
large firms taking 81% of the local market) can make the formation of cartels easier. Since 
fewer companies have to make agreements to cover the market and it is potentially easier 
to communicate, coordinate, conceal and monitor the cartel agreements (cf. Jaspers, 2017). 
However, a high number of firms in a market (i.e. low concentration) can make the uncertainties 
in the market very pressing, increasing the need for anti-competitive agreements (cf. Jamieson, 
1994). This seems to apply specifically to the situation in the Dutch construction industry.
The main similarities in terms of market conditions and structure are: 1) the big share of public 
tenders in both industries; 2) frequent use of subcontracting, joint venture and consortium 
projects in the market, leading to extensive collaboration between firms in the sector; 3) both 
industries experienced episodes of economic prosperity. In addition, several scholars have 
looked at the influence of the market structure, formulating certain economic vulnerabilities 
regarding the involvement of organised crime in legitimate business (Lavezzi, 2008; Van de 
Bunt 2008; Gambetta & Reuter 1995; Reuter 1987). The economy of Sicily is characterised by 
a large dimension of traditional sectors, such as construction, which also has a strong territorial 
specificity; a large presence of small firms; a low level of technology; and a large public sector 
(Lavezzi, 2008). Varese (2011a; 2011b) builds upon the theoretical model of Morselli, Turcotte 
and Tenti (2011) to assess local conditions for organized crime to provide services to legitimate 
business. For instance, locally based competition and low barriers for entry are considered 
to induce risks for business cartels in construction industry (Varese, 2011a; 2011b). These 
characteristics also apply to both cases in this analysis. 
In terms of regulatory changes, both countries have roughly seen an increase in enforcement 
efforts to tackle several forms of unfair competition, such as bid rigging, price-fixing and market 
allocation. However, in terms of legislation Canada has had a tradition of criminalisation 
regarding cartel conduct. While in the Netherlands, there has been a shift away from hardly 
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enforced criminal law towards the use of strongly enforced administrative law. Comparably 
however, both Canada and the Netherlands experienced a boost in enforcement efforts over 
the past roughly 25 years, in terms of professionalisation in existing and the formation of new 
regulatory agencies. Through providing competition enforcement with an increase in personnel, 
resources and investigative powers in order to tackle cartel conduct over the past 25 years.
5. Bid-rigging in the construction industry in Canada and  
the Netherlands
5.1 Parliamentary investigations construction industry in Quebec, Canada 
(1996-2011)
When the prices of public contracts increased, several whistle-blowers came forward on 
bid rigging schemes in the province of Quebec, Canada. Upon the initial revelations, the 
parliamentary commission Charbonneau (CEIC) was installed in 2011. The Commission 
Charbonneau investigated bid rigging, corruption, illegal financing of political parties and the 
infiltration of organised crime in the local construction industry in the province of Quebec 
between 1996 and 2011. During a period of seven months, nearly 50 witnesses testified to 
the Commission, including entrepreneurs, engineers, technicians, civil servants, political 
leaders, and the former heads of the city government. The final report was finished in 2015. 
It covers various forms of misconduct, including corporate crime, corruption and organised 
crime. Besides bid rigging by construction firms and involvement of organised crime, the 
Charbonneau investigations cover a great variety of misconduct, such as corruption and illegal 
financing of political parties. Especially the activities in Laval, Quebec are an example of these 
types of misconduct (cf. Reeves-Latour & Morselli, 2016). However, in light of the research 
question this chapter focuses on the Montréal construction cartels.
5.2 The Montréal construction cartels
The Montréal construction cartels involve four bid-rigging schemes regarding public tendering 
procedures in the engineering and infrastructure sector. The markets include: the construction 
of aqueducts; construction of sidewalks; construction of city parks; and the construction of 
roads. The cartel in aqueducts included 15 colluding firms. These firms rotated bids, dividing 
all local projects in the market. They executed their bid rigging agreement by adjusting their 
bids, after discussing whose turn it was to win the project. In order to assure this firm would 
actually win the project the other companies would intentionally turn in higher bids. This 
is also referred to as ‘cover pricing’. The second cartel, in sidewalks, consisted of six firms. A 
contractor that functioned as a ringleader distributed the available projects by instating fear 
with competitors, hereby coordinating the cartel. This contractor also tried to organise the 
construction of city parks (and other markets, such as sewers and aqueducts) using the same 
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strategy, but with limited success. This cartel lasted between two and three years. Since the 
beginning of the year 2000, the directors of five firms initiated the asphalt cartel. This cartel is 
considered to be the most professional and structured of the cartels in Montréal. The conspiracy 
ensured the firms of profits up to 30%, instead of the usual 4-8%. This cartel entailed a market 
division, using production quotas and allocating the market in the greater city of Montréal. 
Every plant had a quota based on volumes of production. The cartels also used geographical 
market allocation, especially in the asphalt plants. By effect, the cartel successfully lowered the 
level of foreign competition in Montréal. In 2005, public contracts in Montréal were awarded 
to local firms in more than 95% of the cases. Contractors and entrepreneurs from outside 
Montréal were bullied and intimidated if they attempted to acquire projects in the Montréal 
area.
5.3 The parliamentary investigations Dutch construction industry (1985-2000)
In 2001, large-scale bid rigging in the Dutch construction industry was also uncovered by a 
whistle-blower; the commercial director of a Dutch construction company that was involved 
in several bid-rigging schemes. As a result, in 2002 The Parliamentary Commission on the 
Construction industry in the Netherlands (PEB) was appointed to investigate irregularities 
in the construction industry (PEB 2002). In addition, the Dutch Competition Authority 
started investigations into several markets within the construction industry, namely the 
civil engineering and infrastructure sector and the installation sector (NMa 2004). The 
parliamentary commission investigated what the nature and scale of the irregularities in 
the Dutch construction industry entailed, from 1985 onwards. Under irregularities they 
considered: fraud, false reporting, economic crimes, fiscal fraud, public procurement violations 
and violations of ethical rules within the industry (PEB 2002, p. 31). The Dutch Competition 
authority investigated infringements of the cartel prohibition under Dutch and European 
competition law, from 1998 onwards - when the cartel prohibition was first introduced under 
Dutch administrative law.
5.4 The Dutch construction cartels
The Dutch construction cartels include bid-rigging schemes in public tendering procedures 
regarding the construction of infrastructure projects in roads, water and groundwork. In each 
of these markets a group of bidders predetermined the outcome of tendering procedures. 
Participants took turns winning projects, artificially raising prices and splitting the difference. 
Firms used a system involving mutual claims to determine whose turn it was to get the 
next project. In a rigged tendering procedure, the winning firm owed ‘credits’ to the other 
participants that let him win the project. Those firms then held ‘claims’ on the former winner, 
calculated from the overcharge of the project (the artificially raised amount) divided by the 
number of participants. These claims were used in future tendering procedures to determine 
which firm should ‘rightfully’ win the project. This also enabled firms to come together for any 
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specific project in various compositions and within several markets. In other words, there was 
no fixed ring of bidders per market or region. Instead, there was a relatively flexible and open 
system in which every Dutch construction company could participate. Scores of the mutual 
claims were meticulously kept in general ledgers by all major construction companies. Later 
on, ironically, these ledgers served as central evidence in the investigations revealing the cartels.
6. Results: Exclusive versus inclusive: bid-rigging schemes in 
public tendering procedures
Both in the Netherlands and in Montréal, firms in the engineering and infrastructure sector 
coordinated their bidding process in public tenders. Construction firms structurally collaborated 
in order to determine which firm would be the winner of the contract, using strategies such as 
cover pricing and courtesy bidding. Moreover, prices of contracts were artificially inflated. Both 
case studies entail a combination of bid rigging and price-fixing in the construction industry.
6.1 Exclusion: violence in the Montréal construction cartels
Entrepreneurs, especially from the cartels in sidewalk, sewing and aqueducts, were seen at the 
company of a known leader of the Italian Mafia in Montréal. They regularly frequented the 
so-called ‘social club’, which served as a headquarters for the Rizzuto clan. The exchange of 
money was taped with a hidden camera. According to a witness, the members of the cartel 
were working ‘under the blessing’ of the Mafia and paid them compensations, also referred to 
as ‘pizzo’. These forms of taxes or extortion rackets were usually paid to the leader of the cartel 
in sidewalks. He acted as an intermediary between the cartels and the Mafia. Leaders of the 
Rizzuto clan acted as mediators to settle conflicts between firms and to prevent newcomers 
from entering the market.
The cartels operated on a basis of consensus and reciprocity. Contractors made compromises to 
be able to reach a well-functioning system where all companies involved could benefit. At the 
same time, the system clearly functioned as a disciplinary instrument for the firms involved. An 
entrepreneur that participated in one of the cartels explained: 
“The interest of entrepreneurs is that the system works, so it was in the interest of everyone 
involved to push in the same direction, like a hockey team. Once the decision has been made, 
it must be respected: “If, with every contract, we argued, well, I’ll tell you, it would not have 
lasted more than two weeks. There is no one in charge: decisions are taken by consensus” 
(CEIC, Tome 2, p. 33).
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Contrary to the Dutch bid rigging scheme, there was no formal accounting or keeping scores in 
the Montréal cartel cases. No notebooks or other forms of registration containing names of the 
companies that won the contracts in Montréal. Comparable to the Dutch cases, the Montréal 
cartels were based on informal social control between the construction firms in the cartel:
“When I say, “keep an eye out”, I mean we talked among entrepreneurs, OK, he got this, it is 
possible that he is at this level, soon ... When there are three contracts in tender, normally it 
should go to me, him or such. So it was really an exchange amongst the entrepreneurs in the 
market” (CEIC, Tome 2, p. 31)
Another contractor confirmed that the entrepreneurs were trying to get along with each other 
in a harmonious way, in order to ensure the rotation of contracts:
“What I am saying is if Infrabec comes to see me and I don’t agree, maybe Paul will call me 
and say: Why aren’t you just settling it? You’ll get another one that’s coming to you, you know” 
(CEIC, Tome 2, p. 33). 
One of the entrepreneurs, Lino Zambito, declared how 2,5% of the profits of the cartel were 
transferred to members of the Cosa Nostra. He added that the system had been in place 
for many years and was initiated by the construction firms. The involvement of organised 
criminal groups only started afterwards. He describes a system of kickbacks for services and 
products that were never actually delivered. This was used to even out disparities between the 
construction companies and to make cash payments to criminal groups and local politicians 
(CEIC 2015, p. 239). What Zambito describes can be categorized as a symbiotic relationship 
between construction firms and criminal groups (Passas 2002; Van de Bunt, Siegel and Zaitch 
2014). However, it remains unclear from the data whether this should be seen as collaboration 
or co-optation (cf. Passas 2002).
One of the standout differences between the Dutch and the Canadian cartels is that in 
Montréal, construction firms outside the cartel were victimised by members inside the cartel. 
Firms outside the cartel that wanted to participate in the local construction market in Montréal 
were bullied, threatened and intimidated into not entering the market or exiting it. Some 
construction firms in the Montréal area experienced the strong position of the existing cartel 
through activities of organised criminals. This is demonstrated in the testimonies of several 
entrepreneurs outside of the bid rigging cartels. They were threatened and bullied by the 
members of the Cosa Nostra. After acquiring a large new construction project, Martin Carrier 
-an entrepreneur from the Montréal area- received a call from a director of one of the other 
construction companies in Montréal, Francesco Bruno. Bruno had also bid on the project and 
expressed his dissatisfaction about the fact that Carrier was operating in ‘his’ area and requested 
103
4
that he would stop his activities. Carrier ignored the message and was then phoned again, this 
time by Del Balso (member of the Rizzuto family, part of the Canadian Cosa Nostra), which 
told him the following: “You did not want to listen. You were warned. Now it ends”. There were 
no physical repercussions for Carrier, but he was uncomfortable with the situation. In February 
2001, professional conflicts between the firms were still on-going in a civil suit. Around that 
time Carrier received some remarkable mail to his address. It contained a condolences card with 
his name on it stating: “Dear friend, if you don’t stop bidding in Montréal, this is the type of 
card we will be sending to your family” (CEIC 2015, p. 987).
Another local entrepreneur, Andre Durocher, also declared receiving threats after putting in his 
price for a project on the ‘Chabanel Street’ in Montréal. The reason was that he was bidding 
on projects that were indented to go to members of the cartel. His installations and tools were 
destroyed, and his brother was beaten up. Afterwards, four men visited his office and demanded 
that he would cancel the project. He ignored their demands. Shortly after, he received a call 
from the insurance company telling him that the insurance on his equipment was cancelled if 
he would not retract his bid on the Chabanel Street project. This time Durocher caved in and 
retracted his bid.
6.2 Inclusion: mutual claims and clandestine bookkeeping
Firms in the engineering sector in the Netherlands coordinated their bidding in a meeting 
before the tendering procedure started. One of the Dutch companies explained the aim of these 
meetings, summarising the main strategy applied within the market to divide public tenders:
“In a pre-consultation meeting the goal was to determine i) which of the involved firms 
would execute the project (named ‘rightful owner’), ii) for which amount the project would 
be executed, and iii) which mutual claims between the participating firms would be created 
as a result of this agreement. The ‘price’ that the ‘rightful owner’ would pay to the others, to 
be the lowest bidder in the tendering procedure, would determine the amount of the claims 
others would have on him in future tenders” (NMa, 2004, p. 7).
The bidding procedure was particularly predictable, because the lowest bidder would always get 
the tender. In some cases, tenders would not be open to all construction companies but issued 
by invitation only. One of the companies explained: “In case of tenders by invitation, we would 
quickly determine which other firms got an invitation to bid on the project” (NMa, 2004, p. 
9). This also meant the circle of bidders could differ from one project to another. However, 
the different agreements were strongly related. Although the circle of bidders per tender would 
differ, there was a structural system in place in which virtually every Dutch construction 
company participated. A statement of one of the companies involved illustrates the common 
practice of these activities: “It was custom for all contractors operating in the Dutch market 
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to comply with the system. In fact, there was somewhat of a ‘code of honour’” (NMa, 2004, 
p. 13). According to the investigations and testimonies, around 98% of Dutch construction 
companies were involved in rigging public tendering procedures. Indeed, the activities entailed 
a long-standing tradition in the sector, which was passed on to newcomers: “People that were 
new to the industry were informed and instructed by their predecessor” (NMa, 2004, p. 14). 
Testimonies demonstrate a web of different schemes throughout the industry, making it nearly 
impossible not to participate in bid rigging agreements if you wanted to be in business. The 
inevitability of these practices was especially induced by the system of mutual ‘claims’ that 
resulted from the pre-consultation meetings. One of the companies explained:
“In this pre-consultation, which usually took place 1 or 2 hours before the bidding process, 
the bidding would be coordinated between the participating firms (...) In addition to the 
price, the amount for the claims was determined. These claims were then settled and evened 
out with previous and future projects” (NMa, 2004, p. 8).
The coordination and allocation of projects took place through a system of mutual ‘rights’ and 
‘obligations’, so-called claims. At the pre-consultation meeting, the firms will first write down 
an amount for which they can potentially execute the project. Firm A writes down the lowest 
amount, the other firms will now agree that firm A will win the project. Together they will 
determine for which price firm A will actually submit his bid to get the project. They inflate 
the earlier amount, which was a competitive price. All other firms will submit a bid above A 
deliberately, not winning the project as a result. In return, the winner of the project (firm A) 
will have a ‘debt’ to the others, based on the difference between the initial amount and the real 
price of the bid he turns in, divided by the number of participating firms. For example, if the 
initial amount was 4.75 million and the winner turns in his bid at 4.95 million, the difference 
of 200.000 Euros is divided between the other four companies, making the debt of firm A to 
the others 50.000 Euros per firm (PEB, 2002, p. 88).
Because of the accumulation of mutual claims, the participating firms created a web of mutual 
dependencies. Their relationship with other firms became one of creditors and debtors. It was 
clear that previously built up claims would play a role in future contracts (NMa, 2004, p. 10-
11). One of the companies explained:
“It was custom that claims were never intended to be actually paid out in practice. Firms 
would strive to even out disparities by balancing the claims. In fact, the claims served as 
‘change’ (small cash) for other projects in which a firm would participate. Built up claims were 
used to acquire projects in other tenders. As a consequence of this system, some firms would 
only participate in pre-consultation meetings, to collect these ‘claims’” (NMa, 2004, p. 11).
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“The claims were noted in the general ledger. This way, the claims would materialise and 
could be used in the future to determine whose turn it was to get a project. The principle of 
these claims was work in exchange for work” (NMa, 2004, p. 23).
As demonstrated above, firms would keep clandestine administrations on agreements and 
mutual claims; this illustrates the structural character of the system. These administrations 
had the form of general ledgers. For every company one made agreements with and had a 
relationship of dependency through mutual claims, several pages were listed. This resulted in 
a norm of ‘fair sharing’ between construction companies (Van de Bunt, 2010; Van de Bunt, 
2008). Besides meticulously kept so-called ‘shadow bookkeeping’, this social norm was induced 
by an informal business culture in which people were well acquainted with one another, 
both professionally and personally. Every company involved in these agreements would keep 
such an administration. All projects were listed in this administration: companies would 
note which firm got the project, for which price and the amount of the claims to the other 
participants. However, it was not always possible to perfectly even out the disparities between 
the participating firms. As a last resort, firms would therefore sometimes use false invoices for 
services or products that were never actually delivered. Or they would give large discounts on a 
shipment of e.g. gravel or other products (PEB, 2002, p. 126).
7. Conclusion
The purpose of this chapter was to investigate why business cartels sometimes do and sometimes 
do not include the involvement of criminal groups with a violent reputation. The often-separated 
criminological discourses of organised and organisational crime literature have both treated the 
phenomenon of economic cartels, respectively framing it as organised crime ‘infiltration’ and 
pure corporate conspiracy. However, contemporary studies in organised crime offer extensive 
elaborations about the interactions and interfaces between ‘upper’ and ‘underworld’. This 
analysis has therefore, in the tradition of analysing serious crimes for gain, moved beyond 
analytical debates and focused on the modus operandi, networks and different actors involved 
in economic cartels. By looking at two different case studies we can see how two different types 
of collusion emerge under different cultural, economic and regulatory conditions.
Case studies from the construction industry in Canada and the Netherlands demonstrate how 
two different systems of collusion developed under different regulatory and cultural conditions. 
The Montréal cartels were a form of exclusive collusion; closed circles of fixed bidders, 
and construction firms outside the cartel were victimised. The construction cartels in the 
Netherlands were a form of inclusive collusion; open to all construction firms, with changing 
compositions. The Montréal cartels were more closed to new entrants, while the Dutch cases 
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demonstrated a collective business strategy. This strategy was shared within the broader industry. 
This has to do with the history of the construction industry in the Netherlands, in which the 
combination of enforcement tolerance and the structural character of the way of working were 
considered ‘business as usual’. Additionally, the Dutch construction industry barely had losing 
or victimised firms as a result of the bid rigging cartels.
Differences regarding involvement of violent criminal groups in business cartels between 
The Netherlands and Canada can be explained by the cultural and regulatory conditions 
under which the two cases emerged. Both a strictly criminalised regulatory regime regarding 
business cartels and a highly competitive and predictable tendering procedure with criminal 
opportunities in Canada, explain the involvement of criminal groups with a violent reputation. 
In the Netherlands, the combination of a historically lenient regulatory regime towards business 
cartels and a strong subcultural normalisation of bid rigging throughout the construction 
industry explain the emergence of business cartels without the involvement of organised crime.
Relating to the research question, if the system of collusion is more closed and dependent on 
keeping outsiders out (preventing newcomers from entering the market) and protecting insiders 
within the cartel, a demand for intimidation is more pressing. This fits the job description of 
organised criminal groups with a violent reputation. Note that this neither means they have 
‘infiltrated’ the industry completely, nor that they have initiated or forced their services upon 
the firms involved in illegal bid rigging agreements in the construction industry. This was 
demonstrated in the Montréal cases that illustrated a symbiotic relationship between criminal 
groups and collusive business owners (cf. Gambetta & Reuter 1995; Passas 2002; Van de Bunt, 
Siegel and Zaitch 2014). In the Dutch inclusive system, there is less of a natural need for a 
strong arm to enforce the existing power balance of construction firms in the industry. Old 
industry directors informally coordinated cartels, or third parties like secretaries and chairmen 
functioned sufficiently as regulators or mediators for the cartels (cf. Van de Bunt 2010; Jaspers 
2017; Hertogh 2010).
In both cases authors have suggested that it was not failing regulations and regulators, or 
the strategic creation of an external criminal group that sufficiently explains the misconduct 
in the construction industry. In fact, it was the vulnerable system itself that produced the 
misconduct: “What this means is that the collusion problem and the emergence of an organized 
and centralized group of profiteers is a product of the system itself and not, as popular opinion 
often suggests, the strategic creation of an external criminal group that arrives to take control of 
the process at any given time. In short, a vulnerable system begets its own deviant organization 
and does not require a mafia or organized crime presence to organize it” (Morselli et al. 2012, 
p. 2). For the Dutch case, several authors have similarly suggested how the structure and culture 
of the industry and its vulnerabilities contributed to the bid rigging schemes, and not as is often 
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suggested regulatory failure alone (Van de Bunt 2008; Van den Heuvel 2005; Vulperhorst, 
2005). However, although collusion between firms was the main focus of this chapter, both 
the Montréal and the Dutch case also revealed collusion between construction firms and 
governmental agencies, both local and federal (cf. Reeves-Latour & Morselli 2016; Van den 
Heuvel 2005). The role of the state when it comes to collusion in the construction industry 
cannot to be underestimated. In a sector where financial and economic interests of the state 
are so strongly connected to corporate interests and where governments can be client, project 
developer and regulator at the same time, collusion between government and construction 
firms is a significant risk.
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Chapter 5
Leniency in exchange for cartel 
confessions*
Abstract:
Leniency offers corporations the possibility to come clean about their involvement in cartel 
conduct (e.g. price-fixing, bid-rigging) in exchange for immunity or reduction of financial 
penalties. In Europe, nearly 60% of detected cartels are discovered through leniency. This 
makes leniency the most applied detection tool for uncovering cartel conduct violations. 
What are considerations in applying for leniency or refraining from doing so? How do those 
considerations relate to private law enforcement through civil liability regarding business 
cartels? These questions are discussed based on semi-structured interviews (n=34) with cartelists, 
competition lawyers and in-house legal counsel to study theoretical assumptions underpinning 
leniency arrangements in the Netherlands. This study investigates four scenarios on the use 
of leniency suggested in the literature and only finds empirical support for two. Strategic use 
of leniency and false confessions occur in the Netherlands, but to a lesser extent than the 
existing literature suggests. Moreover, various disincentives and especially the rise of private 
enforcement make leniency an unattractive and uncertain option for cartelists.
*  This chapter has been published as: Jaspers, J. D. (2020). Leniency in exchange for cartel confessions. European Journal 
of Criminology, 17(1), 106–124. doi: 10.1177/1477370819874432
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1. Introduction
Cartel confessions are an essential source for competition authorities in uncovering cartel 
conduct violations (e.g. price-fixing, bid-rigging). Leniency offers corporations the possibility 
to confess to their involvement in cartel conduct in exchange for immunity or reduction of 
financial penalties. In Europe, nearly 60% of detected cartel cases are discovered through 
leniency applications, making it the most employed detection tool by competition authorities 
in uncovering cartels (Carmeliet 2012). Over the last decade, more than 50 jurisdictions 
worldwide have adopted leniency arrangements in their competition and anti-cartel 
enforcement policies (Beaton-Wells 2015). Leniency arrangements contributed to detection of 
a substantial number of cartels across the globe. For example, due to its Amnesty program, the 
US Antitrust Division secured more fines in 1999 alone, than the sum of fines imposed under 
the Sherman Act since its adoption in 1890 (Aubert, Rey & Kovacic 2006). Leniency also 
triggered the largest financial penalties imposed by the European Commission (e.g. Vitamins, 
Auction Houses, Air Cargo) (cf. Carmeliet 2012; Stephan & Nikpay 2015). Recently however, 
the number of leniency applications declined worldwide, causing concern among experts 
about the dependency of competition authorities on this detection tool (Guttuso 2015; ICN 
2014). Therefore, it is important to understand more about the decision-making process and 
motivations regarding leniency applications. This study contributes to that understanding by 
empirically investigating motivations and disincentives for leniency applications. Does leniency 
work according to the theoretical assumptions underpinning it or do cartelists use leniency 
strategically, and if so, to what extent?
Previous research has addressed these questions through economic modelling (cf. Hinloopen 
2003; Blum, Steinat & Veltins 2008; Hinloopen & Soetevent 2008). This gives insight in 
potential interactions of cartels with leniency and theoretical scenarios on strategic use, but 
economic models lack empirical validation. Socio-legal scholars have conducted empirical 
research through single case studies or systematic document analyses of detected cartel cases 
(cf. Bergman & Sokol 2015; Brenner 2009; Stephan & Nikpay 2015). Some studies also 
include interviews with cartelists, but these studies have not specifically addressed leniency 
(cf. Parker 2013). The most extensive study regarding leniency is by Sokol (2012), who uses 
surveys and interviews among anti-trust practitioners in the US. Through his study, Sokol 
(2012) was the first to probe the assumptions underpinning leniency by studying how leniency 
decision-making works in practice. However, Sokol did not interview cartelists themselves and 
the study is US-based only. Although many studies have looked at the effectiveness of leniency, 
optimal leniency and some at leniency in legal practice, most of these studies are conducted in 
the US (cf. Harrington 2008; Sokol 2012). It is known that the US antitrust policy is set in a 
more adversarial legal system compared to European institutions (cf. Kagan 2006). Therefore, 
findings of this research cannot be automatically generalised to the European context. This 
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study contributes to extant research by adding a case from a European country and by adding 
first-hand experience from cartelists. Building on insights from these earlier empirical studies, 
this study looks at the specific Dutch context for leniency and investigates the theoretical 
assumptions behind leniency. The following questions are addressed: what are considerations in 
applying for leniency or refraining from doing so? How do those considerations relate to private 
enforcement of business cartels? And to what extent do cartelists use leniency strategically? The 
aim of this chapter is to answer these questions through interviews with competition lawyers, 
in-house legal counsel and cartelists in the Netherlands.
2. Theory: Assumptions underpinning leniency arrangements
Cartel agreements are based on mutual trust between cartelists. This trust entails the willingness 
to make oneself vulnerable to the risk of betrayal by others in the cartel (Leslie 2006). However, 
explicit agreements, informal contracts and secret book keeping are often also part of running 
cartels. Those can be seen as attempts to formalise or solidify this trust and as signs of an 
underlying lack of trust at the same time (Jaspers 2017). Leniency plays into this trust dynamic, 
attempting to disrupt cartels by increasing the benefits of betrayal for cartelists (Spagnolo 
2000). Leniency facilitates this by offering immunity to the first firm who comes forward to 
the authority with evidence of their involvement in cartel infringements. In addition, leniency 
provides reduction of financial penalties for firms with sufficient evidence that follow after the 
immunity-seeker. Policy makers and enforcement authorities rely on leniency to undermine 
potential trust in cartel agreements and induce distrust between cartelists, ultimately destabilising 
cartels (Choi & Hahn 2014). In combination with deterrent penalties and a credible threat 
of detection, leniency is presumed to instil distrust between cartelists and trigger a race to 
the competition authorities (Stucke 2015). Extradition of cartelists to foreign countries and 
examples of cartelists sentenced to prison in the US presumably increase credible deterrence 
(Thomas, et al. 2017; Crofts & Nylen 2015). In reality, cartels might also end because of 
exogenous reasons such as changing market conditions, change of management, mergers and 
acquisitions (Levenstein & Suslow, 2006; 2011). Because we only observe discovered cartels 
it remains unknown to what extent leniency programs actually destabilise existing or deter 
potential cartels (Harrington 2008). 
Cartel enforcement is based on the Beckerian theory of optimal deterrence (Becker 1968), 
also referred to as the Chicago School Approach (Sokol 2012). The experimental support for 
the Beckerian Proposition is mixed, given different contexts and markets and there is a lack 
of consensus on the appropriate level of deterrent fines. The underlying assumption is that 
firms balance expected gains from a violation against the expected punishment. In this theory, 
deterrence is a function of the size of the penalty and the probability of detection (Wils 2007). 
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Stephan and Nikpay (2015) identify three main theoretical assumptions underpinning leniency 
arrangements: 1) cartelists are rational and unified entities with centralised decision making, 
2) with accurate and predictable information about the expected benefits of the cartel, and 3) 
deterrent penalties and a credible threat of detection make leniency an attractive option for 
cartelists. These three assumptions; rationality, predictability and deterrence, will be compared 
to alternative explanations in the existing empirical research on leniency and result in three 
hypotheses for this study.
2.1 Rationality and unified entities with centralised decision making
The first assumption underpinning leniency policy is that participants in a cartel are rational 
actors whose behaviour is primarily determined by profit incentives. Additionally, firms are 
believed to be unified entities with centralised decision-making processes and assumed to make 
decisions about when to enter, leave or report a cartel at the top level. Contrary to the idea of 
firms as unified entities, corporations are in fact complex and fragmented institutional structures 
with decentralised decision-making in various units and locations (Harding 2013). Firms are 
complex structures due to differences between individual and firm incentives and firms may 
have difficulties to control and monitor rogue agents (Sokol, 2012). Information deficits exist 
within corporations; different departments can fail to communicate, and executives can be 
unaware of what happens on the shop floor. Differences exist between smaller and larger firms 
regarding decision-making about compliance (Parker 2013): large corporations with many 
subsidiaries face the difficulty of identifying infringements and to manage improvement if 
cartel violations have occurred (Braithwaite & Makkai 1991; Jamieson 1994). However, large 
corporations have more resources available to adopt professional compliance programs and 
legal advice. Smaller firms have fewer difficulties in monitoring cartel conduct - within smaller 
firms (e.g. family owned, owner-director), directors or managers are more likely to be aware or 
actively involved in conduct. Reversely, small firms will have fewer resources available regarding 
compliance programs. 
Moral ambivalence and ambiguity are known to play a role in cartel conduct violations (Haines 
& Beaton-Wells 2012; Parker 2012; Whelan 2013). Business people can find competition 
law abstract and complex or might not support moral wrongfulness of cartel conduct (cf. 
Hertogh 2010). Therefore, the expectation is that the size of firms and their legal consciousness 
(awareness and support for legal rules) influences to what extent they are aware of cartel 
conduct and inclined to act on this. Studies show that low legal-consciousness towards 
competition law causes calculated interaction with leniency. Literature finds a paradox between 
cartel criminalisation – enhanced enforcement, significantly high financial penalties – on the 
one hand, and fixed collectivistic sentiments and values in business cultures on the other (cf. 
Stephan, 2010). Within firms, the topic of competition law and cartel conduct is associated 
with moral ambiguity (Parker 2012; Whelan 2013). Closely related to what Gilbert Geis 
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(1977) noted in his seminal study on the heavy electrical equipment cartel cases. He quoted a 
Westinghouse executive rationalising price fixing: “Illegal? Yes, but not criminal. (…) I assumed 
that criminal action meant damaging someone, and we did not do that” (p. 67). This translates 
into the attitudes and self-perception of cartelists. They realise certain economic action and 
business conduct is strictly speaking not allowed, however they do not perceive it as unjust or 
morally objectionable.
2.2 Predictability of expected benefits and likelihood of detection
The second assumption underpinning leniency policy is that firms have accurate information 
about the expected benefits of the cartel, and adequately assess the likelihood of detection 
and the size and likelihood of punishment. Competition authorities are known to frame 
leniency as triggering ‘a race to the authorities’ between firms that struggle with: the risks of 
their involvement in cartel conduct, distrust towards their ‘partners in crime’ and remorse 
(Stucke 2015). Competition authorities actively present this frame within their regulatory 
communication (Van Erp 2017). Through information on their websites, (social) media 
campaigns and movie clips, competition authorities portray leniency as an attractive choice for 
cartelists that are considering their options. However, the suggestion of leniency destabilising 
active cartels has been challenged in research. Based on a case-study analysis of 40 international 
cartels Stephan and Nikpay (2015) concluded that 53% of those cartels ended before 
parties applied for leniency and only 6% ended after they applied. More studies underline 
this conclusion (Brenner 2009; Stephan 2008) and also suggest reporting is sometimes used 
strategically; challenging the idea that leniency ends existing cartel agreements (Miller 2009). 
In addition, practitioners question the reliability of testimonies derived from cartel confessions. 
It is suggested that whistle-blowers have an incentive to exaggerate their testimony, in order to 
be granted immunity or reduction of penalties (Snoep 2009). 
Harding and Edwards (2015) describe enforcement gaming as follows: “it may be, then, 
that another aspect of the impact of regulation and the use of sanctions in this context is an 
unintended and unwelcome (...) ‘reverse exploitation’ or capture of the process of enforcement 
by firms subject to the regulatory process as a kind of business opportunity” (p. 206). Scholars 
suggest several ways in which cartelists use leniency strategically (Harding et al. 2015; Levenstein, 
Marvão & Suslow 2016; Marvão 2016; Marx, Mezzetti & Marshall 2015). A large number of 
gaming strategies listed by Harding et al. (2015) include; strategies to hurt competitors, to 
intentionally bust the cartel for personal gain or to divert attention from regulators away from 
a bigger cartel (Marx et al. 2015). Marx et al. (2015) use game theory to predict firms will 
apply for leniency for several products at a time. The likelihood of investigation and conviction 
for the first product will increase but decrease for subsequent products. Firms will have an 
incentive to form ‘sacrificial cartels’ and apply for leniency in less valuable products. Using 
this strategy, cartelists can reduce the likelihood of detection and convictions in more valuable 
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cartels. This can also be referred to as a ‘throwing-the-bone strategy’: diverting attention of 
regulators away from a larger cartel. In other words, it is expected from the literature that firms 
use leniency strategically when they confess. However, for many of the theoretical scenarios 
it remains unclear to what extent empirical data supports them and under which conditions. 
Therefore, this study will probe to what extent and in which ways leniency is used strategically 
in the Netherlands. 
For this study, different theories on the use of leniency in the literature have been condensed 
into four scenarios: 1) the destabilising effect (default, no strategic use), 2) the opportunistic 
response, 3) the anticipation effect, and 4) the throwing the bone-strategy. Firstly, the 
destabilising scenario is leniency by the book, similar to how competition authorities generally 
bring it forward in their communication; destabilising active and current cartels. Secondly, 
the opportunistic response is when cartels have already failed for other reasons. In that case, 
firms might request for leniency to put their former cartel members at a disadvantage. Thirdly, 
the anticipation effect signifies a cartel as an intentional and planned construction, only to 
eventually damage other market players in the long run. When the firm is the first to ask for 
leniency it makes them immune to sanctions. Note that this means leniency does end the 
cartel in this scenario, although being used in a strategic way. Fourthly, the throwing-the-bone 
strategy entails firms holding a large international cartel agreement in product X while also 
retaining an agreement on a smaller side market Y (or markets) for a different product. Now 
firms individually or collectively ask for leniency in the smaller cartel to distract the efforts of 
the authorities and to decrease the risk of detection of the larger cartel. These four scenarios are 
operationalised for this study using scenarios in the interviews (see methods).
2.3 Deterrence and credible threat of detection
The third assumption underpinning leniency arrangements is that they are effective only when 
combined with penalties of sufficient magnitude to deter, and a credible threat of detection. 
In addition, competition authorities can exploit the uncertainty around the strength of an 
investigation by bluffing (Sauvagnat 2015). However, leniency policies do not operate in a 
vacuum, but interact with other legislation and enforcement, such as criminal liability and 
private damage actions (OECD 2012; Luz & Sapgnolo 2017). While it may be beneficial to 
self-confess in order to be granted immunity or reduction of penalties by public enforcement 
authorities, admitting to a violation and providing evidence for it can also be a disadvantage 
in follow-on civil damage cases as immunity from public sanctions does not extend to follow-
on civil damage claims (Cauffman 2011; Swaak & Wesseling 2015; Canenbley & Steinvorth 
2011; Guttuso 2015; Wils 2009). Buccirossi, Marvão & Spagnolo (2015) demonstrate 
damage actions could potentially improve the effectiveness of leniency programs, but only if 
civil liability of the immunity recipient is minimized and access to all evidence is granted to 
claimants. However, as Guttuso (2015) puts it: “the probability of exposure to private damages 
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not only in the jurisdiction where leniency was obtained, but also in other jurisdictions, have 
been cited as key factors inhibiting potential leniency applicants from self-reporting” (p. 279). 
Private enforcement in the form of follow-on damage procedures is the most important reason 
cartelists are increasingly cautious with leniency. These procedures are civil cases following after 
an infringement decision from the European Commission or national competition authorities. 
In the Netherlands, there have been developments in several cases where claimants are seeking 
redress from cartelists, such as TenneT/ABB, Sodium Chlorate, Paraffin Wax and Air Cargo. 
In Tennet/ABB the court ordered ABB to pay TenneT €68 million in damages. In Sodium 
Chlorate and Parrafin Wax, the German litigation funder CDC (Cartel Damages Claims) 
was involved. The Netherlands is a popular forum for claiming cartel damages. This attracts 
professional litigation funders from abroad. Litigation funders gather claims from damaged 
parties in the market and litigate on their behalf in order to collect a return on their investment 
in the form of a percentage of the damage claims, if granted (cf. Maton, Poopalasingam, Kuijper 
& Angerbauer 2011). For example, in the Air Cargo cartel: two days after the dawn raids, 20 
class action lawsuits were filed against Lufthansa alone in the US. Lufthansa ended up settling 
for $85 million. In addition, Lufthansa’s outside legal costs relating to the cartel averaged 
$12 million a year between 2005-2009 (Bergman & Sokol 2015). In short, it is expected 
that disincentives and stakeholders outside of cartelists and the competition authority might 
influence the decision-making process of leniency for corporations. 
Table 1 Leniency policy assumptions and empirical explanations
Theoretical assumptions leniency Alternative empirical explanations
Firms are rational and unified entities with 
centralised decision making 
Distribution of responsibilities within firms 
complicates centralised decision-making and moral 
ambiguity distorts rational decision-making.
Cartelists have accurate information on expected 
benefits of the cartel
Firms use leniency strategically if and when they 
confess
Deterrent penalties and credible threat of detection Leniency applications pose additional risks and 
uncertainties to cartelists and lead to increased 
exposure to private enforcement
Table 1 summarizes the main theoretical assumptions underpinning leniency arrangements 
and the alternative empirical explanations that challenge them. This study assesses whether 
there is support for these alternative explanations in the Netherlands and to what extent, by 
answering the following question: does leniency work according to the theoretical assumptions 
underpinning it or do cartelists use leniency strategically and to what extent?
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3. Methods 
For the purpose of this chapter a qualitative study among corporate and legal professionals 
in the Netherlands was conducted (cf. Sokol, 2012). As mentioned, most socio-legal studies 
on leniency in cartel cases are based on single case studies or systematic case-file analyses. 
Unfortunately, leniency case-file reports – including transcripts of confessions, internal 
communication and documentation of leniency applicants – are classified. In the Netherlands, 
the national competition authority was unwilling to grant access to these files. Due to both the 
limited availability of official documents as empirical material and the nature of the research 
question – which is directed at qualitative understanding of the interaction between leniency 
and cartelists – motivations and perceptions are studied through the use of interviews.
34 semi-structured interviews with competition lawyers (17), in-house legal counsel (6) and 
cartelists (11), such as executives and directors were conducted. The reason for also selecting 
non-cartelists as respondents was threefold. Firstly, contacting and establishing trust with legal 
professionals in the field of competition law was essential in order to gain access to cartelists. 
The cartelists in this study were clients and professional contacts of these lawyers and in-house 
legal counsel. Secondly, cartelists only have a one-time experience with leniency, which is 
informative but lacks more general and comparable knowledge of several cases (for example 
when it comes to assessing strategic gaming scenarios). Lawyers and in-house counsel provided 
for broader experience. Thirdly, when cartelists decide whether or not they will apply for 
leniency, legal professionals are influential agents in this process. Although a final decision on 
whether or not to apply for leniency lies with the firm, expertise of legal professionals causes 
an information imbalance with their client which grants them power in the decision-making 
process. Therefore, their experience and attitude towards leniency has significant effects on the 
decision of their client.
The competition lawyers and in-house legal counsel all had extensive experience in consultation 
and defence in (alleged) cartel infringement cases. In addition, most of them (14) had experience 
with preparing and submitting leniency applications for clients. Because cartel cases tend to 
be both a specialist topic and are often considered high-profile cases with high financial and 
reputational stakes, a combination of a level of seniority and expertise amongst respondents was 
essential. Therefore, all respondents were selected on the basis of their professional experience 
and expertise. Respondents held relevant professional experience of minimum 8 years, up to 41 
years and were all experts in the field of competition law. The competition lawyer respondents 
all worked in one of the following occupations: partner, lawyer-partner, senior counsel or off-
counsel. The in-house legal counsel respondents also had a relevant professional experience of 
a minimum of 8 years, up to 18 years. In addition, interviews were held with cartelists (11); 
chief executives and directors with experience in the process of considering leniency related 
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to (potential) cartel conduct violations in their company. Their professional experience in an 
executive or director role varied between 5-26 years. All the corporate professional respondents 
had a one-time only experience with cartel infringements and or leniency. Two had a background 
in law, the others in business studies or economics. Cases involved the construction industry 
(4); heavy industry (3); general services industry (2); and financial industry (2). Average 
duration of the cartels was 3.4 years. The number of participants in the cartels varied between 
3 and 7 firms. Typically, the cartelists physically met twice a year. Agreements were made 
through the use of minimum pricelists, customer lists, and geographical market allocation. 
Cartelists (n=11) interviewed for this study were involved in a wide variety of cartel types. 
These cartels initially started through meetings in market associations and industry connections 
through subcontracting. Cartel agreements were triggered by; low margins, pressure by other 
companies in the supply chain or uncertain market conditions. Motives for starting the cartel 
and conditions under which they took place had consequences for the decision to apply for 
leniency or refrain from doing so. Most notably, in several cases the fear of reactions of others in 
the industry (social control) is reason to refrain from applying for leniency. Six cases ultimately 
led to an administrative fine from the competition authority. Respondents pursued leniency 
in four cases. In two of these four cases respondents indicated they wanted to change their 
standing business practices and leniency provided a way to do that. In two cases, cartelists used 
leniency strategically to improve their position by hurting their co-cartelists. However, these 
cases can be described mostly as opportunistic use of leniency; the cartel already ended, or the 
cartelists did not hold up the agreement anymore at the time of the leniency application.
In order to gain access to the field and establish contacts with respondents to conduct 
interviews, the Dutch national association for competition lawyers was contacted. The 
board of the association forwarded a request in their newsletter, explaining the research 
and call for respondents. Several respondents contacted the researcher after the call in the 
newsletter, others were contacted after online searches for contact information, and others 
were approached through the so-called snowballing method; every respondent was asked to 
recommend additional respondents which were contacted. Clients (in-house legal counsel, 
chief executives and directors) were also contacted through this method of snowballing. The 
interviews themselves took place at the offices of the respondents. Mostly, these interviews were 
held in the conference room, and sometimes in personal offices or coffee corners. Interviews 
typically lasted for 50 minutes, with outliers of 45 and 150 minutes. The interviews were audio 
recorded and transcribed afterwards. 
During the interviews, the following topics were discussed: issues relating to fragmented 
institutional structure (e.g. the role of legal professionals) and decentralised decision making 
within companies relating to cartel infringements and leniency; incentives and disincentives to 
apply for leniency; and the role and influence of follow-on civil procedures (damage claims, 
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compensations) and the influence of professional litigation funders. Four scenarios on the use 
of leniency from the theoretical framework were presented to respondents for confirmation or 
falsification regarding their practical experience with leniency. The four theoretical scenarios 
on strategic use of leniency were introduced to respondents through the use of short scenario 
descriptions (see appendix III) and respondents were asked to comment on accuracy for these 
scenarios in their daily legal practice and asked to give factual examples. The transcripts of the 
interviews were coded for the following topics: decentralised decision making; moral ambiguity; 
framing and reliability; opportunistic use; civil damage claims. In addition, interviews were 
coded for verification or falsification on each of the four scenarios.
3.1 Limitations: non-response and social desirability 
About 30-40% of approached potential respondents declined from being interviewed for this 
study. This mainly concerned those who were contacted after the online search (‘cold calls’). All 
non-response was followed up by a question for the reason(s) of non-response. Where indicated, 
reasons for non-response amongst lawyers were mainly a lack of time, interest or sufficient expertise 
in their own opinion. Reasons for non-response amongst in-house legal counsel, executives and 
directors, mainly concerned issues regarding confidentiality. In-house legal counsel often sign 
internal contracts with their company, or between company and regulator in case of settlements. 
This bounds them from speaking or commenting on the case. In addition, the negative image of 
big business (especially multinational corporations) as non-compliant was noted as a reason not 
to cooperate in this study. Concerning non-response amongst cartelists, mostly multi-national 
firms declined from participating in the study, which might indicate a slightly overrepresentation 
of more local and smaller businesses. On the other hand, the majority of interviews with lawyers 
were with lawyers in large international and trans-national firms dealing with major multinational 
corporations as clients, so their experience is represented in the data from that end.
Semi-structured interviews have limitations. Firstly, it is not possible to generalize results to a 
larger population. Therefore, the results in this study are not representative for all cartels in the 
Netherlands. The purpose of this study is to understand the nature of the interactions regarding 
leniency. Research findings regarding the interaction between regulation and businesses can have 
a wider relevance e.g. in other domains of law. They inform us about the nature of interactions 
between different types of professionals when it comes to the decision-making process around 
compliance. Secondly, social desirability of respondents is an issue in interviews. Naturally, 
lawyers are advocates to their clients’ best interest and therefore, to a certain extent, also their 
conduct. To correct for anticipated social desirability, the interviewer used his extensive research 
through case studies (cf. Jaspers 2017) on recent national cartel cases. In addition, during the 
interview the researcher consequently invited respondents to provide specific examples from their 
own professional experience to prevent superficial answers, avoid generalisations and socially 
desirable responses. 
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4. Results: Leniency applications in the Netherlands
As per the theoretical framework, the results are categorised using the assumptions underpinning 
leniency policy: rationality, predictability and deterrence.
4.1 Rationality: centralised versus fragmented decision making
The results of this study confirm that fragmented institutional structure and decentralised decision 
making within firms causes differences in awareness of cartel conduct between departments 
and demonstrates that awareness of senior management in case of cartel infringements diverges 
between smaller and larger firms. (cf. Harding 2013; Sokol 2012). These differences can be 
attributed to the variety in firm size. The interviews show how large (multinational) companies 
with multiple subsidiaries struggle with ‘local’ issues more often when it comes to cartel conduct 
violations. Smaller and mid-size companies include active involvement of the executive director 
or owner-director more often than in large firms (cf. Jamieson 1994). The difference in size also 
affects the decision-making process in applying for leniency. Smaller firms often entail direct 
involvement of executives and owner-directors, therefore the decision to apply for leniency will 
affect the executives directly and has personal consequences. A confession means coming clean 
about your own personal responsibility for the infringement. As opposed to a chief executive of a 
multinational company that deals with a ‘local issue’ at a subsidiary. An executive will experience 
more personal distance in the decision-making process regarding leniency. 
Larger firms will generally be better equipped to deal with compliance procedures and legal 
issues regarding competition law. Hence, they are better equipped than smaller companies to 
hire internal and external legal advice and consultation. This enables them to better organise, 
structurally incorporate and implement fair competition rules into their compliance programs. 
Smaller companies have less resources and staff (or none) to organise compliance in a professional 
and structural way. Results indicate infringements by small firms are often unintentional and a 
result of ignorance or lack of professionalism. However, this does not explain why both small 
and big business are involved in cartel conduct violations. There is more to it than knowing the 
law. Parker (2013) demonstrates how knowledge about the law is less important to companies 
than their relationship with the law. Bigger ‘elite’ firms see themselves as intimate with the law 
and able to ‘game’ it in their advantage. Smaller companies perceive themselves as unknowing 
towards compliance. This perception influences internal support for the rules, otherwise known 
as legal-consciousness.
4.2 Rationality: Moral ambiguity
Secondly, this study demonstrates that low legal-consciousness towards competition law causes 
calculated interaction with leniency. Results show cartelists bring forward several reasons and 
rationalisations for their misconduct. These relate to tradition, market structure and mutual 
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dependencies between competitors in a market. Lawyers also indicated how their clients often 
present explanations or rationalisations regarding their cartel activities. Cartelists embrace these 
justifications and are even happy to explain their illegal conduct to competition officials:
“They believe the market conditions justify it… that they… feel like they have to, because of 
the small profit margins. I notice this with my clients. For instance, a big problem in these 
interrogations with the competition authority is how clients are more than happy to tell them 
[the authorities JJ] everything they did and why they did it, because they truly feel that what 
they did is the right thing.” (R3)
This example illustrates how cartel conduct is integrated in traditions within certain markets. 
Cartelists have internalised justifications of these practices. In a few markets and industries, 
these justifications are institutionalised. The results demonstrate a paradox between increased 
awareness and enforcement on the one hand and sentiments of moral ambiguity on the other. 
From regulatory studies we know that a lack of support for rules or moral condemnation of 
conduct can result in an instrumental interaction with rules and regulation (cf. Blumtenhal, 
Christian & Slemrod 2001; Braithwaite 1995; Gneezy & Rustichini 2000; Van de Bunt & 
Huisman 2007; Van Wingerde 2012).
Competition lawyer respondents with the longest working experience (> 20 years) point 
out the changing regulatory context over the past two decades (cf. Beaton-Wells & Ezrachi, 
2011). They explain how expansion of global cartel enforcement has induced elevated levels 
of awareness and increased professionalism in compliance programs and special compliance 
departments regarding competition law. Today, heavy financial penalties make competition law 
a top priority in internal compliance programs and training sessions. However, simultaneously 
the topic bears the most moral ambiguity amongst business people according to respondents. 
Topics such as bribery or privacy laws, also considered important issues in contemporary 
compliance, are more unambiguously supported according to the interviewees.
4.3 Predictability: Strategic use of leniency
The interviews demonstrate that firms use leniency strategically, but in a limited number of 
ways. Firstly, the results do not support more sophisticated scenarios, such as an anticipation 
effect – cartelists entering into a cartel with the intention of asking for leniency at a later stage 
to damage their cartel ‘partners’ financially (cf. Harding et al. 2015) or the ‘throwing the bone 
strategy’ – distracting attention and resources of regulators by asking for leniency in several 
product markets (cf. Marx et al. 2015). The results do not support these two scenarios for 
strategic use of leniency in the Netherlands. However, the results do support ‘opportunistic’ use 
of leniency and selective framing of confessions. Opportunistic use is either reporting cartels 
that have already ended e.g. in the process of mergers and acquisitions (to avoid or reduce 
121
5
accountability at a later stage) or reporting in order to get ahead of competitors with more 
market power when market conditions change.
Examples of opportunistic use of leniency are cartelists that are in a so-called hub and spoke 
construction with a more powerful market player. In a hub and spoke cartel, the dominant 
firm is the producer of one the resources for example, so that its competitors are also its clients. 
These dominant firms set conditions for other players in the market. In two cases, companies 
used leniency to damage the dominant firm in order to get out of restricting contracts and 
market conditions. One cartelist explained why he applied for leniency:
“After a few years this player made it increasingly difficult for us to do business (…) Every 
year I was presented with a list of prices for the upcoming year (…) And yes, as with any of 
our activities this was a way to push the other firm out of business, or at least to make their 
life as miserable as possible” (R28)
Concerning strategic use of leniency, other studies point to elaborate gaming schemes and 
strategies employed by cartelists (Harding et al. 2015; Marx et al. 2015). However, this study 
found more subtle and nuanced forms of framing and using leniency in practice. By selective 
framing of confessions, cartelists present their testimony selectively, through either withholding 
certain information or overstating certain facts and circumstances in order to be granted leniency. 
For example, respondents refer to “over-confession” when they describe how cartelists frame 
their confession to leniency officers. When, after internal deliberations, a firm has committed 
to apply for leniency they are highly motivated for the application to be granted. Competition 
authorities set certain standards for the application, such as that substantial evidence should 
be provided, and facts and circumstances must indicate a clear infringement. This can put a 
strain on the reliability of the testimony of leniency applicants. Respondents also noted that 
they come across examples in practice where several leniency applications are contradictory and 
inconsistent in the same case, indicating false confessions 
Competition lawyers with extensive experience consider applying for leniency an exception 
to the rule. If they do apply for leniency this seems to be driven more by inevitability and 
opportunism. Internal investigations are part of the process of mergers and acquisitions. 
These internal investigations can result in firms applying for leniency. Change in management 
can create momentum for a fresh start or leniency is used to settle possible liability-risks in 
the future. These leniency applications often entail ceased activities, or ‘dead’ cartels as one 
competition lawyer points out:
122
Chapter 5 | Leniency in exchange for cartel confessions
“By a clean slate I mean in case of selling the company or when you are about to enter in to a 
merger. Maybe there are some skeletons in the closet that you have to get rid of. And you can 
do this through applying for leniency.” (R14)
4.4 Deterrence: Disincentives to apply for leniency
The fourth result from this study is that several disincentives make leniency an unattractive 
option for cartelists in most cases. In the literature, corporations involved in cartel conduct 
are often considered agents in a prisoner’s dilemma (in the context of game theory cf. Blum 
et al. 2008) regarding the decision whether to apply for leniency. However, when there is no 
reason to assume information about the illegal agreements is reaching the authorities and there 
is sufficient mutual trust, the best option for all those involved is “not to play the game at all” 
(Leslie, 2006). The results from this study demonstrate a number of reasons for firms involved 
in cartel conduct not to play the game indeed, namely: insufficient evidence of the conduct for 
an application, social control (reactions in the market), cultural objections, the costly and time-
consuming internal investigations and preparation of leniency applications, and the influence 
of follow-on civil damages procedures after investigations and fines from public competition 
authorities.
First off, respondents explain that facts and circumstances might indicate an infringement, but 
too little evidence can be retrieved to assure an infringement actually happened. If there is a 
lack of evidence after internal investigations, firms cannot provide the authority with sufficient 
information to be granted leniency. The following example by an in-house legal counsel 
illustrates this:
“Internal investigations pointed out that regionally there had been deliberations and illegal 
agreements between competitors. This was mapped into detail and was discussed with head 
legal in Germany on further steps to follow. A draft leniency application was even drawn 
up. In the end we decided against leniency, because there was simply insufficient written 
evidence. Nothing but suspicions really.” (R32)
Secondly, reactions of others in the market are also reason to remain silent in case of possible 
infringements. The social control backlash from ‘telling on your peers’ differs greatly, especially 
depending on the type of market. Depending on how certain markets are structured they 
induce great dependency between competitors. Damaging the trust by telling the authorities 
about certain agreements that might qualify as an infringement can gravely damage that trust. 
Damaging trust might form a disadvantage to firms in future activities in the market. The 
following example from an in-house legal counsel of a mid-size firm illustrates this:
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“The market we operate in is defined by a number of legitimate collaborations on numerous 
activities. And you know, if you take these steps [apply for leniency JJ] you will be treated like 
dirt by the others in the market afterwards.” (R16)
Thirdly, respondents report cultural objections. Cultural objections have a social dimension 
but should be understood as more principle-based objections towards leniency. For example, 
respondents refer to leniency as; ‘telling on someone’ or ‘betraying others’ and qualify this as 
immoral in and of itself. The idea of being disloyal to other businesses in the market, which are 
often considered colleagues in business, is often perceived as incompatible with personal values. 
A competition lawyer of a multinational firm explains:
“I have had clients that simply say: ‘we will not betray others’. Sometimes you have to explain 
to them as their lawyer: it can actually be the best scenario for you.” (R6)
Fourthly, the burden of going through a leniency process, in terms of financial costs, 
(management) time and other strains it puts on firms’ operations is another reason to refrain 
from leniency. High costs of legal consultation, internal data collection to prepare a leniency 
report and the management time of highly paid executives puts a brake on business activities for 
months or years. More importantly, these are certain and short-term costs the firm is confronted 
with, in contrast to highly uncertain and long-term consequences of an administrative fine. 
In that sense it can be distorted cost-benefit analyses when firms do end up with a financial 
penalty. However, it is their perception at the time of deciding on leniency that drives their 
decision. There is also a high degree of uncertainty in terms of the legal position of the company 
during the procedure and the eventual outcome. Before the investigations of the authorities and 
court decisions are done, this uncertainty can easily last years. Two competitions lawyers state:
“Applying for leniency requires a ton of work, which is often underestimated. It demands lots 
of statements, documents and paperwork and is therefore a costly procedure.” (R25)
“Sometimes you are in a leniency procedure and your gut already tells you: ‘this is not working 
out’. When the authorities keep asking for additional information again and again and there 
is no real progress. It is way less structured and comes with a lot more uncertainty, more 
uncertainty in fact than regular cartel investigations! [ex-officio investigations JJ].” (R5)
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Table 2 Summary of perceived incentives and disincentives regarding leniency
Incentives to apply for leniency Disincentives to apply for leniency
Full disclosure in light of M&A process Insufficient evidence
Opportunistic response Social: response in the market
Cultural objections
Costly and time consuming
Follow-on damage claims
Table 2 presents a summary of the most commented on perceived incentives and disincentives 
in applying for leniency in this study. The fifth disincentive: the risk of follow-on damage 
claims, involves the relationship between firms involved in cartel conduct violations and 
damaged parties in the market seeking compensation. These private stakeholders are consumers, 
anywhere down the line in the supply chain of a particular market that can make a convincible 
claim for losses as a result of cartel agreements. Exposure to private cartel enforcement was 
highly commented on by respondents.
4.5 Deterrence: Interaction between private and public enforcement
Although private enforcement is relatively recent in the Netherlands, respondents explain how 
the risk of being confronted with follow-on civil damages procedures induces more caution 
towards applying for leniency. It also causes most of the leniency testimony to be done verbally 
and not in writing. Lastly, it also makes parties litigate longer and makes them less inclined to 
accept settlements from the Commission or national competition authorities, because they can 
be seen as an admission of guilt. A competition lawyer comments:
“I will not be quick to advise leniency anymore, especially because of these follow-on damages 
claims. That is a classic: ‘the operation was successful, but the patient died’. So leniency no 
longer means closure, today it is only the mere beginning.” (R11)
In line with Cauffman (2011), these results indicate how leniency and private enforcement 
interact; the threat of follow-on damage claims is an important disincentive to come forward 
as a leniency applicant. Respondents indicate that civil litigation can lead to corporate liability 
for damages up to 4 or 5 times the amount in (public) financial penalties imposed by the 
competition authority.
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5. Conclusions
The aim of this chapter was to compare the main assumptions underpinning leniency policy 
with the practice of leniency in the Netherlands. This study examined three main assumptions 
(cf. Stephan & Nikpay, p. 142): 1) Firms act as rational and unified entities with centralised 
decision making 2) Predictability of costs and benefits 3) Deterrent Penalties and Credible 
Threat of Detection. These assumptions were compared with existing empirical literature on 
leniency and a qualitative interview study on leniency in the Netherlands. Relating to these 
assumptions this study comprises four main results. Firstly, awareness of management in case 
of cartel infringements diverges between small and large firms. The level of social responsiveness 
and professionalism in terms of compliance and the relationship with the law differs between 
smaller and larger companies. This influences decision-making procedures towards leniency, 
making leniency applications less likely for smaller firms. Secondly, there is a paradox between 
cartel criminalisation – enhanced enforcement, significantly high financial penalties – on the 
one hand, and fixed collectivistic sentiments and values in business cultures on the other. This 
paradox results in firms gaming enforcement efforts and strategic use of regulation. Thirdly, 
firms use leniency strategically, however in limited ways. Support for both selective framing 
and opportunistic use of leniency was found in the interviews but not for more sophisticated 
strategies suggested by some authors (Harding et al. 2015; Marx et al. 2015). Fourthly, several 
disincentives make leniency an unattractive option for cartelists. Disincentives concerning 
leniency include: insufficient evidence for an application, social control (reactions in the 
market), cultural (principle based) objections such as ‘telling on your peers’, the costly and time-
consuming internal investigations and preparation of leniency applications, and the influence 
of follow-on civil damages procedures after investigations and fines from public competition 
authorities. Seven out of the eleven cartelists that were interviewed for this study decided 
against leniency. The fear of reactions of others in the industry is an important reason to 
refrain from applying for leniency. Respondents pursued leniency in four cases. In two of these 
cases cartelists indicated strategic use to improve their position by hurting their co-cartelists. 
However, strategic use in these cases can be characterised as opportunistic use of leniency; the 
cartel already ended for exogenous reasons.
5.1 Discussion and implications
The balance and interaction between compensations and leniency is one of the issues the 
European Commission and national competition authorities (NCA’s) struggle with. Several 
suggestions for legal provision have been made, ranging from preventing disclosure of leniency 
applications, reducing risks of damages claims to introduce additional financial incentives to 
leniency recipients. However, NCA’s, can also direct attention towards efforts to better involve 
other stakeholders, such as professional litigation funders and specialised lawyers in designing 
more attractive leniency programs that include private interests and reduce obstacles and 
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uncertainties in the current programs. Private enforcement seems to decrease the number of 
leniency applications and hereby slowing down the public enforcement of cartels. Private and 
public enforcement of cartels interact (Cauffman 2011). For example, the financial penalty-
decision that the Commission and national competition authorities publish is the starting 
point for litigation funders to collect claims and start follow-on damage procedures. This is 
where NCA’s have leverage to start negotiations with several stakeholders in the field of private 
enforcement and damages.
In short, this study demonstrated major disincentives in applying for leniency. This leaves 
room to speculate how many cartels fail to be revealed by leniency. Moreover, it gives food for 
thought regarding the dependency of competition authorities on those cases that did result in 
leniency applicants. In addition, this influences thinking and dominant perceptions of what 
a cartel is, in both enforcement practice and academic research. Leniency applicants largely 
provide the mythology around what cartels are and how they look like (cf. Harding & Edwards 
2015) and this might feed collective blind spots. The issues with strategic gaming, framed 
and false confessions only begin to shed light on how biased the regulatory and empirical 
understanding of cartels is. When most insights arise from detected cases, which are largely 
induced by leniency. In that regard, can leniency been seen as regulatory success, in terms of 
its goal to destabilise active cartels? Or is it a form of regulatory deadweight loss; inefficient 
allocation of resources? Moreover, this study has illustrated how the social context influences 
decision making towards leniency applications and that whistle-blower incentives, like leniency, 
do not operate in a social vacuum. For example, in bid-rigging cartels there is interaction 
with legislation and enforcement around corruption (Luz & Spagnolo 2017). In other words, 
besides the public enforcement there are other stakeholders in the process that can immensely 
influence the ultimate outcome of these confessions. These stakeholders are often insufficiently 
taken into account in the design of regulatory policies, as leniency proves.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and discussion: 
cooperation against the law
Cartel conduct is cooperation without and against the law. This study has demonstrated how 
cartels can operate both without and against the law. The central question in this research was 
how cartel agreements can endure despite increased efforts to discourage and punish them. The 
social dynamics within and relational and structural networks around cartels were examined to 
determine how businesses succeed to cooperate without and against the law. First, successful 
cartelists are able to overcome the constraints that revolve around the interaction between 
cartelists. Cartelists can overcome the lack of formal arbitration and legal contracts in making 
and enforcing their illegal agreements. They use clandestine communication and settlement 
systems to enforce their agreements. Interpersonal trust is essential in maintaining the cartel 
network. This study demonstrated how the longevity of cartel agreements can be explained by 
the relational and institutional embeddedness of cartel conduct. Cultural embeddedness of 
cartel conduct in the European and Dutch context was expressed in the rationalisations and 
explanations of conduct by cartelists. Second, cartelists are able to overcome the constraints of 
increased regulation and enforcement of cartel conduct by remaining hidden ‘in plain sight’. 
This study illustrated the influence of culture and regulatory traditions on the nature and 
structure of two different systems of collusion: inclusive and exclusive collusion. This study 
also described how cartelists interact with the most important policy tool for competition 
authorities in uncovering cartel conduct: leniency. Some cartelists do confess their illegal 
agreements using the leniency arrangement. However, this study also demonstrated certain 
types of strategic use of leniency.
This chapter deals with the conclusions of this study and provides an answer to the sub-
questions and hereby the central research question. Paragraph 1 includes an overview of the 
findings and answers to the sub-questions of this study. Paragraph 2 includes a discussion 
of the results and the theoretical implications of this study. In paragraph 3, methodological 
strengths and limitations of this study are discussed. In paragraph 4, policy implications for 
cartel enforcement are discussed.
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1. Overview of findings
This study was structured around four interconnected research questions. All the questions 
referred back to the overarching research question, namely how cartel agreements can endure 
despite increased efforts to discourage and punish them. The research questions in this study 
revolved around the different challenges cartelists face in sustaining their cartel agreements: 
stabilising, concealing, enforcing and confessing.
•  How do informal coordinating mechanisms enable cartel stability outside the scope of 
formal legal control and what role does trust play?
First, while stabilising the cartel, cartelists are faced with the difficulty of working together 
without the possibility to rely on formal legal contracts or arbitration. This difficulty was referred 
to as the cooperation paradox, because although cooperation is in the interest of cartelists, so 
is cheating the cartel agreement while others abide to it. The absence of legal arbitration and 
contracts introduces risks of cheating and defection within cartels. Cartelists need to address 
these risks using clandestine systems of communication, coordination and control.
•  How are cartels able to remain hidden from outsiders for long periods of time?
Second, cartelists are faced with the challenge of concealing their illegal agreements and related 
conduct from outsiders to the cartel. As with criminal networks, cartels need to coordinate their 
collective action efficiently by communicating, while at the same time facing the risk of exposure. 
In this study, this challenge is referred to as the secrecy-coordination paradox. This paradox 
points to how cartelists deal with the conflicting interests of coordination and concealment.
•  Why do business cartels sometimes do and sometimes do not involve organised crime? 
Third, cartelists are faced with the risk of internal instability because of a lack of credible 
enforcement of their illegal agreement in case of cheating cartelists. Some cartels deal with this 
challenge of cartel stability through third party enforcement by organised criminal groups. 
The literature on organised crime describes these business cartels as examples of infiltration of 
organised crime in legitimate business sectors. However, many cartels do not entail involvement 
of a third party organised criminal group.
•  What are considerations for cartelists in applying for leniency or refraining from doing so?
Fourth, cartelists are faced with the risk of defection by other cartelists confessing and 
denouncing the cartel to the authorities in exchange for leniency: immunity or reduction of 
penalties. Indeed, cartel confessions are the most important source for competition authorities 
in uncovering cartel conduct. Leniency is presumed to instil distrust between cartelists. 
However, in light of a decrease in leniency applications in recent years, discussion centres on 
the functioning of leniency arrangements in practice.
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In order to answer the main research question, this study used three methods of analysis: 
literature review, case-file analysis and semi-structured interviews. This study employed several 
qualitative research methods and used a combination of qualitative sources. The results in 
this study are based on literature review, case-file analysis of official documentation and semi-
structured interviews. The literature review contains both theoretical and empirical studies 
on cartels from different disciplines including criminology, sociology, socio-legal studies, and 
competition law and economics. The case-file analysis conducted for this study is based on 
secondary sources that can be divided in three categories: 1) private enforcement reports and 
records of fourteen detected Dutch cartel cases, 2) public parliamentary investigation reports 
and records into construction industry in the Netherlands and Quebec, Canada, and 3) public 
enforcement reports published by the European Commission on detected European cartels. The 
European cartel cases are used to illustrate and contextualise the main findings of the research, 
resulting from the former two categories and other sources; the literature review and interviews. 
The interviews conducted for this study are primary sources and can be characterised as semi-
structured interviews. These interviews were held amongst three categories of respondents 
in the Netherlands: 1) competition authority officials/investigators (in 2012), 2) specialised 
competition lawyers (between 2015-2017), and 3) cartelists (between 2015-2017). 
1.1 Stabilising: how do cartelists stabilise their cartel ‘without the law’?
The first research question of this study asked how cartelists manage their cartels in the absence 
of law. The focus was on the internal structure of cartels in order to answer the overarching 
question how cartels can endure. How do cartelists stabilise their cartel agreements? Two 
different perspectives were identified in the existing literature. First, an economic approach 
departed from the assumption of a lack of trust between cartelists and a need for monitoring 
and retaliation as a consequence of this lack of trust. Second, a social approach departed from 
the assumption of mutual trust and the use of negotiation and mediation as means to build 
trust. Elements of both ideal types occurred in the private enforcement reports and records 
of fourteen detected Dutch cartel cases and interviews with the case managers used for this 
analysis.
On the one hand, cartelists in the selected cases stabilise their cartel agreements through the 
use of informal social mechanisms. Means of coordination and compensation − meetings, 
informal rules and mutual debts − were established between firms through communication and 
reciprocity. The cases proved how the paradox of social embeddedness is applicable to cartels, 
namely; the need to operate secretly forces cartelists to rely heavily on social ties through 
informal means of coordination. Furthermore, mutual rights and obligations make parties 
interdependent, and reciprocity can function as a powerful market mechanism. This stabilises 
and strengthens cartels and makes it hard for firms to end existing agreements. In addition, 
social capital, strong social ties, and trust are often considered desirable in light of growth and 
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economic value (cf. De Bliek 2015). However, these mechanisms can also have less-desirable 
consequences. The strong ties in a social group such as a business cartel can benefit its members 
but exclude others from access. Moreover, it can limit and restrict the individual freedom of its 
members (Parker 2012; Portes 2010: 39). In other words, cartelists become too reliant on their 
social network within the market, even when these relations are working against their personal 
or their company’s interests. This is how cooperation against the law is established.
On the other hand, third-party auditors and the formalisation of agreements in writing also 
indicate a lack of trust: conflicts occurred in some cases, and parties sometimes responded 
through retaliation. However, retaliation appears more likely to lead to the end of the cartel 
rather than stabilising it. In light of conflicts, the dominant strategy throughout the cases 
seems to be not to punish other cartel members. In contrast, firms are often able to overcome 
mutual disagreements by means of negotiation and compensation. Moreover, most cases do not 
involve explicit episodes of conflict, confirming the preventative effect imposed by the systems 
of coordination and compensation. This is comparable to research findings on drug markets, 
where retaliation is found to be a costly business tool and negotiation and toleration are more 
common (Jacques & Wright 2008; 2011; Zaitch 2005).
The role of trust in cartels remains a chicken and egg situation, because the formalisation 
of cartel agreements − clandestine bookkeeping, minutes of meetings, and rules on mutual 
compensations − can both express mutual trust or a lack thereof. Both elements are clearly 
hard to disentangle, and such an exercise harms the complexity of the social reality of 
cartel agreements. In this regard, the economic approach overlooks the fact that − given the 
participants’ proper response − conflicts can prove to be an opportunity to strengthen the 
cartel, and they can turn out to be a source of stability instead of instability. This is also referred 
to as the ‘cleansing’ function of social conflicts (Coser 1956). In these cases, cartels will be 
more difficult to break up, even when facing the threat of formal legal control (enforcement) or 
changing market conditions (Levenstein and Suslow 2011).
The results illustrate the importance of mutual dependencies between competitors and the 
use of informal social mechanisms to build trust and to stabilise cartels. This enables even 
relatively large groups of firms to cooperate effectively. The analysis of these cases hereby shows 
how an economic model provides an incomplete explanation for cartel stability and it calls for 
incorporating a social or sociological perspective in competition law and policy. The results of 
this first part of the study emphasise that in order to explain cartel stability we need to consider 
the social embeddedness and the importance of social mechanisms that induce trust. Trust and 
a lack of trust both play a role in how firms manage and shape their cartels.
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1.2 Concealing: how do cartels remain hidden from outsiders?
The second research question referred back to the second part of the overarching question in 
this study, namely: how can cartels endure despite increased efforts to discourage and punish 
them? This part of the study was directed to answering the question how cartels are able to 
remain hidden from outsiders for long periods. In answering this question, both the role of 
concealment and communication and the role of trust and social embeddedness were addressed. 
To analyse the question, insights gleaned from the extensive body of work within both the field 
of organised crime and corporate and white-collar crime were used (cf. Edwards & Levi 2008; 
Lord & Levi 2017; Levi 2008). Like participants of criminal networks, cartelists need to deal 
with both coordinating illegal agreements and concealing their activities at the same time. 
Private enforcement reports and records of fourteen detected Dutch cartel cases and interviews 
with case managers were used in answering the second research question.
A combination of the existing literature on criminal and covert networks, and studies on social 
networks of cartels resulted in the following three main expectations for this second part of 
the study: (1) cartels may not be as centralised and hierarchically organised as in the classic 
image of the ‘secret society’; (2) cartels may not only prioritise for concealment but also for 
effective communication; and (3) it is not isolation from their social environment but their 
embeddedness in their environment that provides an explanation for the longevity of cartels. 
The results of this study demonstrated three main findings in light of the question how cartels 
are able to remain hidden from outsiders.
First, to avoid the risk of detection, cartels in the selected cases used techniques aimed at 
concealing their illegal conduct. However, empirical material illustrated how cartel participants 
are focused primarily on establishing well-functioning agreements, and therefore communicate 
frequently and in a centralised manner. Paradoxically, efforts to conceal by means of impersonal 
communication methods, such as phases-of-the-moon systems (rotating bids by taking turns) 
and price lists, led to a need for more communication and documentation in practice (cf. 
Goffman 1970). The cases showed how cartelists also try to ensure that co-conspirators will 
keep their end of the bargain. Cartelists perceived opportunism as a risk, and therefore they 
centralised their communication and developed extensive documentation of their agreements. 
This proves how the need for mutual trust prevails over concealment of conduct by minimising 
the means of communication. However, further study and discussion is needed to determine 
whether the elaborate systems of communication and sometimes administration are to be 
considered instruments for building trust or are in fact indications of a lack of trust.
Second, the use of trust-substitutes and the role of facilitators in the empirical material 
demonstrated how cartels are strongly embedded in their social environment and can emanate 
from pre-existing professional and personal networks. Cartels, opposed to most ‘classic’ forms of 
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organised crime, can thereby shroud in a context of legitimate business interactions. Cartelists 
can be considered trusted criminals (Friedrichs 2010; Punch 1996; Wheeler & Rothman 1982). 
The results from this study hereby prove how corporate and white-collar crime perpetrators 
can rise above suspicion and are facilitated by a cooperative and silent social environment. 
The fact that cartelists seemingly act on behalf of the organisation, creates a smokescreen for 
enforcement authorities, which complicates their detection efforts (Van de Bunt 2010).
Third, the cases show that longevity of cartel secrecy is explained by the embeddedness of 
cartels in their social environment and not by concealment or internal control of secrecy 
within the cartel. This is also demonstrated by the use of trust-substitutes (in the form of loans, 
mortgages, etc.). Furthermore, the role facilitators play in cartels is mentioned and illustrated 
by imprudent clients, actively involved secretaries and chairmen of cartels, or members of 
collective market associations. The added difficulty in distinguishing the intentional and 
unintentional facilitation of illegal activities is the distance that exists between the actions of 
the facilitator and the illegal conduct of the network. This distance provides facilitators with an 
opportunity to evade moral and legal accountability for their actions (cf. Cohen 2001). 
As mentioned before and in the introduction (see chapter 1), this study takes the approach 
of exploring the organisation of corporate and white-collar crime (cf. Edwards & Levi 2008; 
Lord & Levi 2017; Levi 2008). This second part of the analysis has theoretical implications for 
the field of both organised and corporate and white-collar crime. Theoretical implications for 
the study of corporate crime are that, although one can draw a few parallels in the operation 
of criminal networks in organised crime (e.g. importance of trust; the use of trust-substitutes; 
social embeddedness), an important difference lies in the vast opportunities that corporate 
crime perpetrators have at their disposal to shroud their activities in a context of legitimacy 
and licit corporate conduct. This also explains why most organised forms of corporate crimes 
do not require modus operandi of intimidation or violence in the event of conflict. As 
regards corporate criminal conduct, an oblivious or cooperative social environment provides 
practical opportunities for businesses to create and maintain illegal agreements. The theoretical 
implication for the study of organised crime is that illegal or criminal networks might not 
always prioritise for concealment. They can operate through elaborate communication and go 
far beyond minimizing information exchange, as was demonstrated by the cases described in 
this analysis.
Based on the analysis so far, the question rises whether one can really speak of concealment as 
an explanation for the longevity of organised illegal activity. Is this an adequate question to pose 
when it comes to cartel agreements? In any case, it is clear that the longevity cannot be explained 
solely by studying the means of concealment by cartelists alone. Most cases can be more or less 
indicated as a ‘public secret’: namely, many people − within and outside the organisations 
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involved − do know, could or should know about the activities, but are either disinterested or 
are reluctant to come forward to reveal them or to inform enforcement authorities. Therefore, 
the governance and regulation of corporate and white-collar crime should pay closer attention 
to the legal and moral responsibility and liability of facilitators and bystanders. As many licit 
organisations, platforms, and other facilitators provide an opportunity for cartel conduct to 
occur, it is important to acknowledge their legal and moral responsibility and accountability 
with regard to the existence and endurance of cartel agreements. Some judicial decisions 
demonstrate how such facilitators can be taken into account (Harding 2009). One could argue 
that governance and regulation of corporate and white-collar crime should examine carefully 
the responsibility and liability of facilitators and bystanders, as established in efforts against 
organised crime through criminalising actions of preparation and complicity (cf. Middleton 
2005). 
1.3 Enforcing agreement: why do some cartels involve organised crime and do 
others not?
Cartelists are faced with the risk of internal instability because of a lack of credible (legal) 
enforcement of their illegal agreement in case of cheating cartelists. The purpose of the third 
research question was to investigate why business cartels sometimes do and sometimes do not 
include the involvement of criminal groups with a violent reputation to make up for this lack 
of credible enforcement. The third research question hereby refers back to the first part of the 
central research question, namely; how can cartels endure? The often-separated criminological 
discourses of organised and organisational crime literature have both discussed the phenomenon 
of economic cartels, respectively framing it as organised crime ‘infiltration’ or purely corporate 
conspiracy. However, contemporary studies in organised crime offer extensive elaborations on 
the interactions and interfaces between ‘upper’ and ‘underworld’. In the tradition of analysing 
serious crimes for gain, this part of the study has therefore moved beyond analytical debates and 
focused on the modus operandi, networks and different actors involved in economic cartels. 
The results from case study analyses of two different construction cartels demonstrated how 
two different types of collusion emerge under different cultural, economic and regulatory 
conditions.
Case studies from the construction industry in Canada and the Netherlands demonstrated how 
two different systems of collusion developed under different regulatory and cultural conditions. 
The Montréal cartels were a form of exclusive collusion; closed circles of fixed bidders, and 
construction firms outside the cartel were victimised. The construction cartels in the Netherlands 
were a form of inclusive collusion; open to all construction firms, with changing compositions. 
The Montréal cartels were more closed to new entrants, while the Dutch cases demonstrated 
a collective business strategy of the industry as a whole. The latter has to do with the history 
of the construction industry in the Netherlands, in which the combination of enforcement 
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tolerance and the structural character of doing business were considered ‘business as usual’. The 
Dutch construction industry therefore barely had losing or victimised firms within the industry 
as a result of the bid rigging cartels. As opposed to the Canadian construction cartels, where 
some firms were violently threatened not to bid for specific projects.
Differences regarding involvement of violent criminal groups in business cartels between 
The Netherlands and Canada can be explained by the cultural and regulatory conditions 
under which the two cases emerged. Both a strictly criminalised regulatory regime regarding 
business cartels and a highly competitive and predictable tendering procedure with criminal 
opportunities in Canada, explain the involvement of criminal groups with a violent reputation. 
In the Netherlands, the combination of a historically lenient regulatory regime towards business 
cartels and a strong subcultural normalisation of bid rigging throughout the construction 
industry explain the emergence of business cartels without the involvement of organised crime.
If the system of collusion is more closed and dependent on keeping outsiders out (preventing 
newcomers from entering the market) and protecting insiders within the cartel, a demand for 
intimidation is more pressing. This fits the job description of organised criminal groups with a 
violent reputation. Note that this neither means they have ‘infiltrated’ the industry completely, 
nor that they have initiated or forced their services upon the firms involved in illegal bid rigging 
agreements in the construction industry. This was demonstrated in the Montréal cases where 
a symbiotic relationship between criminal groups and collusive business owners existed (cf. 
Gambetta & Reuter 1995; Passas 2002; Van de Bunt, Siegel and Zaitch, 2014). In the Dutch 
inclusive system, there is less natural need for a strong arm to enforce the existing power balance 
of construction firms in the industry. Old industry directors informally coordinated cartels, or 
third parties like secretaries and chairmen functioned sufficiently as regulators or mediators for 
the cartels (cf. Van de Bunt 2010; Hertogh 2010) (also see chapter 2 of this study).
In both cases, scholars have suggested that it was not failing regulations and regulators, or an 
external criminal group alone that sufficiently explains the misconduct in the construction 
industry. In fact, it was the vulnerable system itself that produced the misconduct: “What 
this means is that the collusion problem and the emergence of an organized and centralized 
group of profiteers is a product of the system itself and not, as popular opinion often suggests, 
the strategic creation of an external criminal group that arrives to take control of the process 
at any given time. In short, a vulnerable system begets its own deviant organization and does 
not require a mafia or organized crime presence to organize it” (Morselli et al. 2012, p. 2). 
For the Dutch case, several authors have similarly suggested how the structure and culture of 
the industry and its vulnerabilities contributed to the bid rigging schemes, and not as is often 
suggested regulatory failure alone (Van de Bunt 2008; Van den Heuvel 2005; Vulperhorst, 
2005). However, although collusion between firms was the main focus of this part of the study, 
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both the Montréal and the Dutch case also revealed collusion between construction firms and 
governmental agencies, both local and federal (cf. Reeves-Latour & Morselli 2016; Van den 
Heuvel 2005). The role of the state when it comes to collusion in the construction industry 
cannot to be underestimated. In a sector where financial and economic interests of the state 
are so strongly connected to corporate interests and where governments can be client, project 
developer and regulator at the same time, collusion between government and construction 
firms is a significant risk. However, this falls outside the scope of this study.
1.4 Confessing: why do cartelists confess in exchange for leniency or refrain from 
doing so?
The fourth and final research question refers back to the second part of the central research 
question, namely: how can cartels endure despite increased efforts to discourage and punish 
them? Cartel confessions in exchange for leniency are an essential source for competition 
authorities in detecting cartel conduct. What considerations do cartelists have to confess their 
conduct to the regulator in exchange of leniency or why do they refrain from doing so? How 
do those considerations relate to private enforcement of business cartels? And to what extent do 
cartelists use leniency strategically? In order to answer these questions, the main assumptions 
underpinning leniency policy were compared with the practice of leniency in the Netherlands. 
This part of the study touched upon three main assumptions underpinning leniency policy 
(Stephan & Nikpay 2015): 1) cartelists are rational and unified entities with centralised decision 
making, 2) with accurate and predictable information about the expected benefits of the cartel 
agreements, and 3) deterrent penalties and a credible threat of detection make leniency an 
attractive option for cartelists. These assumptions were confronted with existing empirical 
literature on leniency and a qualitative interview-based study on leniency in the Netherlands.
The results for the fourth research question comprise four main conclusions. First, awareness 
of management in case of cartel infringements diverges between small and large firms. The 
level of social responsiveness and professionalism in terms of compliance and the relationship 
with the law differs between smaller and larger companies. This influences decision-making 
procedures towards leniency, making leniency applications less likely for smaller firms. Second, 
there is a paradox between cartel criminalisation – enhanced enforcement, significantly high 
financial penalties – on the one hand, and fixed collectivistic sentiments and values in business 
cultures on the other. This paradox results in firms gaming enforcement efforts and strategic 
use of regulation. Third, firms use leniency strategically, however in limited ways. Support 
for both selective framing and opportunistic use of leniency was found in the interviews but 
not for more sophisticated strategies suggested by some authors (Harding, Beaton-Wells & 
Edwards 2015; Marx, Mezzetti & Marshall 2015). Fourth, several disincentives make leniency 
an unattractive option for cartelists. Disincentives concerning leniency include: insufficient 
evidence for an application, social control (reactions in the market), cultural objections 
138
Chapter 6 | Conclusion and discussion
(principle based), such as ‘telling on your peers’, the costly and time-consuming internal 
investigations and preparation of leniency applications, and the influence of follow-on civil 
damages procedures after investigations and fines from public competition authorities. Seven 
out of the eleven cartelists that were interviewed for this study decided against leniency. The 
fear of reactions of others in the industry is an important reason to refrain from applying for 
leniency. Respondents pursued leniency in four cases. In two of these cases cartelists indicated 
strategic use to improve their position by hurting their co-cartelists. However, strategic use in 
these cases can be characterised as opportunistic use of leniency; the cartel already ended for 
exogenous reasons.
Regarding the second conclusion, the paradox between criminalisation and collectivistic 
business cultures, the Australian experience with competition enforcement is relevant. Because 
of a lack of both public support and a coherent and unambiguous political approach the cartel 
criminalisation project in Australia failed (Beaton-Wells, Haines 2010). Although the situation 
in the Netherlands with an administrative regulation of cartel conduct seems different, the 
Australian context can prove relevant. The absence of the possibility for criminal prosecution 
is often suggested to negatively influence the effectiveness of leniency. In other words, if firms 
are not sufficiently deterred by severe sanctions, they will be less likely to apply for leniency. 
This argument is then followed by a call for cartel criminalisation, as was the case in the 
Netherlands as well. However, this may be risky. Indeed, empirically the criminalisation-
leniency relationship is poorly understood (Harding et al. 2015). Leniency policy may in fact 
undermine the normative function of criminal law (Beaton-Wells, 2017).
The balance and interaction between compensations and leniency is one of the issues the 
European Commission struggles with (ICN 2014). The EC could try and succeed to better 
involve other stakeholders, such as professional litigation funders and lawyers to incorporate 
their private enforcement efforts against cartels. Private enforcement seems to decrease the 
number of leniency applications and hereby slowing down the public enforcement of cartels. 
However, private and public enforcement of cartels mutually dependant. For example, the 
financial penalty-decision that the Commission and national competition authorities publish 
is the starting point for litigation funders to collect claims and start follow-on damage 
procedures. To that end, public enforcement has leverage over private enforcement, because 
private enforcement depends on public enforcement and not the other way around.
To summarize, the two central conclusions in this analysis were: 1) there are major disincentives 
in the process of deciding whether or not to apply for leniency. This leaves room to speculate 
how many cartels fail to be revealed by leniency policy. Moreover, it brings up for debate the 
dependency of competition authorities on those cases that did result in leniency applicants. 
The dependency of competition authorities on voluntary confessions of cartelists influences 
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the image of cartels that is dominant in both enforcement practice and academic research. In 
criminology, the influence of selectivity in criminal enforcement towards understanding crime 
has been widely discussed. The selection bias particularly influences secondary data sources, 
such as official case-files or confessions. These sources are gathered with the objective of a 
criminal or administrative investigation. The choices and limitations in light of the scope and 
objective of cartel investigations will ultimately also influence the perception and understanding 
of cartels. In that regard, can leniency be seen as regulatory success? Does leniency settle the 
most serious or most harmful cartels? 2) Whistle-blower incentives, like leniency, do not 
operate in a social vacuum. In other words, besides the public enforcement, other stakeholders 
in the process influence the ultimate outcome of these confessions to a large extent. These 
stakeholders are often insufficiently taken into account in the design of regulatory policies, as 
leniency demonstrates.
2. Discussion
2.1 Sociological insights for the study of cartel conduct
This study has shown the value of incorporating insights from (economic) sociology into white 
collar and corporate crime studies, in analogy to organised crime literature. For example, 
understanding the interaction between coordination and secrecy demonstrated how the need 
for effective communication impedes covertness in cartels. Also, the importance of trust was 
demonstrated by the embeddedness of cartel agreements in personal and professional networks. 
This study has hereby proven how insights around cooperation, trust, social and cultural 
embeddedness inform our understanding of the social organisation of corporate crime. This 
study has done so regarding business cartels, to better answer research questions that revolve 
around collective efforts of sustaining cooperation against the law. Once we better understand 
how corporate and white-collar criminals successfully cooperate and avoid detection, we can 
use these insights towards regulation and enforcement of specific types of corporate crime. 
Although one may draw parallels in the operation of criminal networks in organised crime (e.g. 
importance of trust, the use of trust-substitutes, social embeddedness of crime), a difference 
lies in the greater number of opportunities that corporate crime perpetrators have at their 
disposal to shroud their activities in a context of legitimacy. In part, this also explains why 
most organised forms of corporate crimes do not require intimidation or violence in the event 
of conflict. However, recent developments in the mass production of XTC and cannabis in the 
Netherlands, have demonstrated how organised crime may also create a shadow economy. As 
regards corporate criminal conduct, an oblivious or cooperative social environment provides 
practical opportunities for businesses to create and maintain illegal agreements. This may also 
apply to some successful forms of organised crime in illegal markets.
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Trust and a lack of trust both play a role in the nature and structure of cartel agreements. 
Formalisation of cartel agreements − clandestine bookkeeping, minutes of meetings, and rules 
on mutual compensations − can express either mutual trust or a lack thereof. Both elements are 
hard to disentangle, and such an exercise harms the complexity of the social reality of cartels. In 
any case, the results in this study show the essential role trust plays in cartels. This study hereby 
substantiates studies in organised crime. When it comes to literature describing the trade-off 
between concealment and communication, the theoretical implication for the study of organised 
crime is that illegal or criminal networks might not always prioritise for concealment. They can 
operate through elaborate communication and go beyond information exchange according to a 
need-to-know basis, as was demonstrated by the cases described in chapter 3.
Is concealment an explanation when it comes to cartel conduct? Based on this study it seems 
questionable as to whether one can really speak of concealment as an explanation for the 
longevity of organised illegal activity. It is clear that the longevity cannot be explained by only 
studying the means of concealment by cartelists. Most cases can be characterized as a ‘public 
secret’: namely, many people − within and outside the organisations involved − know, or could 
or should know about the activities, but are either disinterested or are reluctant to come forward 
to reveal them or to inform enforcement authorities. Therefore, regulation and enforcement 
of cartels is rightfully directing resources to activating the legal and moral responsibility and 
liability of facilitators and bystanders of cartel agreements.
2.2 European and Dutch context of cartel regulation
This study demonstrated the importance and specificity of the European context of cartel 
regulation and enforcement for the nature, structure and organisation of cartel conduct. Moral 
ambiguity around the wrongfulness of cartels provides opportunities for cartelists to justify 
their cartel agreements and to embed them in existing transactions, corporate structures and 
professional relations. More so than in the US, where there is less moral ambiguity around 
cartel conduct. This study demonstrates less involvement of serious organised crime with 
business cartels in Europe. This can be linked to the positive sentiments connected to cartel 
behaviour in Europe, both in the past and in the present.
Historically, the Netherlands has long been qualified as a ‘cartel paradise’. Up until 1998, there 
was no active enforcement against cartel conduct in the Netherlands. Manpower to address 
competition issues was limited to a few officials at the Ministry of Economic Affairs, who 
mainly dealt with the most excessive market power cases (De Jong 1990). These officials were 
provided with very little resources; hence, their activities were limited. In addition, there was no 
explicit cartel prohibition under Dutch law. The code on Economic Competition (WEM) dealt 
with cartel conduct. However, this code merely provided a provision that prohibited abuse of 
a cartel or market dominance, classifying a criminal offense. A legal provision in the Dutch 
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criminal code also dealt with cartel conduct, but both the provision in the code on Economic 
Competition (WEM) and in the criminal code were hardly used in practice (De Bree, 2006). 
This resulted in a tolerant enforcement climate for cartels in the Netherlands, and during 
roughly 40 years there was no active enforcement of cartels in the Netherlands. Indeed, since 
1962 there was a cartel register at the ministry of Economic affairs. Businesses could get their 
cartel legally registered, to ensure government approved them (cf. Petit, 2017, p. 41-42). The 
rationale behind the register was that it enabled the Ministry to monitor firms would not abuse 
cartels. However, calculated estimates demonstrated that only about half of active cartels were 
actually registered during that time (De Jong, 1990).
Today, cooperation between competitors in a market is still considered positive in certain cases. 
Improving sustainability, ensuring safety and even innovation can be legitimate reasons to allow 
for intensified collaboration between competitors within markets (cf. Claassen & Gerbrandy 
2018). In the Dutch context of this study such positive sentiments connected to cartel conduct 
have certainly influenced cartel conduct. This study demonstrated how (for example) safety 
reasons are mentioned by some cartelists when rationalising their cartel conduct. Cultural 
embeddedness of cartel conduct in certain markets of the Dutch economy was also noted 
in this study. First, the structure of many industries in the Netherlands today is still based 
around cooperation and consensus instead of competition. Many industries and markets have 
powerful market associations representing the interests of businesses. The political system in 
the Netherlands also includes much consideration for different interest groups in the procedure 
of law making and governance. Many industries such as construction, agriculture, and 
transportation have a strong negotiation position in relation to the political process of decision 
making. In addition, some of the case studies and interviews demonstrated how cartel conduct 
was sometimes passed from generation to generation.
3. Methodological strengths and limitations
The research methodology and research sources used to conduct this study have several general 
and specific strengths and limitations. The research materials used for this study can be divided 
into secondary and primary data sources. Secondary data sources contain information that is not 
primarily gathered for scientific research purposes. Primary data sources contain information 
that is collected for the purpose of doing scientific research. Secondary sources used in this 
study consist of 1) private official reports on cartel conduct violations gathered by the Dutch 
competition authority, and 2) public official reports from parliamentary investigations into 
cartel conduct violations. The primary sources used in this study consist of semi-structured 
interviews with insiders, namely 1) Dutch competition authority officials (case managers), 2) 
specialised competition lawyers, 3) in-house legal counsel, and 4) cartelists.
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Several qualitative data sources and research methods were combined in this study. Combining 
research data and methods is also referred to as triangulation of data (Bijleveld 2013). 
Triangulation increases the internal validity of results. Internal validity entails the credibility of 
claims. Internal validity is generally high in qualitative data, because data are well verifiable to 
determine if they measure what they aim to measure (Zaitch, Mortelmans & Decorte 2016). 
Qualitative data is rich data and enables the researcher to check the validity of the material, 
especially when combining data sources and methods of analyses. External validity entails the 
question whether the results of this study can be generalised to a broader population outside 
of the sample used in the study. External validity is generally lower in qualitative research data. 
This has to do with the amount of work and time needed to collect and analyse qualitative data, 
which causes qualitative data samples to generally be too small for generalisation of the result 
outside the sample. Two strategies were used in this study to compensate for the lack of external 
validity due to the research data and methods in this study: 1) results were compared to other 
empirical studies on cartels, 2) results were compared to case studies of detected cases fined by 
the European Commission. Results from the Dutch empirical sample that were substantiated 
by those sources are considered to have a modest measure of external validity outside the scope 
of the Dutch sample of this study.
When it comes to using secondary data sources, researchers deal with selection criteria and 
aims of the regulatory agency that gathered the data. In the case of this study, secondary 
sources were collected both by the Netherlands competition authority and parliamentary 
research commissions. The use of secondary sources leads to several limitations. Detection and 
enforcement objectives create a selection bias in the data. Therefore, the cases do not necessarily 
provide a representative image of all cartel conduct in the Netherlands. Some cartels have 
greater chances of being detected, and cases that involve substantial proof will have a greater 
chance of ultimately resulting in an administrative fine. The statements of corporate officials 
derived from official reports, might express firms’ perspectives but were originally made in the 
course of an administrative procedure. Note that one of the formal legal requirements of finding 
a person or corporation guilty of an infringement is that the effects of the infringement must 
be ‘noticeable’; have a significant effect on the market. This might lead some of the corporate 
officials to deny the ‘real’ effect of any agreements made, as a legal defence strategy, or to under-
report their conduct in general. For more information on the limitations of the use of the 
secondary sources in this study see chapter 2 and 4. In order to address these limitations, the 
secondary data sources were compared and contrasted with interview data. Research data from 
interviews are primary data sources; gathered for scientific research purposes. These interview 
data were used to answer questions that could not be answered through case-file analyses and 
also to nuance and correct the image that emerged from the enforcement data.
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Lastly, the use of semi-structured interviews also has limitations of its own. To correct for 
anticipated social desirability, the interviewer used his extensive research on national cartel cases 
through case studies (see Jaspers 2017). During the course of the interviews, the interviewer 
consequently insisted respondents to go into specific examples from their own professional 
experience to avoid generalizations in their answers. Competition authorities granting access to 
leniency documents, such as direct testimonies, (providing the anonymity of the corporations) 
would improve further insights into the dynamics between cartelists, lawyers, in-house legal 
counsels and the competition authority itself. This can yield a better understanding that 
can prove beneficial towards more effective enforcement strategies. The Dutch competition 
authorities denied such access for the purpose of this study.
4. Avenues for future research
If competition authorities would grant full access to using their enforcement databases for 
the purpose of scientific research, future studies could focus on making these databases 
fit for purpose. By studying specific characteristics of cartels, such as duration, number of 
participants, type of network, type of communication etc., and maintaining these databases. 
Doing this would enable researchers to monitor and report on changes of cartel characteristics 
over time. Documenting this information in using a standardised approach on a national scale 
for several European countries would consequently create possibilities for comparative analyses. 
In addition, these studies could also focus on the effect of significant changes in enforcement 
efforts, strategies and tools both on a national and European level on these cartel characteristics.
Other suggestions for further research include studying the influence of procedural justice in 
the process of leniency applications. Interesting would be to see if and how perceived fairness 
by cartelists and lawyers in these procedures influences the satisfaction with the outcome and 
how this affects potential future applications.
5. Policy implications for cartel enforcement
5.1 Activating the social environment around cartels
Cartels are embedded in their social environment. Therefore, the implication of this study is 
to target enforcement effort towards the institutions and relations in which cartels operate. 
For example, franchise constructions, merger and acquisition processes, market associations, 
and buyers. The social environment of cartel networks is as essential for cartelists in sustaining 
their cartel activities as the network itself. Conscious or unconscious, potential facilitators will 
play a role in the periphery of cartel networks. By activating this ‘silent social environment’ 
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to speak up, one can break down walls of secrecy and promote disclosure of misconduct (Van 
de Bunt 2010). The Dutch competition authority ACM recently took certain steps in this 
area, by launching a public campaign in which more information was presented on the nature 
and effects of business cartels to create awareness and to motivate the public and bystanders 
to speak up and provide authorities with extra tips and complaints about cartel conduct (Het 
Financieele Dagblad, 7 juni 2016). Other competition authorities globally have launched 
similar campaigns (cf. Competition Commission Hong Kong) and many authorities introduced 
educational videos to explain what cartels are and what the negative effects of cartels are (Van 
Erp 2017). These campaigns seem to increase awareness of the rules regarding fair competition 
in targeted industries, but it remains unclear what the precise impact on compliance is.
In conclusion, competition authorities should pay close attention in their public cartel 
enforcement to the existing relational and institutional networks in which cartels operate. 
For example, seemingly legitimate collaborations between competitors in the same market 
could hide an alternative motive. Heightened scrutiny and alertness towards agreements on 
sustainability, safety or exchanging information to promote collective innovations and sharing 
research and development is warranted.
5.2 Aligning private and public enforcement interests
The balance and interaction between private compensations and leniency (part of public 
enforcement by competition authorities) is one of the issues the European Commission struggles 
with. However, the implication of this study is that competition authorities can attempt to 
better coordinate their own interests with those of other stakeholders, such as professional 
litigation funders and lawyers. Private enforcement seems to decrease the number of leniency 
applications and hereby slowing down the public enforcement of cartels. Private and public 
enforcement of cartels are dependent on each other. For example, the financial penalty-decision 
that the Commission and national competition authorities publish is the starting point for 
litigation funders to collect claims and start follow-on damage procedures.
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Summary
This study deals with the shadow side of cooperation; a type of cooperation that is forbidden by 
law because of its negative effects, namely business cartels. Business cartels entail cooperation 
between firms in the same or similar area of economic activity trying to avoid competition 
between them by controlling the market through e.g. fixing prices, dividing customers or 
rigging tender procedures. Conflicts between cartelists, cartelists cheating on agreements or 
cartelists denouncing the cartel to the authorities all form internal threats to the stability of 
business cartels. Such internal threats are more pressing today, now that cartel agreements are 
subject to administrative, private or criminal legal sanctions globally. The existing social-legal 
and criminological studies that focus on the motives and opportunities for cartel agreements 
result in two main conclusions. First, increasing predictability of business and reducing 
risks and uncertainties of a competitive market are important drivers for cartelists to get 
involved in cartel agreements; and illegal conduct is effectively neutralised and rationalised 
by cartelists. Second, motives and rationalisations for cartel conduct are socially embedded in 
collectivistic business cultures that cultivate cooperation, collaboration and anti-competition 
sentiments at odds with (changing) cartel legislation and regulation. In chapter 1, a theoretical 
approach towards studying the social organisation of business cartels is introduced. Central 
to this approach is the assumption that economic action (like cartel conduct) is socially and 
culturally embedded. To understand the organisation of cartels we must study their relational 
and structural embeddedness in society. The concept of trust is important in this approach in 
two ways. First, interpersonal trust between cartelists will prove essential given the absence 
of institutional trust (e.g. legal arbitrations or contracts). Second, trust between cartelist and 
regulator influences the likelihood of cartels being denounced to the authorities by cartelists. 
Competition authorities introduced leniency policies, these offer cartelists the possibility to 
come forward with evidence regarding their involvement in cartel conduct in exchange for 
immunity or reduction of financial penalties. Confessions are the most important source for 
authorities in detecting cartels.
Despite the process of cartel criminalisation in recent decades, cartels that lasted for years, 
sometimes decades are still detected today. This raises the question how and why cartels manage 
to persist, despite increased efforts to discourage them. This research will focus on the question 
how cartelists control their cartel, and how enforcement strategies by cartel authorities influence 
those interactions. The question is: how do cartels manage to endure in illegality? To study and 
operationalise this research question, this study is divided into four sub-questions. These sub-
questions are based around challenges that cartelists need to overcome in order to manage their 
agreements: stabilising, concealing, enforcing and confessing.
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This study employs several qualitative research methods and uses a combination of qualitative 
sources. The results in this study are based on literature review, case-file analysis of official 
documentation and semi-structured interviews. The literature review contains both theoretical 
and empirical studies on cartels from different disciplines including criminology, sociology, 
socio-legal studies, and competition law and economics. The case-file analysis contains: 1) 
private enforcement reports and records of detected Dutch cartel cases, 2) public parliamentary 
investigation reports and records into the construction industry in the Netherlands and 
Quebec, Canada, and 3) public enforcement reports published by the European Commission 
on detected European cartels. The semi-structured interviews are held amongst three categories 
of respondents in the Netherlands: 1) competition authority officials/investigators (in 2012), 2) 
specialised competition lawyers (between 2015-2017), and 3) cartelists (between 2015-2017). 
Cartels face two main internal threats, namely cheating and defection. Cartels are unable to 
formulate binding contracts or resort to legal conflict resolution due to their illegal nature. 
Chapter 2 of this study focuses on the question:
•  How do informal coordinating mechanisms enable cartel stability outside the scope of 
formal legal control and what role does trust play?
Two theoretical models are introduced to deal with this research question; the economic 
perspective and the social perspective. The economic perspective assumes cartel stability can be 
established through retaliation. The social perspective assumes cartel stability is created through 
mutual trust. In the economic perspective cartels can only establish stability by means of a 
system with internal punishment that increases the costs of cheating. This requires cartelists 
to monitor their agreement to detect cheating and instate credible punishments. The social 
perspective focuses on the relation between cartelists and assumes actors are normatively 
motivated instead of focussing on the individual economically motivated actor. This requires 
actors to establish systems of communication and reciprocity to build trust and common 
norms. Both perspectives expect the organisation of cartels to involve systems of coordination 
and monitoring for different reasons. However, the two models expect different responses to 
cheating. The economic perspective expects punishment and retaliation, whereas the social 
perspective expects mediation and negotiation between cartelists. The results demonstrate how 
systems of coordination, monitoring and compensation exist within cartels. Bid-rigging cartels 
use over-pricing, rotating systems and end-of-year compensation by means of discounts or 
evening out disparities with the use of future contracts. Price-fixing cartels use meetings and 
minimum pricelists. Market division cartels use client lists, turnover lists, market sharing lists 
and geographical distributions. Some instances of cheating lead to discussions and conflict 
within cartels. However, breaking up more often seems hard to do for cartelists due to social 
mechanisms that induce social pressure, existing loyalties towards ‘co-competitors’ and 
simply interdependency. The results from chapter 2 thereby confirmed the paradox of social 
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embeddedness: namely, the need to operate secretly forces cartelists to rely heavily on social ties 
through informal means of coordination. Furthermore, mutual rights and obligations make 
parties interdependent, and reciprocity can function as a powerful market mechanism. This 
stabilises and strengthens cartels and makes it hard for firms to end existing agreements. The 
results illustrate the importance of mutual dependencies between competitors and the use of 
informal social mechanisms to build trust and to stabilise cartels. 
Criminal acts committed through collaboration between criminal partners require not only 
concealment but also communication. In light of increasing cartel enforcement concealment 
also proves essential for cartels. The aim of chapter 3 was to answer the question:
•  How are cartels able to remain hidden from outsiders for long periods of time?
In answering this question, both the role of concealment and communication and of trust and 
social embeddedness are addressed to provide possible explanations. Three main expectations 
in chapter 3 are: (1) cartels may not be as centralised and hierarchically organised as in the 
classic image of the ‘secret society’; (2) cartels may not only prioritise for concealment but 
also for effective communication; and (3) it is not isolation from their social environment 
but their (natural) embeddedness that provides an explanation for the longevity of cartels. 
The results in chapter 3 show three main findings. First, to avoid the risk of detection, cartels 
clearly use techniques aimed at concealing their illegal conduct, however cartel participants 
are focused primarily on bringing about well-functioning agreements, and they therefore – in 
a pragmatic manner − communicate frequently and in a centralised manner. Second, the use 
of trust-substitutes and the role of facilitators demonstrate how cartels are strongly embedded 
in their social environment and can emanate from pre-existing professional and personal 
networks. Third, the cases show that the longevity of cartel secrecy is explained not so much 
by concealment or internal control within the cartel as it is by the relational and institutional 
embeddedness of cartels.
The aim of chapter 4 is to investigate why business cartels sometimes do and sometimes do not 
include the involvement of criminal groups with a violent reputation:
•  Why do business cartels sometimes do and sometimes do not involve organised crime? 
Case studies from the construction industry in Canada and the Netherlands demonstrate how 
two different systems of collusion develop under different regulatory and cultural conditions. 
In Montréal the construction cartels take the form of exclusive collusion; closed circles of 
fixed bidders, and construction firms outside the cartel are victimised. In the Netherlands 
the construction cartels take the form of inclusive collusion; open to all construction firms, 
with changing compositions. The Dutch cases demonstrate a collective business strategy. 
This strategy was shared throughout the broader industry. This has to do with the history 
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of the construction industry in the Netherlands, in which the combination of enforcement 
tolerance and the structural character of sharing and dividing projects are considered ‘business 
as usual’. In addition, the Dutch construction industry barely had losing or victimised firms as 
a result of the bid rigging cartels. Relating to the research question, if the system of collusion 
is more closed and dependent on keeping outsiders out – preventing newcomers from entering 
the market – and protecting insiders within the cartel, a demand for intimidation is more 
pressing. This fits the job description of organised crime groups with a violent reputation. 
This is demonstrated in the Montréal cases that illustrate a symbiotic relationship between 
criminal groups and collusive business owners. In the Dutch inclusive system, there is no need 
for a strong arm to enforce the existing power balance of construction firms in the industry. 
Old industry directors informally coordinated the cartels, or third parties like secretaries and 
chairmen functioned sufficiently as regulators or mediators for the Dutch construction cartels. 
In that sense, the Dutch construction cartels are comparable to the cases described in chapters 
2 and 3 of this study.
Chapter 5 of this study deals with the interaction of cartelists with the most important 
enforcement tool in detecting cartels for competition authorities; leniency. The aim of this 
chapter is to compare the main assumptions underpinning leniency policy with the practice of 
leniency in the Netherlands. This chapter touches upon three main assumptions underpinning 
leniency policy: 1) cartelists are rational and unified entities with centralised decision making, 2) 
with accurate and predictable information about the expected benefits of the cartel agreements, 
and 3) deterrent penalties and a credible threat of detection make leniency an attractive option 
for cartelists. These assumptions are confronted with existing empirical literature on leniency 
and a qualitative interview-based study on leniency in the Netherlands. The question of this 
chapter is:
•  What are considerations for cartelists in applying for leniency or refraining from doing so?
These considerations were also related to private enforcement of business cartels. Regarding the 
policy assumptions underpinning leniency, the results of this study comprise four conclusions. 
The first conclusion is that awareness of management in case of cartel infringements diverges 
between small and large firms. The level of social responsiveness and professionalism in terms of 
compliance and the relationship with the law differs between smaller and larger companies. This 
influences their decision-making procedure towards leniency. The second conclusion relates to 
legal-consciousness. There is a paradox between cartel criminalisation – enhanced enforcement, 
significantly high financial penalties – on the one hand, and fixed collectivistic sentiments and 
values in business cultures on the other. This paradox is known to result in strategic use of 
regulation. Indeed, the third conclusion is strategic use of leniency. Support for both selective 
framing and opportunistic use of leniency is found in the interviews. The fourth conclusion 
from the interviews is that there are disincentives in applying for leniency. These disincentives 
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entail: insufficient evidence of the conduct for an application, social control (reactions in 
the market), cultural objections, the costly and time-consuming internal investigations and 
preparation of leniency applications, and the influence of follow-on civil damages procedures. 
More often than not, this makes leniency an unattractive option for cartelists, making them 
decide against leniency.
In chapter 6, the main findings, conclusion are discussed. This study shows the value of 
incorporating insights from (economic) sociology into white collar and corporate crime studies, 
in analogy to organised crime literature. For example, understanding the interaction between 
coordination and secrecy demonstrates how the need for effective communication impedes 
covertness in cartels. Also, the importance of trust is demonstrated by the embeddedness of 
cartel agreements in personal and professional networks. This study hereby proves how insights 
around cooperation; trust; and social and cultural embeddedness, inform our understanding 
of the social organisation of corporate crime. Such an approach allows us to better answer 
research questions around the collective efforts of sustaining cooperation against the law. This 
study answers these questions for the topic of business cartels. Once we better understand how 
corporate and white-collar criminals successfully cooperate and avoid detection, we can also 
use these insights towards regulation and enforcement of specific types of corporate crime. 
Further research could focus on systematically monitoring the main characteristics of business 
cartels. This could track any changes over time as well as monitor the influence of regulatory 
changes and innovations on the characteristics of cartels. Future research could focus attention 
to the role of procedural justice in leniency applications to see if and how perceived fairness 
by cartelists and lawyers in these procedures influences the satisfaction with the outcome and 
potential future applications.
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Nederlandse samenvatting (Dutch summary)
Dit onderzoek gaat over de schaduwzijde van samenwerking. Kartelafspraken zijn een vorm van 
samenwerking die wettelijk verboden is vanwege de negatieve effecten ervan. Een kartel is een 
afspraak tussen bedrijven in dezelfde markt die proberen eerlijke concurrentie en mededinging 
te vermijden door de markt te controleren via bijvoorbeeld prijsafspraken, klantverdelingen 
of aanbestedingsvervalsing. Deze kartelafspraken zijn verboden bij wet en deelnemers van 
kartelafspraken worden geconfronteerd met diverse uitdagingen bij het effectief uitvoeren 
van hun verboden afspraken. Er zijn verschillende interne bedreigingen voor de stabiliteit van 
kartelafspraken, zoals conflicten tussen kartellisten, kartellisten die valsspelen ten aanzien van de 
kartelafspraak, of kartellisten die het kartel als clementieverzoeker bij de mededingingsautoriteit 
melden. De interne stabiliteit van kartels staat tegenwoordig meer en meer onder druk gelet 
op de toegenomen inspanningen wereldwijd om kartels op te sporen en te bestraffen middels 
bestuurs- en strafrechtelijke sancties en de opkomst van privaatrechtelijke procedures omwille van 
kartelschade. De bestaande rechtssociologische en criminologische studies die zich richten op de 
motieven en gelegenheid voor kartelafspraken, leiden tot twee conclusies. Ten eerste vormen het 
vergroten van de voorspelbaarheid van bedrijven en het verminderen van risico’s en onzekerheden 
van een concurrerende markt de belangrijkste drijfveren voor kartellisten om betrokken te raken 
bij kartelafspraken. Illegaal gedrag wordt daarbij door karteldeelnemers effectief geneutraliseerd en 
gerationaliseerd. Ten tweede zijn motieven en rationalisaties voor kartelgedrag sociaal ingebed in 
collectivistische bedrijfsculturen waar samenwerking en concurrentiebeperkende sentimenten die 
haaks staan  op (veranderende) kartelwetgeving en -regelgeving worden gecultiveerd. In hoofdstuk 
1 van dit onderzoek wordt een theoretische benadering geïntroduceerd voor het bestuderen van de 
sociale organisatie van kartelafspraken. Centraal in deze benadering staat de veronderstelling dat 
economisch handelen (zoals kartelafspraken) sociaal en cultureel ingebed is. Om de organisatie 
van kartels te begrijpen, moeten we dus de relationele en structurele inbedding van die afspraken in 
de samenleving bestuderen. Het concept van vertrouwen is daarbij op twee manieren van belang. 
Ten eerste is interpersoonlijk vertrouwen tussen kartellisten essentieel, gelet op het ontbreken 
van institutioneel vertrouwen (via bijvoorbeeld juridische arbitrage of afdwingbare contracten). 
Ten tweede beïnvloedt het vertrouwen tussen de kartellist en de mededingingsautoriteit de kans 
dat kartels door kartellisten aan de autoriteiten worden gemeld middels een clementieverzoek. 
Mededingingsautoriteiten hebben het clementiebeleid ingevoerd. Dit beleid biedt kartellisten de 
mogelijkheid om bewijs aan te leveren met betrekking tot hun eigen betrokkenheid en dat van 
anderen bij kartelgedrag in ruil voor immuniteit of vermindering van boetes. Bekentenissen zijn 
de belangrijkste bron voor mededingingsautoriteiten bij het opsporen van kartels.
Ondanks het toegenomen toezicht en de bestraffing van kartelafspraken in de afgelopen 
decennia, worden vandaag de dag nog steeds kartels ontdekt die jaren, soms zelfs decennialang 
hebben voortgeduurd. Dit roept de vraag op hoe en waarom kartels erin slagen te blijven 
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voortbestaan, ondanks toenemende inspanningen om ze te bestrijden. Dit onderzoek richt zich 
op de vraag hoe kartellisten hun kartelafspraken controleren en hoe handhavingsstrategieën 
door kartelautoriteiten deze interacties beïnvloeden. De vraag is: hoe slagen karteldeelnemers 
erin om kartelafspraken te bestendigen in de illegaliteit? Om deze onderzoeksvraag te bestuderen 
en te operationaliseren is deze studie verdeeld in vier deelvragen. De subvragen zijn gebaseerd 
op uitdagingen die kartellisten moeten overwinnen om hun overeenkomsten te effectueren: 
stabiliseren, verbergen, controleren en bekennen.
In dit onderzoek worden verschillende kwalitatieve onderzoeksmethoden en een combinatie 
van kwalitatieve bronnen gebruikt. De resultaten in dit onderzoek zijn gebaseerd op 
literatuuronderzoek, dossieranalyse en semigestructureerde interviews. Het literatuuronderzoek 
bevat zowel theoretische als empirische studies over kartels uit verschillende disciplines, 
waaronder criminologie, sociologie, rechtssociologie, mededingingsrecht en economie. De 
dossiers bevatten: 1) handhavingsrapporten en boetebesluiten van Nederlandse kartelzaken, 
2) openbare parlementaire onderzoeksrapporten over de bouwsector in Nederland en Quebec, 
Canada, en 3) openbare handhavingsrapporten van Europese kartelzaken gepubliceerd door de 
Europese Commissie. De semigestructureerde interviews zijn gehouden onder drie categorieën 
respondenten in Nederland: 1) zaaksbehandelaren/projectleiders van de Nederlandse 
mededingingsautoriteit (in 2012), 2) gespecialiseerde mededingingsadvocaten en interne 
bedrijfsjuristen (tussen 2015-2017), en 3) kartellisten (tussen 2015-2017).
Kartelafspraken gaan gepaard met twee belangrijke bedreigingen voor de interne stabiliteit 
van deze afspraken, namelijk karteldeelnemers die vals spelen ten aanzien van de verboden 
afspraken en karteldeelnemers die de afspraken opbiechten bij de toezichthouder in ruil voor 
clementie. Vanwege het illegale karakter van de afspraken zijn karteldeelnemers niet in staat om 
bindende contracten te formuleren of hun heil te zoeken in juridische arbitrage in geval van 
onderlinge conflicten. Hoofdstuk 2 van dit onderzoek spitst zich toe op de vraag:
•  Hoe zorgen informele sociale controle- en coördinatiemechanismen voor stabiliteit 
van kartelafspraken bij afwezigheid van formele juridische controle en welke rol speelt 
vertrouwen hierbij?
Twee theoretische modellen worden geïntroduceerd om deze onderzoeksvraag te behandelen: 
het economische perspectief en het sociale perspectief. Het economische perspectief 
veronderstelt dat stabiliteit van kartelafspraken kan worden bestendigd door vergelding van 
schendingen van de afspraken. Het sociale perspectief gaat er vanuit dat kartelstabiliteit wordt 
gecreëerd door middel van wederzijds vertrouwen tussen karteldeelnemers. In het economische 
perspectief kunnen kartellisten alleen stabiliteit van hun afspraken bewerkstelligen door 
middel van een systeem met interne straffen die de kosten van valsspelen verhogen. Dit 
vereist dat kartellisten hun afspraken controleren om schendingen van gemaakte afspraken 
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door anderen te detecteren en deze schendingen op geloofwaardige wijze te bestraffen. Het 
sociale perspectief richt zich meer op de relatie tussen kartellisten en gaat ervan uit dat 
mensen normatief gemotiveerd zijn in plaats van zich te concentreren op de individueel en 
economisch gemotiveerde mens. Dit vereist dat karteldeelnemers communicatiesystemen 
hanteren, waarmee ze wederkerigheid en onderlinge afhankelijk creëren. Hiermee kunnen 
zowel onderling vertrouwen als gemeenschappelijke normen worden opgebouwd. Beide 
perspectieven voorspellen dat de organisatie van kartels om verschillende redenen systemen 
van coördinatie en monitoring bevatten. De twee modellen verwachten echter verschillende 
reacties op schendingen van afspraken. Het economische perspectief voorspelt straf en 
vergelding, terwijl het sociale perspectief bemiddeling en onderhandeling tussen kartellisten 
voorspelt. De resultaten laten zien dat karteldeelnemers systemen voor coördinatie, controle 
en onderlinge compensatie ontwikkelen om hun afspraken te bestendigen. Kartels waarbij 
aanbestedingsvervalsing een rol speelt maken gebruik van prijsverhogingen, roulatiesystemen 
en onderlinge compensaties aan het einde van het boekjaar, door middel van kortingen of het 
wegwerken van verschillen met het gunnen van toekomstige subcontracten (onderaanneming). 
Prijskartels maken gebruik van minimumprijslijsten en van bijeenkomsten waar het prijsniveau 
in de markt wordt besproken. Marktverdelingskartels gebruiken lijsten met klantverdelingen, 
omzetlijsten, vastgestelde marktaandelen en gebiedsverdelingen. In sommige gevallen leidt 
valsspelen tot discussies en conflicten binnen kartels. De resultaten laten echter zien dat het 
vaak moeilijk is voor karteldeelnemers om te breken met de afspraken vanwege onderlinge 
mechanismen die sociale druk veroorzaken, bestaande loyaliteit jegens ‘mede-concurrenten’ 
en ook de onderlinge afhankelijkheid die bestaat binnen markten tussen concurrenten. De 
resultaten van hoofdstuk 2 bevestigen daarmee de paradox van sociale inbedding: de noodzaak 
om in het geheim te opereren dwingt karteldeelnemers om via informele coördinatiemiddelen 
sterk te vertrouwen op onderlinge sociale banden. Bovendien maken wederzijdse rechten en 
verplichtingen partijen onderling afhankelijk van elkaar en fungeert wederkerigheid daarmee 
als een krachtig mechanisme. Dit stabiliseert en verstevigt kartelafspraken en maakt het voor 
bedrijven moeilijk om bestaande overeenkomsten te beëindigen. De resultaten illustreren het 
belang van wederzijdse afhankelijkheid tussen concurrenten en het gebruik van informele 
sociale mechanismen om vertrouwen op te bouwen en kartels te stabiliseren.
Verboden afspraken tussen bedrijven vereisen niet alleen onderlinge communicatie, maar ook 
verhulling. In het licht van de toenemende handhaving van het kartelverbod lijkt het verbergen 
van afspraken voor buitenstaanders ook essentieel voor kartels. Het doel van hoofdstuk 3 is om 
de vraag te beantwoorden:
•  Hoe kunnen kartels lange tijd verborgen blijven voor buitenstaanders?
Bij het beantwoorden van deze vraag wordt zowel de rol van verhulling en communicatie als 
van vertrouwen en sociale inbedding bekeken om mogelijke verklaringen te geven voor de 
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onderzoeksvraag. Drie verwachtingen in hoofdstuk 3 zijn: (1) kartelafspraken zijn misschien 
niet zo gecentraliseerd en hiërarchisch georganiseerd als in het klassieke beeld van ‘secret 
societies’; (2) karteldeelnemers zullen niet alleen prioriteit moeten geven aan verhulling, maar 
ook aan effectieve communicatie; en (3) het is niet isolatie van hun sociale omgeving, maar 
juist de inbedding van kartelafspraken in hun omgeving die een verklaring biedt voor hun 
levensduur. De resultaten in hoofdstuk 3 laten drie hoofdbevindingen zien. Ten eerste, om het 
risico op onthulling van kartelafspraken te voorkomen, gebruiken karteldeelnemers inderdaad 
technieken die gericht zijn op het verbergen van hun illegale gedrag. Echter, karteldeelnemers 
zijn vooral gericht op het tot stand brengen van goed functionerende overeenkomsten en 
communiceren daarom – vanuit pragmatische overwegingen – frequent en op een overwegend 
gecentraliseerde wijze. Ten tweede tonen het gebruik van vertrouwensgaranties en de rol 
van facilitators aan hoe kartelafspraken vaak sterk zijn ingebed in hun sociale omgeving en 
veelal ontstaan uit reeds bestaande professionele en persoonlijke netwerken. Ten derde tonen 
de resultaten aan dat de levensduur van het ‘kartelgeheim’ niet zozeer wordt verklaard door 
verhulling of interne controle binnen het kartel, maar wel door de relationele en institutionele 
inbedding van kartels.
Het doel van hoofdstuk 4 is om te onderzoeken waarom kartelafspraken soms wel en soms 
niet te maken krijgen met de betrokkenheid van georganiseerde misdaadgroepen met een 
gewelddadige reputatie:
•  Waarom zijn er soms wel en soms geen georganiseerde misdaadgroepen betrokken bij 
kartelafspraken?
Gevalsstudies van de bouwsector in Canada en Nederland tonen aan hoe twee verschillende 
systemen van verboden kartelafspraken zich ontwikkelen onder verschillende soorten regelgeving 
en culturele omstandigheden. In Montréal hebben de bouwkartels de vorm van exclusieve 
afspraken; gesloten kringen van vaste bieders controleren de markt en bouwbedrijven buiten 
het kartel worden het slachtoffer van deze kartellisten. In Nederland hebben de bouwkartels de 
vorm van inclusieve afspraken; open voor alle bouwbedrijven, in wisselende samenstelling. De 
Nederlandse kartels laten een collectieve bedrijfsstrategie zien in de hele markt. Deze strategie 
werd gedeeld in de bredere sector en algemeen aanvaard als manier van zakendoen. Dit heeft 
deels te maken met de geschiedenis van de bouwsector in Nederland, waarin de combinatie van 
handhavingstolerantie en het structurele karakter van het delen en verdelen van projecten als 
‘business as usual’ wordt beschouwd. Bovendien kende men binnen de Nederlandse bouwsector 
nauwelijks verliezers of slachtoffers als gevolg van de kartelafspraken. Met betrekking tot 
de onderzoeksvraag: als het systeem van collusie meer gesloten is en afhankelijk is van het 
buitenhouden van buitenstaanders – voorkomen dat nieuwkomers de markt betreden – en het 
beschermen van insiders binnen het kartel, is er een grotere vraag naar controle en intimidatie. 
Dit past in de functieomschrijving van georganiseerde misdaadgroepen met een gewelddadige 
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reputatie. Dit wordt geïllustreerd door de Montréal-zaken waarin een symbiotische relatie 
bestaat tussen georganiseerde misdaadgroepen en bouwondernemers. In het Nederlandse 
inclusieve systeem is er geen behoefte aan een sterke arm om de onderlinge verhoudingen van 
bouwbedrijven in de sector te handhaven. Voormalig directeuren coördineerden daar de kartels 
op informele wijze. Zij traden veelal op als derde partij, in de rol als secretaris of voorzitter 
en functioneerden vervolgens als toezichthouders of bemiddelaars voor de Nederlandse 
bouwkartels. In die zin zijn de Nederlandse bouwkartels meer vergelijkbaar met de kartels 
beschreven in hoofdstukken 2 en 3 van dit onderzoek.
Hoofdstuk 5 van dit onderzoek gaat over de interactie van karteldeelnemers met het belangrijkste 
handhavingsinstrument bij het opsporen van kartels voor mededingingsautoriteiten; de 
clementieregeling. Het doel van dit hoofdstuk is om de belangrijkste aannames die aan het 
clementiebeleid ten grondslag liggen te vergelijken met de praktijk en uitvoering van de 
clementieregeling in Nederland. Dit hoofdstuk gaat in op drie hoofdaannames die ten grondslag 
liggen aan het clementiebeleid: 1) karteldeelnemers zijn rationele en uniforme entiteiten 
met een gecentraliseerde besluitvorming, 2) met nauwkeurige en juiste informatie over de 
verwachte voordelen van de kartelafspraken, en 3) afschrikkende sancties en een geloofwaardige 
dreiging van ontdekking maakt clementie een aantrekkelijke optie voor karteldeelnemers. Deze 
veronderstellingen worden vergeleken met de bestaande empirische literatuur over clementie 
en een kwalitatieve studie gebaseerd op semigestructureerde interviews over de uitvoering van 
de clementieregeling in Nederland. De vraag van dit hoofdstuk is:
•  Wat zijn overwegingen voor karteldeelnemers om al dan niet clementie aan te vragen?
Bij het beantwoorden van de onderzoeksvraag wordt in dit hoofdstuk ook gekeken naar de 
invloed van privaatrechtelijke procedures omwille van kartelschade op de beslissing van het 
al dan niet indienen van een clementieverzoek door karteldeelnemers. De resultaten van deze 
studie vallen uiteen in vier conclusies. De eerste conclusie is dat betrokkenheid bij en wetenschap 
hebben van kartelinbreuken bij het management tussen kleine en grote bedrijven verschilt. De 
mate van sociale responsiviteit en professionaliteit in termen van naleving en de relatie tot 
wet- en regelgeving verschilt tussen kleinere en grotere bedrijven. Dit beïnvloedt ook hun 
besluitvorming met betrekking tot het indienen van een clementieverzoek. De tweede conclusie 
heeft betrekking op het juridische bewustzijn. Er is een paradox tussen kartelcriminalisering 
– verbeterde handhaving en aanzienlijk hogere financiële sancties – enerzijds en vaste 
collectivistische sentimenten en waarden in bedrijfsculturen anderzijds. Het is bekend dat deze 
paradox in andere domeinen leidt tot strategische omgang met wet- en regelgeving. De derde 
conclusie is dat dit ook geldt voor de clementieregeling. Er is sprake van bepaalde vormen van 
strategisch gebruik van de clementieregeling. Ondersteuning voor zowel selectieve framing als 
opportunistisch gebruik van clementie wordt gevonden in de interviews. De vierde conclusie 
uit de interviews is dat er negatieve prikkels zijn om een clementieverzoek in te dienen. 
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Ontmoedigende factoren zijn: onvoldoende bewijs gevonden na intern onderzoek voor het 
doen van een clementieaanvraag, sociale controle (reacties in de markt), culturele bezwaren, 
kostbare en tijdrovende interne onderzoeken en voorbereiding van clementieverzoeken en ook 
de invloed van privaatrechtelijke procedures in navolging van bestuurlijke boetes omwille van 
kartelschade. Dit maakt de clementieregeling veelal een onaantrekkelijke optie voor kartellisten, 
waardoor ze dan ook besluiten om geen clementie te gebruiken.
In hoofdstuk 6 worden de belangrijkste bevindingen en conclusies van dit onderzoek besproken. 
Dit onderzoek toont de waarde aan van het integreren van inzichten uit de (economische) 
sociologie in onderzoek naar fraude en bedrijfscriminaliteit, waarvan de georganiseerde 
misdaadliteratuur al jarenlang heeft aangetoond dat dit een vruchtbare benadering vormt. Door 
bijvoorbeeld de interactie tussen coördinatie en geheimhouding beter te begrijpen, zien we 
dat de behoefte aan effectieve communicatie de verhulling van kartels in praktijk belemmert. 
Het belang van vertrouwen wordt ook aangetoond door de inbedding van kartelafspraken 
in persoonlijke en professionele netwerken. Deze studie bewijst hiermee hoe inzichten rond 
samenwerking, vertrouwen en sociale en culturele inbedding ons begrip van de sociale organisatie 
van fraude en bedrijfscriminaliteit kunnen vergroten. Een dergelijke benadering stelt ons in 
staat onderzoeksvragen rond de organisatie van verboden samenwerkingsverbanden beter te 
kunnen beantwoorden. Dit onderzoek beantwoordt deze vragen voor het specifieke onderwerp 
van kartelafspraken. Als we beter begrijpen hoe fraudeurs succesvol kunnen samenwerken en 
ontdekking weten te voorkomen, kunnen we deze inzichten ook gebruiken voor regulering en 
handhaving van specifieke soorten bedrijfscriminaliteit. Vervolgonderzoek zou zich kunnen 
richten op een systematische monitoring van de belangrijkste kenmerken van kartels door te 
tijd heen. Dit zou mogelijke veranderingen en ontwikkelingen kunnen vastleggen en daarmee 
zou ook de invloed van wijzigingen in regelgeving en handhavingsinnovaties op de kenmerken 
van kartels kunnen worden bestudeerd. Ook zou de aandacht gevestigd kunnen worden op 
de rol van procedurele rechtvaardigheid in clementieverzoeken om te zien of en hoe ervaren 
rechtvaardigheid door kartellisten en advocaten in deze procedures de tevredenheid met de 
uitkomst en potentiële aanvragen in de toekomst zouden kunnen beïnvloeden.
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Appendix I: topic list case-file analysis
1. General
-  Name
-  Code
-  Date (administrative) decision
-  Industry (SBI-code):
i. Relevant market
2. Investigation
-  Cause for investigation
-  Investigation powers and methods used
-  Individual testimonies given/refused
-  Essential evidence
3. Facts and circumstances
-  Summary of facts, behaviour of suspects and circumstances in which they operated (e.g. 
type of cartel conduct, market structure, market culture)
-  Description strategy and structure of agreements (modus operandi)
4. The cooperation unit
-  4.1 Suspects
-  Number of legal persons (LP)
-  Number of natural persons (NP)
-  Data per LP and NP
i. LP: name
ii. NP: name
-  4.2 Network
-  Structure and composition of the cartel, location of conduct, geographical market (local, 
regional. national), type of network (centralised, decentralised) and common market 
share
-  Organisation between cartelists, tasks and roles
-  4.3 Origin of agreements
-  Nature of personal/professional relationships between participants
-  Where, when and how did the agreements commence?
-  Role and characteristics of market association (e.g. meeting point, cover up, 
communication platform)
-  Duration of the agreements
-  Developments within the cooperation and agreements
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-  4.4 Trust
-  How did secrecy or covertness of activities take place?
-  How did participants deal with trust and distrust?
-  Were the agreements known widely within the companies involved?
-  Which control and enforcement mechanisms were in place to enforce the agreements?
-  Was there a form of dispute settlement within the cartel?
-  How were the profits of the cooperation divided between the participants?
-  4.5 Ending of agreements
-  Where, when and how did the agreements end?
-  Causes for ending the agreements (e.g. disputes, new players entering the market, 
breaking/cheating agreements, crisis of trust)
-  Did any of the participants (LP or NP) file a leniency application at the Competition 
Authority?
5. Motives, opportunities and neutralisations/rationalisations
-  Which motives can be identified for the participants? (e.g. economic reasons, financial 
reasons, personal)
-  To what extent did the market structure offer opportunities for the agreements?
-  Which neutralisations or rationalisations were used by participants?
-  Where did these neutralisations or rationalisations apply to (responsibility, damage, 
victims, higher allegiance)
6. Sanction decision and recidivism
-  Which sanction was given to the participants (height of fine)
-  Other directions or informal sanctions given
-  Recidivism; decisions and/or sanctions for any of the participants for past cartel 
agreements
7. Summary
-  Summary in 100 words based on the topics above
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Appendix II: topic list interviews 1
(competition authority officials)
Informed consent and data management
Ask respondents if they agree with the interviewer taking notes during the conversation. Explain 
that these notes serve the purpose of documenting the interview. The notes are anonymised. This 
anonymisation means notes will not contain any retraceable personal information regarding the 
respondent. Explain they might recognize themselves in statements they have made in potential 
future publications of this study. However, third parties will not be able to identify them from 
this information. In other words, their anonymity is not infringed.
1. Origin of agreements
-  How did the participants get acquainted?
-  What was the role of the market association?
-  How did the cooperation and agreements commence?
2. Trust
-  How did the participants hide their conduct and secured secrecy and covertness of the 
agreements?
-  Did participants hide agreements within their own company?
-  How knew of the agreements within the participating companies?
-  Which control/enforcement mechanisms were used by participants?
-  Were there any conflicts and if so, any dispute resolution?
3. Opportunities
-  Which barriers of entry were there for this market?
-  To which extent were the companies in this market mutually dependant?
-  Did participants report any explanations for their conduct?
-  Were there any case-specific conditions that provided an opportunity to participants to 
make and continue their agreements?
4. Ending agreements
-  Did the agreements actually end as far as you know?
-  If so, what was/were the reasons for the agreements to end?
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Appendix III: topic list interviews 2
(competition lawyers, in-house legal counsel and cartelists)
Informed consent and data management
Ask respondents if they agree with an audio-recording of the conversation. Explain that these 
recordings serve the purpose of transcribing the interview afterwards. When the transcription 
is completed, these audio-recordings are deleted. The transcriptions are anonymised. This 
anonymisation means transcripts will not contain any retraceable personal information 
regarding the respondent or their clients. Explain they might recognize themselves in statements 
they have made in potential future publications of this study. However, third parties will not be 
able to identify them from this information. In other words, their anonymity is not infringed.
1. Background
-  Can you tell me something about yourself: function/experience etc.?
-  The firm: size, expertise etc.
-  How is the firms’ practice build up? (Clients/services etc.)
-  How do you advise companies concerning (alleged) cartel infringements?
2. Leniency
-  How often do you advise companies about the leniency program?
-  How often, roughly, do companies actually request for leniency in these cases?
-  Do companies mostly follow your advice in these cases?
-  Concerning the timing of leniency, would you say leniency generally comes before, 
during or after the ending of the cartel?
-  How often, by your knowledge, do cartels generally continue despite of leniency request?
3. Cases
-  Could you walk me through me a few examples of cases in which a company was accused 
of involvement in cartel infringements? Preferably one in which the company decided on 
whether to apply leniency.
While respondents elaborate on these cases I will steer for topics regarding different 
considerations and scenario’s (see below)
4. Factors to apply/not to apply
To apply
-  Perceived chance that other members apply
-  Perceived probability of detection by authorities
-  Perceived probability of detection by third parties (complaints etc.)
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-  Expected fine reduction (only when not A-applicant)
-  Labour dispute
-  Interpersonal (relational issues)
-  Personal grudges/resentment
Not to apply
-  Risk of civil claims
-  Personal reputational loss
-  Firm reputational loss
-  Cartel profits
-  Moral objections (to defection)
-  Distrust in procedures and authorities
-  Strong business relationships
-  Good/positive personal relationships
-  Financial interdependencies
-  Reciprocal relations (mutual depts)
5. Leniency scenarios
-  The destabilising effect (rat race; fear of detection or defection)
-  The opportunistic response (cartel ended)
-  The anticipation effect (preconceived plan; ends cartel)
-  Throwing the bone strategy
Further clarification topic list
Reasons to apply – theoretical scenarios on the use of leniency
The image of leniency that competition authorities generally bring forward in their 
communication is that of a destabilising instrument to end active and current cartels (Van Erp, 
2013). Through the existence of these arrangements, parties will perceive the risk of defection 
by others and if they realise the risks of being caught and receiving substantial fines for their 
actions, they will choose for the safe option to come clean in return for immunity. 
As Levenstein and Suslow (2006) bring forward, the most frequent reason for cartels to fall 
apart are external shocks in the market, e.g. entry of new firms or changes in demand. To 
give an example, the Belgian Beer Brewers cartel failed in January 1998 mainly as a result of 
falling demand, overcapacity and pressures from retailers. The European Commission did not 
start an investigation until six months after raises questions on the notion that the cartel was 
actually disrupted by the leniency notice (Stephan, 2009, p. 544). A study of European cartel 
cases (in which leniency was applied by one or more cartelists) demonstrates 53% of the cartels 
ended before the leniency request was submitted (Stephan & Nikpay, 2015). This suggests 
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that leniency policies do not disrupt these existing cartels per se, but that these cartels might 
have failed already for other reasons. In such a case, firms might have requested for leniency to 
put their former cartel members, now competitors again, at a disadvantage. I will call this the 
opportunistic response.
There is also a variation on this scenario. That is when parties enter into a cartel, or pressure 
others to form a cartel with them, with the preconceived idea to ask for leniency when the cartel 
is up and running. This would entail the cartel as an intentional and planned construction only 
to eventually damage other market players when the firm is the first to ask for leniency, making 
them immune to sanctions. I will call this the anticipation effect of the leniency system. Note that 
this means leniency does end the cartel in this scenario, although being used in a strategic way.
Another scenario in which firms ask for leniency is yet a different strategic option. In this 
scenario, firms might hold a large international cartel agreement and also make an agreement 
on a smaller side market. Now the firms ask for leniency in this small cartel to distract the efforts 
of the authorities and risk of detection in the large cartel. This can be called the throwing-the-
bone strategy.
Considerations that are more general can be; the perceived chance that other members of the 
cartel apply for leniency; expected fine reduction (only when not first applicant); the perceived 
probability of detection by authorities; perceived probability of detection by third parties. 
One might also think of other personal reasons such as; a labour dispute; other interpersonal 
(relational) issues; cartelists that hold a grudge or have resentment against other members of 
the cartel.
Reasons not to apply
There are several reasons for firms not to apply for leniency in case of a cartel. First off, attention 
should be giving to the question how leniency relates to other forms of legal control, especially 
the civil enforcement of competition law. Is there still an incentive for parties when following 
from a leniency request can be a civil claim? The risk of follow-on damage claims because of 
leniency applications can have a serious oppressive effect on the willingness to request for 
leniency.
In addition, one might consider the personal and corporate reputation as a reason not apply. 
Rosenboom (2012) examined the career development of managers confronted with prosecution 
by the Netherlands competition authority. The results show detected cartel infringements have 
a negative effect on the careers of managers in comparison to managers that were not involved. 
When we consider the reputation of the firm because of leniency requests, we can also expect an 
oppressive effect. Empirical analysis of Dutch listed firms for anti-competitive activities by the 
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authorities, shows imposed fines contribute 12% of the total value loss, 55% is due to the loss 
of cartel profits and reputational damages account for 33% of the value loss (Van den Broek, 
Kemp, Verschoor & De Vries, 2012). Therefore, cartelists may not apply for leniency due to 
personal and firm reputation issues. Moreover, drawing further from the results of Van den 
Broek et al., one might consider the cartel profits as a reason not to apply.
Other personal factors may be: moral objections to defection; distrust in procedures and/or 
authorities; strong business and personal relationships; financial interdependencies (collective 
property or mutual assets); reciprocal relations (mutual depts or uncollected compensations).
Abovementioned factors and scenarios are incorporated in the preliminary topic list. This 
functions as a tool to use in semi-structuring the interviews with competition lawyers. Note, 
that room is deliberately left for induction from results that derive from respondents themselves.
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Dutch topic list (original)
Topiclijst | Interviews respondentengroep 2 (mededingingsadvocaten en 
kartelisten)
Mededeling vooraf aan respondenten - vertrouwelijkheid
Na mijzelf kort voor te stellen, vraag ik vooraf aan respondenten op zij er bezwaar tegen hebben 
als ik het gesprek opneem, zodat ik mij volledig op het gesprek kan kunnen richten en het verslag 
achteraf n.a.v. de opnames uit kan werken. Hierbij geef ik aan de opnames te verwijderen zodra 
het verslag is uitgewerkt. Daarnaast geef ik aan dat het verslag wordt geanonimiseerd en details 
die herleidbaar zijn tot de respondent of diens cliënten uit het verslag worden gehouden. Daar 
voeg ik aan toe dat het wel zo kan zijn dat respondenten zichzelf herkennen in uitspraken die 
zij hebben gedaan –in publicaties van resultaten op basis van de gesprekken- maar dat anderen 
hen of cliënten niet zullen kunnen identificeren aan de hand van die uitspraken. Met andere 
woorden, zeg ik toe dat de anonimiteit van respondenten niet zal worden doorbroken. 
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Topics
• ALGEMEEN
- Kun je vertellen jouw functie binnen dit kantoor, je werkzaamheden, jaren ervaring etc.?
- Kun je iets meer toelichten over hoe de praktijk in dit kantoor is opgebouwd?
-  Indachtig een situatie waarin je cliënten bijstaat/advies geeft bij kartelzaken, op welke 
manieren kan zo’n proces in zijn werk gaan? (ad hoc, advisering, compliance etc.)
• AGENCY EN BEWUSTZIJN
-  Met welke partijen hebben jullie uit naam van de onderneming contact?
-  Kun je iets vertellen over welke rol de bedrijfsjurist/bestuurder/compliance adviseur 
speelt in dit proces, welke positie zij innemen?
-  In welke geledingen van de onderneming ligt er wetenschap/verantwoordelijkheid van 
inbreuken in jouw ervaring?
-  Hoe bewust zou je zeggen dat zij zich zijn van het verboden karakter van afspraken die 
kunnen kwalificeren als inbreuk? (denk aan voorbeelden van formalisering van afspraken 
schriftelijk, of juist verheimelijking)
• VOORBEELDEN: AFWEGINGEN CLEMENTIE
-  Indachtig een situatie van bijstand/advisering in kartelprocedure van cliënten, hoe gaat 
de besluitvorming daar en welke afwegingen spelen daarin een rol?
-  Welke afwegingen spelen een rol in het al dan niet gebruik maken van de clementieregeling?
	  Mogelijke factoren wel aanvragen: gepercipieerde kans dat anderen melden, pakkans 
autoriteiten, melden door derden, verwachtte immuniteit/reductie mogelijke boete, 
arbeidsconflict, andere relationele conflicten, persoonlijke rancune
	  Mogelijke factoren niet aanvragen: risico op schadeclaims, persoonlijke/bedrijfsmatige 
reputatieschade, kartelwinsten, morele bezwaren (tegen ‘verraad’), wantrouwen 
jegens autoriteit/procedures, sterke zakenrelaties/persoonlijke relaties, financiële 
afhankelijkheden/verrekeningen etc.
-  Waar ligt het initiatief om de clementieregeling op tafel te brengen/is dit nieuws voor 
cliënten? Hoe ziet dit advies er inhoudelijk uit?:
	 Geven jullie een richtinggevend advies (expliciet voor of tegen clementie)?
	 Wordt jullie advies altijd opgevolgd, waarom wel/niet?
	 Verhouding inbreuken die op tafel liggen en hoeveelheid verzoeken etc.?
-  Wat is het belang van het risico op civiele claims in deze afweging?
-  Is er een onderscheid zichtbaar tussen grote en kleine ondernemingen m.b.t. deze punten?
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• SCENARIO’S CLEMENTIE
-  Tot slot wil ik een aantal mogelijk scenario’s aan je voorleggen die ingaan op de functie 
die de clementieregeling in de praktijk kan hebben, ik vraag je om op deze scenario’s te 
reflecteren.
	 Destabiliseringseffect
	 Opportunistische respons
	 Anticipatie-effect
	 ‘Throwing the bone’-strategie
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Appendix IV: Invitation/request interviews 2
